Operation Rising Lion and the Long War Over Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions: History, Capabilities, and Strategic Consequences

A preliminary analysis

1. Introduction

On 13–14 June 2025, Israel launched Operation Rising Lion, a large scale air and covert strike targeting over 100 Iranian sites—including key nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow, as well as senior IRGC commanders and nuclear scientists. Israel justified the operation by asserting that Iran was mere weeks away from acquiring fissile material for a crude nuclear weapon—a claim reinforced by a recent UN nuclear watchdog finding that Iran had amassed uranium enriched to ~60%, below weapons grade but indicating the likely intent to develop a nuclear weapon or at least a breakout capabilitiy. Iran responded with waves of ballistic missile and drone strikes on Israel, reportedly killing several civilians and marking the first direct exchange of strikes since 1979. This unprecedented escalation threatens to broaden into a wider regional conflagration.

This study, which is a work in progress as the conflict is still ongoing, investigates the origins and progression of Iran’s nuclear ambitions alongside Israel’s strategic calculus, highlighting how recent military confrontation emerges not in a vacuum but from decades of mistrust, technical development, and geopolitical rivalry. Iran’s nuclear journey dates back to the 1950s under the “Atoms for Peace” initiative, later evolving into a clandestine enrichment programmeme that intensified after the 1979 revolution and escalated through the 2000s with the covert acquisition of enrichment capability . International efforts like the JCPOA in 2015 initially curtailed Tehran’s programmeme, yet from 2019 onward Iran systematically expanded enrichment, installed advanced centrifuges, and refuted Western demands—driving a robust defensive posture in Jerusalem and Washington. Israel has long declared its threshold red lines: any Iranian capacity for nuclear breakout is untenable. Precedents like the 1981 Iraq strike and 2007 Syria operation underpin its willingness for unilateral military action. The 2025 strikes underscore a dramatic pivot from shadow conflicts to overt warfare, with consequences reverberating through regional security, non proliferation regimes, and global diplomacy. By tracing Iran’s nuclear programmeme, the historical Israel–Iran security dilemma, and the recent military escalation, this study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of how nuclear ambitions and security fears can drive states into direct conflict—with implications for international law, deterrence theory, and future diplomatic frameworks. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities has remained one of the most significant topics within the field of international security studies since the 1980s. From the clandestine beginnings of its nuclear endeavours in the 1980s to the negotiations for and after the implementation of the JCPOA, the American rejection of the JCPOA under the first Trump administration and efforts to develop an alternative deal, Iran’s nuclear path has consistently engaged policymakers and scholars. The issue of proliferation has once again become prominent due to the onset of the third nuclear age, the growth of a multipolar nuclear system, and the increased roles of new, primarily regional actors. Iran’s continued pursuit of a nuclear technology regime has become a crucial test for the strength of international non-proliferation standards and enforcement. At the same time, efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions have tested the efficacy of tools designed for non-proliferation, such as sanctions, diplomacy, and military deterrence. The subject of Iran’s nuclear programme also has important implications for the security interests of the Middle East, where rivalries between major states such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Turkey have already destabilized the security structure. By centering on the specific case of Iran’s nuclear programme, this research will identify the impact of counterproliferation regimes and regional security on state behaviour.

The ongoing issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions has been among the most defining and contentious topics in international security studies over recent decades. Spanning from early covert nuclear developments in the 1980s to the negotiations and subsequent fallout surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), as well as recent covert operations such as Operation Rising Lion, the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear programme has received sustained attention from policymakers and analysts. This paper investigates the interconnected evolution of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, the international counterproliferation frameworks developed in response, and the shifting security dynamics of the Middle East. Special consideration is given to the role of the JCPOA and covert operations, attempts to negotiate a revival of a nuclear agreement, in shaping both Iran’s strategic decisions and the wider international response to perceived proliferation risks.

Nuclear proliferation in the context of the third nuclear age—marked by a multipolar nuclear order and the entry of new regional actors—has brought renewed scrutiny to the challenges posed by states like Iran. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology continues to test the limits of international non-proliferation norms and enforcement mechanisms. Simultaneously, attempts to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions have exposed the limitations of traditional tools, including sanctions, diplomacy, and military deterrence. The subject holds particular relevance for regional security in the Middle East, where rivalries between key states such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Turkey complicate the maintenance of stability and amplify the consequences of any shifts in Iran’s nuclear posture. By focusing on Iran’s case, this research paper seeks to clarify how state behavior adapts under the layered pressures of international counterproliferation and regional security competition.

The primary aim of this research is to examine how Iran's nuclear capabilities and strategic responses have developed in the context of international counterproliferation efforts and regional security dynamics. The focus is on the implementation, dissolution, and aftermath of the JCPOA, as well as the strategic consequences of Operation Rising Lion. The paper analyzes how these developments have shaped Iran’s present nuclear posture, affected the regional security environment, and influenced the international community’s ability to deter proliferation, while also addressing the wider implications for global non-proliferation norms. The central research question guiding this study is: How have Iran's nuclear capabilities and strategic responses evolved in the context of international counterproliferation efforts and regional security dynamics, specifically in relation to the implementation, dissolution, and aftermath of the JCPOA, providing to context to understand Operation Rising Lion.

The study employs a qualitative research methodology based on an extensive review of academic publications, intelligence documents, policy analyses, and primary sources such as IAEA reports and UN Security Council resolutions. Historical and comparative approaches are used to evaluate the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear programme, the effectiveness of counterproliferation strategies, and the resulting regional security challenges. Particular emphasis is placed on the reliability of source material and a regional security perspective for interpreting Iran’s nuclear decision-making and its interaction with international responses. The research incorporates elements of historical analysis to trace the development of Iran's nuclear programme alongside the international reaction, aiming for a comprehensive understanding of the subject.

Current scholarship on Iran’s nuclear programme reflects a divided consensus. Some analyses identify the JCPOA as temporarily effective by introducing stringent verification mechanisms and rolling back certain nuclear capacities. Others point to the agreement’s limited duration and the unresolved nature of Iran’s long-term nuclear ambitions. The 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA further fractured the international response, leading to debates over the effectiveness of increased economic pressure versus diplomatic engagement.

The following chapters are organized to provide a detailed and systematic analysis. Chapter 2 traces the historical evolution of Iran’s nuclear programme, including pre-revolution aspirations, the post-1979 expansion, and the development of weaponization capabilities. Chapter 3 focuses on the JCPOA era, from the negotiation process and agreement implementation to the consequences of the U.S. withdrawal, the maximum pressure campaign, and European efforts at preservation. Chapter 4 examines Iran’s current nuclear infrastructure and technical advances, including enrichment facilities, centrifuge technology, and missile capabilities. Chapter 5 investigates the strategic implications for regional security, proliferation risks, and shifting power dynamics in the Middle East. Chapter 6 assesses the spectrum of international responses and policy options, from diplomatic to coercive measures, and considers future prospects for global non-proliferation. The conclusion ties together the analysis and addresses the implications for international security studies and ongoing debates in nuclear proliferation research.

2. The Evolution of Iran's Nuclear Programme

Tracing the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear ambitions reveals a complex evolution from early aspirations to sophisticated clandestine activities. This section explores the historical roots, strategic motivations, and international interactions that have shaped Iran's nuclear development, providing essential context for understanding current proliferation risks and regional security dynamics within the broader scope of global non-proliferation efforts.

2.1 Origins and Early Development

This section explores the foundational moments of Iran's nuclear journey, focusing on its early ambitions, international collaborations, and capacity-building efforts that shaped its initial infrastructure. Understanding these origins provides crucial context for analyzing how Iran's nuclear capabilities evolved within a complex global environment. As the groundwork was laid through ambitious projects and strategic partnerships, these early developments set the stage for Iran’s subsequent pursuit of clandestine and strategic nuclear objectives in later years.

2.1.1 Pre-Revolution Nuclear Aspirations

Iran's nuclear programme during the pre-revolution era was characterized by an ambitious vision under the Shah, who sought to establish a comprehensive nuclear power industry. This initiative aimed to generate 23,000 megawatts of electricity and position the nuclear sector as the principal economic institution after oil by 1976, with a substantial budget allocation of $1.3 billion (Ansari, 2014, p. 7; Heinonen, 2013, p. 1). Beyond meeting domestic energy needs, the nuclear programme was integrated into broader national economic planning and modernization goals, reflecting a forward-looking strategy to address global energy security concerns. At a time when the volatility of global oil markets was becoming increasingly apparent, the Shah prioritized reducing reliance on fossil fuels, underscoring the potential vulnerabilities of energy-exporting nations like Iran (Ansari, 2014, p. 7). This intention to diversify energy resources placed Iran's nuclear ambition within a wider context of national economic sustainability and strategic planning.

The strategic importance attributed to the nuclear programme elevated the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) to a pivotal role in national policy, second only to the oil sector (Ansari, 2014, p. 7). The envisioned generation capacity of 23,000 megawatts was a benchmark that would have exceeded the capabilities of many regional counterparts, reflecting Iran’s competitive aspirations within the Middle East (Heinonen, 2013, p. 1). Such ambitious plans framed nuclear technology as a status marker of modernization, placing Iran at the forefront of technological progress in the region. The allocation of significant funding to the nuclear sector highlighted the regime’s intention to secure technological and economic independence, linking the programme not only to energy policy but also to state sovereignty and geopolitical strategy (Ansari, 2014, p. 7). Moreover, this emphasis on nuclear energy prefigured arguments that Iran would later make about the rights to peaceful nuclear technology under international frameworks.

International partnerships formed the backbone of Iran’s initial nuclear developments, fostering collaboration with the United States, France, and West Germany, which provided essential technology and expertise. Key agreements during this period included a 1974 contract with Kraftwerk Union, a West German company, to construct two 1,200-megawatt light water reactors at Bushehr and the establishment of the Tehran Nuclear Research Center in 1967, which operated with a 5-megawatt reactor fueled by highly enriched uranium supplied by the United States (Nikou et al., 2018, p. 1; Heinonen, 2013, p. 1). The involvement of the United States in these developments was emblematic of the Atoms for Peace programme, aiming to promote civilian nuclear technology under controlled conditions to mitigate proliferation risks (Nikou et al., 2018, p. 1). This reflected a broader U.S. strategy to shape Iran’s technological trajectory while maintaining oversight to prevent misuse.

The 1974 agreement with Kraftwerk Union signified Iran's ambition to integrate itself into the global nuclear landscape, leveraging advanced European technology while simultaneously diversifying its network of partnerships. By engaging with multiple international actors, Iran sought to establish redundancy in its supply chains and hedge against the possibility of future geopolitical or alliance shifts (Nikou et al., 2018, p. 1). This approach of fostering inclusivity in foreign training and technology transfer is particularly noteworthy, as it laid the groundwork for Iran's post-revolutionary procurement strategies, wherein diversified supply chains became critical in navigating international sanctions and restrictions (Heinonen, 2013, p. 1). Furthermore, reliance on external expertise and materials, such as highly enriched uranium for research reactors, highlighted the dual-use challenges inherent in nuclear technology. This dual-use dilemma—where the same systems and knowledge could support both civilian and military objectives—would later dominate international counterproliferation concerns and debates about Iran’s intentions (Nikou et al., 2018, p. 1).

The reliance on international cooperation during the pre-revolutionary period set important precedents for Iran’s claims to nuclear technology under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). These collaborative efforts, however, also solidified Western fears about the diffusion of sensitive capabilities to politically sensitive environments. This dynamic introduced the challenge of balancing access to peaceful nuclear technology while mitigating potential security risks, a tension that persists in global non-proliferation efforts. The sponsorship of approximately 250 Iranian students to nuclear centers in the United States and the United Kingdom by 1976 further underscores the strategic emphasis on capacity-building (Ansari, 2014, p. 16). This initiative was a deliberate state investment in human capital, ensuring the cultivation of a skilled domestic workforce that could sustain Iran's nuclear ambitions regardless of changing international circumstances.

These international educational exchanges had profound long-term consequences, including the creation of a cadre of nuclear scientists and engineers with transnational networks. Such informal channels of knowledge transfer became particularly critical after the severance of formal diplomatic ties following the 1979 revolution (Ansari, 2014, p. 16). This strategy also reflects an early recognition by Iran’s leadership that technical mastery is central to safeguarding nuclear sovereignty. By extending beyond simple acquisition of hardware, the cultivation of independent expertise ensured that Iran retained operational control over its nuclear infrastructure. In this light, the strategic focus on domestic capacity-building not only advanced technological ambitions but also served as a hedge against international isolation.

Iran’s state-driven scientific agenda during this period illustrates the broader interplay between technological development, sovereignty, and international relations. The focus on education and research created a legacy of self-reliance, which became increasingly relevant when post-revolutionary Iran faced mounting international isolation. However, despite the ostensibly civilian nature of the Shah’s nuclear aspirations, Western partners, particularly the United States, began expressing concerns about the dual-use potential of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. These anxieties were compounded by evidence suggesting that the Shah viewed nuclear weapons as a potential strategic hedge following India’s 1974 nuclear test, despite Iran’s public commitments to the NPT (Pletka, 2008, p. 2). This dual language of peaceful usage and latent weaponization capabilities set a precedent for future Iranian behavior, including its “hedging” approach in navigating international scrutiny.

The tightening of non-proliferation measures by the United States and Europe during the late 1970s foreshadowed the challenges that would later characterize the JCPOA era. These early concerns about Iran’s transparency and long-term intentions reveal a cyclical pattern of proliferation skepticism. As India’s nuclear advancements catalyzed regional security dilemmas, Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology exemplified the complex relationship between regional competition, state modernization, and global non-proliferation objectives (Pletka, 2008, p. 2). By linking nuclear technology to notions of sovereignty and prestige, the Shah’s programme contributed to a broader discourse on the symbolic importance of nuclear capability.

The Shah’s nuclear programme was ultimately embedded within a broader geopolitical and regional context, wherein nuclear technology served as both a practical tool for energy security and a symbolic marker of modern statehood. These dual motivations—safeguarding economic independence and projecting international prestige—shaped not only Iran’s pre-revolutionary nuclear ambitions but also its subsequent strategic calculations. The nuclear programme’s integration into state modernization efforts provided a template for how post-revolutionary leaders would leverage nuclear technology for both domestic and international purposes. Consequently, the structural continuity in Iranian nuclear policy, from the pre-revolutionary period to the present, reflects enduring regional security dilemmas and the persistent allure of nuclear capability as a hedge against strategic uncertainties (Ansari, 2014, p. 7; Heinonen, 2013, p. 1). Recognizing the historical roots of Iran’s nuclear aspirations provides vital context for understanding the complexities of its current programme and the enduring challenges of counterproliferation.

2.1.2 Post-Revolution Programme Expansion

The Islamic Republic’s initial post-revolutionary approach to nuclear technology represented a complex interplay of ideological influences and strategic considerations. After the 1979 revolution, there was a notable ideological suspicion of Western influence, which initially resulted in a temporary freeze on nuclear activities and the halting of foreign-assisted projects, such as the construction of reactors at Bushehr. This hesitation stemmed from deeply rooted revolutionary sentiments that viewed Western powers, particularly the United States, as neo-imperialist actors seeking to dominate Iran’s technological and scientific trajectory (Ansari, 2014, p. 45). However, this freeze was neither absolute nor enduring, as the practical necessity of securing energy independence and enhancing state security began to outweigh ideological reservations. Internal debates among the Iranian leadership highlighted the strategic benefits of reviving nuclear ambitions. Although the initial pause in nuclear activities was influenced by anti-imperialist rhetoric, it became clear that technological isolation would pose a severe long-term vulnerability for the nascent Islamic Republic.

The devastation caused by the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War emerged as a pivotal turning point, reshaping attitudes toward nuclear technology among Iran's elites. The war underscored Iran’s critical security needs, particularly given Iraq's employment of chemical weapons and the widespread regional and international support for Saddam Hussein. Gulf Cooperation Council countries provided substantial financial backing for Iraq, estimated at approximately $40 billion, exposing Iran's geopolitical vulnerabilities (Ansari, 2014, p. 45). These factors likely reinforced the perception that Iran required more robust mechanisms for deterrence and defence. While the Shah’s nuclear programme had emphasized modernization and prestige, the post-revolutionary revival of nuclear activities was fundamentally framed as a response to existential threats. The war’s impact catalyzed a shift toward a pragmatic reassessment of nuclear technology as an indispensable strategic hedge against both immediate and long-term security challenges.

By the late 1980s, Iran systematically resumed nuclear research, initiating a gradual reconstruction and expansion of its nuclear infrastructure. This period saw the transformation of the nuclear programme into a cornerstone of Iran’s strategy to navigate the region’s shifting geopolitical realities. These efforts also reflected a broader adaptive approach to Iran's post-war Middle Eastern geopolitics, allowing the leadership to position the nuclear programme as a buffer against foreign intervention and regional power asymmetries (Ansari, 2014, p. 45; Tertrais, 2020, p. 3). The resumed nuclear activities were not only motivated by defensive considerations but also by the desire to enhance regime resilience. By embedding nuclear development within a broader narrative of sovereignty and ideological resistance, the leadership aligned the programme with the revolutionary ethos of self-sufficiency and defiance of external pressure. This dual symbolism—scientific progress and deterrence—effectively combined ideological imperatives with practical state security concerns.

Although Iran's revolutionary ideals initially complicated relations with Western states, the leadership pursued clandestine procurement networks to circumvent international embargoes and controls. These networks facilitated access to sensitive nuclear materials and technology critical for the advancement of the nuclear programme. For example, in 1991, Iran acquired significant quantities of nuclear materials from China, including 1,000 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), 400 kilograms of uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), and 400 kilograms of uranium dioxide (UO2) (Albright, 2015, p. 15). Such transactions illustrate Iran’s calculated effort to bypass formal non-proliferation mechanisms and establish a self-sufficient nuclear capability. The clandestine nature of these acquisitions also reveals the ongoing tension between Iran’s public assertions of peaceful intentions and its covert pursuit of capabilities that raised proliferation concerns among international observers.

The development of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure during this period relied heavily on secrecy. Major facilities, such as the Natanz and Fordow enrichment plants, were constructed with the explicit intention of avoiding timely detection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western intelligence agencies (Albright, 2015, p. 2, 15). This deliberate concealment seriously undermined trust in Iran’s nuclear intentions and represented clear violations of its comprehensive safeguards agreement under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By expanding its nuclear activities covertly, Iran not only accumulated the technical means for uranium enrichment but also deepened global concerns regarding its long-term objectives. The pattern of partial and delayed disclosures to the IAEA reflected a calculated strategy of information management, allowing Iran to advance its programme while avoiding decisive international intervention. This approach foreshadowed the challenges that would later dominate arms control diplomacy, particularly during the negotiations over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Iran’s nuclear trajectory during the late 1990s demonstrated a sharpened focus on dual-use technological advancements. The leadership sought to balance civilian claims with the development of latent military options, as evidenced by initiatives like “Project 110,” a covert effort that aimed to manufacture five uranium-based implosion-type nuclear devices by early 2003 (Tertrais, 2020, p. 3). Such projects revealed a clear intention to operationalize a latent weapons capability while maintaining sufficient ambiguity to avoid direct confrontation with non-proliferation mechanisms. Parallel research efforts into plutonium separation, laser enrichment, and high-explosive components for weaponization further blurred the lines between civilian and military applications (Albright, 2015, p. 2; Tertrais, 2020, p. 3). This dual-use strategy not only enhanced Iran’s negotiating leverage but also presented significant challenges for external actors seeking to verify compliance and distinguish between permissible and prohibited activities.

The creation of the AMAD Project institutionalized Iran’s pursuit of military-related nuclear research, consolidating key scientific and technical expertise under a centralized structure. Figures like Mohsen Fakhrizadeh played pivotal roles in coordinating weaponization research within the framework of national nuclear policy (Tertrais, 2020, p. 4). This organizational sophistication underscores the regime’s persistent commitment to capability-building, even under the constraints of international oversight and sanctions. By embedding military dimensions within broader scientific and technical frameworks, Iran effectively exploited gaps in international non-proliferation frameworks, navigating the boundaries of compliance while pursuing strategic objectives. The AMAD Project represents a critical case study in how states can institutionalize expertise to sustain and advance covert programmes under challenging circumstances.

Iran’s investment in human capital constituted a central pillar of its nuclear strategy. Efforts to build technical capacity included the recruitment and training of scientists and engineers, as well as attempts to acquire critical technical components necessary for its enrichment programme. For example, in 2011, Iran attempted to procure 100,000 ring magnets essential for operationalizing IR-1 centrifuges, illustrating the regime’s commitment to achieving self-sufficiency in nuclear technology (Ansari, 2014, p. 16; Albright, 2015, p. 17). These activities highlight the strategic importance of cultivating indigenous expertise, a tactic rooted in both pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary approaches to nuclear capability. By embedding technical knowledge within bureaucratic and military-linked structures, Iran ensured the resilience of its programme against external sabotage, sanctions, and diplomatic pressure (Ansari, 2014, pp. 16, 45; Tertrais, 2020, p. 4).

The resurgence of Iran’s nuclear programme also coincided with advancements in delivery systems, such as the development of the Shehab-3 missile with a range of 1,300 kilometers, capable of carrying nuclear payloads (Inbar, 2006, pp. 4-5). The acquisition of cruise missiles with ranges of up to 3,000 kilometers further enhanced Iran’s ability to project power beyond its immediate region. This strategic linkage between missile development and nuclear infrastructure represented a calculated effort to establish credible deterrence while deterring potential adversaries. The growing sophistication of Iran’s missile programme also amplified international concerns, as it provided the technological foundation for pairing nuclear warheads with advanced delivery systems. These developments introduced additional complications for regional security, fueling an arms race in the Middle East and intensifying the challenges of managing proliferation risks.

In summary, the post-revolution period marked a decisive evolution in Iran's nuclear programme, with the leadership pursuing both practical and symbolic objectives under challenging geopolitical conditions. The transition from ideological hesitation to strategic pragmatism illustrates the regime’s adaptability and its commitment to leveraging nuclear technology for deterrence, resilience, and regional influence. These foundations continue to shape the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the broader international efforts to address the proliferation risks associated with its programme.

2.1.3 International Cooperation and Technology Acquisition

The progression of Iran’s nuclear programme has been significantly influenced by its interactions with international actors, particularly during the pre-revolutionary period when Iran actively sought cooperation with Western states. This phase was marked by extensive engagement with industrialized countries, as Iran pursued ambitious plans to integrate itself into the international nuclear framework. Agreements such as the 1974 contract with Kraftwerk Union, a subsidiary of Siemens, to construct two 1,200-megawatt light water reactors at Bushehr illustrate Iran’s intent to establish itself as a major player within the global civil nuclear order. Through such collaborations, Iran not only gained access to advanced dual-use expertise but also aimed to situate its nuclear ambitions within the context of peaceful civilian energy production. However, the nature of the partnership raised concerns among Western actors, particularly regarding the potential military applications of the transferred technologies. The insistence on mastering the nuclear fuel cycle further intensified these apprehensions and would later serve as a justification for stricter international counterproliferation measures. This period underscores a critical tension: while industrialized nations perceived engagement as a way to moderate proliferation risks and integrate Iran into the regulated nuclear landscape, Iran viewed these relationships as a means to achieve technological independence and strategic self-sufficiency (Nikou et al., 2018, p. 1).

A central element in Iran’s early nuclear strategy was the emphasis on human capital development, as evidenced by the sponsorship of approximately 250 Iranian students who were sent to nuclear research centers in the United States and the United Kingdom by 1976. This initiative highlighted Iran’s foresight in preparing for future scenarios where reliance on external assistance might no longer be feasible due to political tensions or embargoes. By investing heavily in domestically trained nuclear experts, Iran aimed to create a sustainable scientific infrastructure capable of advancing its programme independently of international cooperation. This strategic move laid the foundation for Iran’s resilience in the post-revolutionary period, enabling it to retain crucial nuclear expertise despite being subjected to increasing international isolation after the 1979 revolution (Ansari, 2014, p. 16). While this capacity-building effort bolstered Iran’s long-term ambitions, it also raised concerns about how the knowledge gained through these programmes could later be leveraged to support dual-use projects, illustrating the persistent challenges in balancing educational exchange with non-proliferation safeguards.

The Islamic Revolution brought significant changes to Iran’s approach to international cooperation on nuclear technology, as global restrictions and embargoes forced the country to adopt alternative strategies to sustain its nuclear ambitions. The post-revolutionary period saw a shift from overt partnerships to clandestine procurement networks, enabling Iran to navigate around the limitations imposed by the international community. For example, the unreported 1991 acquisition of large quantities of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), and uranium dioxide (UO2) from China exemplifies Iran’s adaptability in circumventing non-proliferation controls (Albright, 2015, pp. 2, 15). Furthermore, the secret construction of key facilities such as the Natanz and Fordow enrichment plants demonstrated a deliberate strategy of concealment, designed to prevent detection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western intelligence until these projects reached advanced stages. These actions not only exposed vulnerabilities within the global export control regimes but also highlighted the difficulties in enforcing transparency and accountability when states adopt deceptive practices. Iran’s reliance on secrecy, combined with its ability to exploit loopholes in international oversight mechanisms, underscored the limitations of the non-proliferation framework in addressing state-level evasion.

Iran’s engagement in clandestine procurement activities illustrates its systematic approach to acquiring critical nuclear materials and expertise under restrictive conditions. These efforts were accompanied by a pattern of selective disclosure and non-compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements, further eroding trust in Iran’s stated commitment to peaceful nuclear development. The challenges faced by the IAEA in verifying Iran’s nuclear activities during this period serve as evidence of the complex interplay between Iran’s strategic pursuit of autonomy and the international community’s efforts to enforce compliance. The recurring violations and delayed reporting by Iran created significant obstacles for verification and accountability, raising wider questions about the effectiveness of existing non-proliferation regimes (Albright, 2015, p. 2). These challenges reveal the need for more robust mechanisms to address state-level deception, particularly in cases where states pursue dual-use capabilities that blur the line between civilian and military applications.

The expansion of Iranian-Russian cooperation in the 1990s represented a critical pivot in Iran’s strategy to counteract its isolation from Western nuclear suppliers. Russia became an alternative partner, providing Iran with access to advanced military and dual-use nuclear technologies, as well as significant arms transfers. With Iran ranking as the third-largest importer of Russian arms after China and India, total sales exceeded $4 billion from 1992 to 2000, including agreements to train Iranian scientists and military personnel in Russian institutions (Cohen & Phillips, 2001, p. 2). This cooperation extended beyond the supply of hardware to encompass knowledge transfer and long-term technical mentoring, embedding nuclear-relevant expertise within Iran’s domestic institutions. Strategic discussions between Iranian and Russian officials, such as the proposed 10-year arms and technology programme worth over $3 billion, further demonstrated a mutual interest in formalizing this partnership despite Moscow’s commitments to non-proliferation norms (Cohen & Phillips, 2001, p. 3). Iranian efforts to harness Russian expertise highlight the geopolitical dynamics influencing nuclear technology transfers, as states often prioritize economic and strategic incentives over absolute adherence to non-proliferation commitments.

Iran’s procurement strategy also relied on unconventional methods, including front companies and intermediary networks to acquire critical technologies and materials. The attempted purchase of 100,000 ring magnets in 2011 serves as a striking example. These magnets, essential for operating IR-1 centrifuges, emphasized Iran’s commitment to expanding its enrichment capacity despite international sanctions (Albright, 2015, p. 17). Such large-scale procurement attempts underscore the challenges faced by export control regimes in detecting and disrupting covert trade. They also reveal how states can systematically exploit the technical ambiguities inherent in dual-use technologies to further their nuclear objectives. This pattern of opportunistic and systematic acquisitions has important implications for counterproliferation strategies, raising questions about the adaptability and enforcement capabilities of international institutions in addressing evolving procurement tactics.

The broader Middle Eastern context has played a significant role in shaping Iran’s approach to international cooperation and technology acquisition. Regional dynamics have fostered an environment of competitive nuclear advancements, with countries like Egypt pursuing nuclear power projects in collaboration with international partners. For instance, the 2015 agreement between Egypt and Russia to build four nuclear reactors provided a technological model for Iran’s own nuclear infrastructure goals, while also justifying Iranian ambitions as part of a wider regional trajectory (Gerges & Ahmad, 2018, p. 2). This competitive environment exemplifies the logic of technological hedging, wherein states’ actions are influenced by the perceived successes and capabilities of their rivals. Iran’s nuclear advancements have, in turn, heightened regional threat perceptions, contributing to a self-reinforcing cycle of arms and technology races in the Middle East. The interplay between Iran and its regional counterparts highlights the challenges of managing proliferation risks in a context where mutual distrust and security dilemmas drive technological escalation (Gerges & Ahmad, 2018, p. 2).

Iran’s approach to international cooperation and technology acquisition thus reflects a complex interplay of historical precedent, strategic calculations, and regional power dynamics. From proactive engagement with Western states during the pre-revolutionary period to the post-revolution reliance on clandestine networks and non-Western partners, Iran’s strategies underscore its commitment to self-reliance and technological autonomy. These efforts, however, have consistently provoked international skepticism and underscored the inherent difficulties of balancing the peaceful use of nuclear technology with proliferation concerns. The subsequent chapters will further explore the implications of these dynamics within the broader context of Iran’s nuclear programme.

2.2 The AMAD Project and Weaponization Research

This section explores Iran’s clandestine efforts to develop nuclear weaponization capabilities through the systematic development of scientific infrastructure, organization of key personnel, and advanced research initiatives. It highlights how Iran has built a resilient and secretive organization to preserve weaponization knowledge and maintain operational readiness. Understanding these clandestine activities is essential for grasping the broader proliferation challenges and international concerns that permeate Iran’s nuclear trajectory and regional security landscape.

2.2.1 Scientific Infrastructure Development

The development of Iran's scientific infrastructure for nuclear purposes has its roots in significant international cooperation, particularly before the 1979 Islamic Revolution. A key example is the establishment of the Tehran Nuclear Research Center in 1967, which operated a 5-megawatt research reactor supplied by the United States and fueled with highly enriched uranium (Nikou et al., 2018, p. 1). This facility symbolized the commitment of Iran's pre-revolutionary government to building a foundation for nuclear technology, guided by partnerships with advanced industrial powers. The involvement of the United States under the Atoms for Peace initiative reflected not only a global agenda for promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy but also a calculated effort to anchor Iran within a regulated framework of nuclear technology. However, this arrangement also laid the groundwork for Iran’s long-term focus on mastering sensitive nuclear processes that could later be repurposed for military applications, highlighting the dual-use challenge inherent in nuclear science.

The importance of human capital in Iran’s nuclear strategy was evident in the pre-revolutionary sponsorship of approximately 250 Iranian students, who were sent to premier nuclear research centers in the United States and the United Kingdom by 1976. This strategic investment aimed to cultivate a self-sustaining knowledge base, reducing Iran’s dependence on external expertise over time (Ansari, 2014, p. 16). By embedding nuclear education in its state-driven modernization policies, Iran prepared for the eventuality of political or economic disruptions that might limit its access to foreign assistance. The foresight demonstrated by these early initiatives underscores the understanding among Iranian leadership of the indispensability of domestic expertise in achieving and maintaining technological autonomy. However, these educational exchanges also prompted concerns among Western stakeholders about how the scientific proficiency gained by Iranian personnel might later contribute to proliferation risks. This tension invites critical analysis of the limits and unintended consequences of such international collaborations, particularly in politically sensitive environments.

The scientific autonomy achieved during this period became instrumental in post-revolutionary Iran's nuclear advancements. Revolution-era disruptions and subsequent international sanctions necessitated the development of independent nuclear capabilities. Covert facilities such as the Natanz and Fordow centrifuge plants, as well as the Physics Research Center at Lavisan-Shian, became central to centrifuge research, undeclared enrichment activities, and the manufacture of high-explosive components vital for weaponization (Albright, 2015, p. 2; Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1). These sites serve as critical case studies in how states under significant international pressure can construct parallel streams of nuclear development while minimizing external knowledge of their efforts. This approach reflects a calculated strategy to hedge against the possibility of foreign intervention or sanctions by maintaining the ability to continue nuclear advancements in secrecy.

The clandestine nature of these facilities allowed Iran to compartmentalize research and development streams, particularly in areas related to high explosives and centrifuge cascades. This compartmentalization not only insulated specific projects from external exposure but also created a platform for advancing parallel programmes that strengthened Iran’s latent breakout capabilities. The organization of these efforts as part of an integrated national nuclear strategy reveals an intention both to sustain civilian nuclear activities and to maintain the option for military escalation if deemed necessary by political leadership. This dual-use trajectory highlights the enduring challenges for the international non-proliferation regime in verifying the peaceful intent of such programmes.

Iran’s ability to procure nuclear materials through clandestine channels further demonstrates the sophistication of its strategic approach. For example, the 1991 purchase of 1,000 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), 400 kilograms of uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), and 400 kilograms of uranium dioxide (UO2) from China provided critical feedstock for Iran’s enrichment projects (Albright, 2015, p. 15). This acquisition underscores the vulnerabilities in global export control regimes and the difficulties in monitoring the flow of sensitive materials. The fact that Iran was able to incorporate these materials into its nuclear infrastructure at facilities such as Isfahan and Natanz speaks to the centrality of clandestine procurement networks in circumventing international restrictions. This dynamic also raises questions about the adequacy of existing counterproliferation measures in addressing state-level evasion and suggests a need for more integrated intelligence and enforcement mechanisms.

The secret AMAD Plan, launched in the late 1990s and early 2000s, represents a pivotal phase in Iran’s nuclear infrastructure development. The plan, underpinned by facilities such as the Sanjarian site, brought together resources and expertise for the development of a “shock wave generator” and high-explosive testing necessary for nuclear weapon design (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, pp. 1, 12). The AMAD Plan coordinated parallel streams of research and production while maintaining secrecy through a compartmentalized organizational structure. This approach underscores Iran’s advanced state-led methodology, which aimed to consolidate scientific expertise under centralized control while minimizing the risks of external exposure. The deliberate institutionalization of weaponization efforts illuminates the regime’s commitment to preserving technical knowledge and infrastructure as a long-term strategic hedge.

Evidence such as the near-completion of the Shock Generator Project by 2003 and large-scale hemispherical charge experiments supports the view that Iran’s nuclear infrastructure had advanced beyond theoretical research to practical weaponization capabilities (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 12). This transition from foundational to operational research highlights the challenges faced by international enforcement bodies in preempting advanced stages of nuclear development. Iran’s ability to maintain and expand this level of expertise reflects its prioritization of building resilience into its programme, ensuring that the infrastructure remains adaptable to policy shifts or external pressure.

In parallel, Iran achieved significant technical milestones, such as the production of 20 percent enriched uranium by 2010, which signified advanced enrichment capabilities (Nikou et al., 2018, p. 9; Albright, 2015, p. 2). These achievements were facilitated by Iran’s mastery of complex centrifuge technologies and cascade management, which not only improved operational efficiency but also reduced the technical barriers for future nuclear escalation. This proficiency highlights the cumulative impact of decades of investment in scientific infrastructure. The resilience demonstrated by Iran following the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) indicates the integral role of infrastructural development in maintaining nuclear capabilities under adverse conditions.

The wider Middle Eastern context further illustrates the implications of Iran’s nuclear trajectory for regional proliferation risks. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of localized nuclear capacity and investment in small modular reactors represents a parallel effort likely influenced by Iran’s perceived success in nuclear infrastructure development (Ahmad et al., 2019, p. 7). This regional emulation underscores the spillover effect of technological advancements, wherein the diffusion of nuclear infrastructure becomes a strategic necessity for states aiming to hedge against dependency or external coercion. As a result, Iran’s infrastructural achievements contribute to a regional arms race that heightens proliferation risks and complicates efforts to establish arms control measures.

Iran’s development of its nuclear infrastructure thus represents a profound interplay between scientific ambition, strategic pragmatism, and international counterproliferation efforts. The resilience and adaptability of Iran’s scientific and technical infrastructure, coupled with its ability to operate under constraints, have made its nuclear programme a central issue in both regional and global security considerations. These dynamics continue to shape the broader non-proliferation discourse and provide essential lessons for understanding the challenges associated with managing state-level nuclear ambitions.

2.2.2 Key Personnel and Organizations

The personnel and organizational structures within Iran’s nuclear programme have played a pivotal role in its development, especially in areas tied to weaponization research and covert activities. Central to these efforts was the leadership of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who directed the AMAD Project's SNPD division and was responsible for approximately 70% of the project’s most skilled scientific personnel (Tertrais, 2020, p. 4). Fakhrizadeh’s leadership not only centralized technical expertise but also underscored the deliberate strategy of embedding critical knowledge within a secure and hierarchically controlled team. Such centralization minimized the risks of defection or intelligence leaks, which is particularly crucial in proliferation-sensitive research. Fakhrizadeh’s role also highlights the direct military oversight of the nuclear programme, challenging Iran’s assertions of purely civilian objectives. His assassination in 2020 further demonstrated the international perception of individual scientists as critical nodes in nuclear proliferation, while underlining the vulnerabilities of such programmes to targeted counterproliferation measures (Tertrais, 2020, p. 4).

The deliberate recruitment and strategic alignment of personnel under the SNPD division reflect a systematic approach to consolidating Iran’s scientific and technical capabilities. The concentration of top-tier physicists, engineers, and explosives experts into a tightly monitored and secure operational structure exemplifies a dual use of secrecy and specialization, ensuring the programme’s resilience even under external scrutiny (Tertrais, 2020, p. 4). The organizational strategy not only protected sensitive activities from external monitoring but also enabled rapid execution of weaponization research. This organizational approach underscores the importance of state-level planning and discipline in building covert nuclear capabilities. Moreover, the compartmentalized nature of the SNPD’s operations highlights a calculated effort to maintain high-level secrecy, a factor that significantly increased the challenges faced by international oversight bodies. The resilience of such structures also raises important questions about the effectiveness of existing counterproliferation frameworks in addressing not just physical facilities but also personnel networks.

The prioritization of military control over Iran’s nuclear programme becomes evident when examining the decision-making hierarchy and reporting mechanisms within the AMAD Project. Fakhrizadeh and his team operated within a tightly coordinated framework that reported directly to senior political and military authorities. This level of integration between scientists and political leadership ensured that the programme’s objectives aligned closely with state-driven strategic goals, allowing for rapid adaptation to shifts in international dynamics (Tertrais, 2020, p. 4). The operational secrecy and resilience demonstrated by the SNPD division illustrate a troubling model that could potentially inform future proliferation efforts by other states. By blending military oversight with scientific expertise, Iran created an organizational structure capable of withstanding external disruptions, thereby complicating the tasks of intelligence agencies and non-proliferation verification bodies.

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) has been central to the advancement of Iran’s nuclear programme, serving as the primary institution for technology transfer, research coordination, and operational management post-1979 (Cotta-Ramusino et al., 2023, p. 28; Tertrais, 2020, p. 4). The AEOI’s dual-use mandate allowed it to function as a bridge between civilian and military applications of nuclear technology, thereby transferring knowledge and materials across both domains. This dual-use functionality blurs the lines between legitimate research and covert weaponization, presenting significant challenges for international monitoring and compliance mechanisms. The AEOI was instrumental in recruiting and retaining highly qualified personnel, ensuring an indigenous knowledge base that reduced reliance on foreign expertise despite the imposition of international sanctions (Tertrais, 2020, p. 4). The organization’s involvement in both overt and covert activities demonstrates its pivotal role in sustaining the resilience and adaptability of Iran’s nuclear programme. This dual mandate challenges existing international frameworks for distinguishing between peaceful and military nuclear activities, further complicating global non-proliferation efforts.

The AEOI’s involvement in the development of critical infrastructure, including facilities used for covert enrichment and high-explosive testing, highlights its centrality to Iran’s nuclear strategy. By managing supply chains, organizing personnel rotations, and overseeing research compartmentalization, the AEOI secured operational continuity even during periods of heightened international scrutiny (Cotta-Ramusino et al., 2023, p. 28). The organization’s ability to compartmentalize sensitive research and maintain logistical networks allowed Iran to advance its nuclear programme while evading detection. This operational sophistication underscores the institutional strength of the AEOI and its role in embedding covert activities within Iran’s broader nuclear framework. These organizational methodologies reflect a calculated effort to enhance the resilience of the programme, making it increasingly difficult for external actors to disrupt its progress through targeted sanctions or inspections.

The technical achievements of the AMAD Project relied heavily on concentrated expertise at covert facilities such as the Sanjarian site. This facility was integral to the development of critical weaponization components, including the “shock wave generator,” and it served as a hub for advanced testing of exploding bridgewires (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, pp. 1, 12). By focusing on practical experimentation, the Sanjarian site moved beyond theoretical research to achieve hands-on capabilities necessary for nuclear weapon design. This shift from theoretical work to applied experimentation underscores Iran’s progress toward operational readiness. The deliberate compartmentalization of technical work into specialized teams further ensured that knowledge was both protected and retained, minimizing the risk of external exposure while maximizing internal expertise (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1). This approach also reflects Iran’s strategic foresight in creating a “black” infrastructure that could be activated or scaled up as necessary, presenting significant challenges for counterproliferation efforts.

The systematic documentation and preservation of institutional memory within Iran’s nuclear programme, as evidenced by the seizure of the “Atomic Archive” by Mossad intelligence operations reveal the depth of managerial organization in the country’s weaponization activities. The archive contained over 55,000 documents, thousands of handwritten notes, and electronic files, demonstrating a methodical approach to knowledge retention (Tertrais, 2020, p. 2). These records highlight the state’s commitment to preserving technical expertise and methodologies for potential future activation of weaponization projects. The existence of such detailed documentation contradicts Iran’s public denials of military dimensions in its nuclear programme and serves as evidence of deliberate bureaucratization of weaponization research (Tertrais, 2020, p. 2). The meticulous record-keeping practices also pose significant risks for counterproliferation, as they ensure that technical knowledge can be transferred efficiently across generations of researchers. This raises critical questions about the adequacy of current international measures to address latent proliferation capabilities.

Iran’s ability to recruit and train qualified personnel, both domestically and internationally, exemplifies its strategic approach to building a resilient knowledge base. The dispatch of Iranian students and scientists to international research centers, combined with the cultivation of dual-use expertise, strengthened the programme’s capacity to overcome technological embargoes and sanctions (Ansari, 2014, p. 16). For example, the clandestine procurement of key technical components, such as the 2011 attempt to purchase 100,000 ring magnets essential for IR-1 centrifuges, highlights Iran’s proactive strategy for sustaining its enrichment capabilities (Albright, 2015, p. 17). These activities underscore the importance of personnel and material integration in advancing nuclear programmes under restrictive conditions. By embedding foreign-trained experts into sensitive research roles, Iran effectively transferred and adapted advanced methodologies to its domestic context. This strategy not only reinforced Iran’s operational independence but also complicated international verification efforts aimed at monitoring and mitigating proliferation risks.

The recruitment and institutionalization of expertise within organizations like the AEOI have generated persistent challenges for global non-proliferation initiatives. The state’s ability to maintain a stable framework of technical capacity ensures that key knowledge and infrastructure can remain dormant but accessible for reactivation. The bureaucratic discipline demonstrated in the preservation of the Atomic Archive further underscores the durability of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, even in the face of external pressures (Tertrais, 2020, p. 2). This structural resilience presents long-term implications for arms control policies, as it highlights the difficulty of dismantling nuclear expertise once it is embedded within a state’s organizational framework. The combination of robust scientific management, concealed personnel networks, and systematic record-keeping exemplifies a model of nuclear programme organization that challenges traditional counterproliferation approaches.

The persistence of Iran’s nuclear knowledge structures underscores the necessity for comprehensive counterproliferation measures that go beyond monitoring physical material flows. Effective strategies must also prioritize the tracking of personnel movements, organizational hierarchy, and knowledge management practices (Albright, 2015, p. 17; Cotta-Ramusino et al., 2023, p. 28). The adaptability and resilience demonstrated by Iran’s nuclear programme provide crucial lessons for understanding state-level proliferation risks, underscoring the importance of integrated intelligence and enforcement frameworks in addressing the evolving challenges of non-proliferation. This analysis concludes that the organizational strategies employed within Iran’s nuclear programme not only reflect the sophistication of its efforts but also highlight the broader implications for international security and nuclear governance.

2.2.3 Military Dimensions of the Programme

The AMAD Plan’s explicit objective to develop five ten-kiloton, uranium-based implosion-type nuclear weapons by the early 2000s demonstrates a deliberate and systematic pursuit of military nuclear capability, transcending the boundaries of mere dual-use or civilian development. This goal involved comprehensive weaponization research, including the design, testing, and manufacture of critical components such as "shock wave generators," essential for initiating the implosion mechanism of a nuclear weapon. Moreover, preparations for an underground nuclear test site further demonstrate a state-led agenda to achieve operational readiness for nuclear arms acquisition. The structured and purposeful nature of these endeavors challenges narratives suggesting ambiguity or defensiveness in Iran's nuclear ambitions and underscores the need to reconsider perceptions of latent proliferation as a cover for outright military objectives (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1; Tertrais, 2020, p. 3).

The organization of the AMAD Plan into distinct subprojects, such as the "Shock Generator Project," illustrates the extent of Iran's commitment to mastering the technical intricacies of nuclear weapons engineering. Facilities like Sanjarian played a pivotal role, not only in manufacturing high-explosive components but also in conducting advanced experiments, including the use of exploding bridgewires (EBWs). These experiments reflect a depth of technical expertise that extends well beyond theoretical understanding, highlighting Iran’s capacities for the practical application of sophisticated weaponization technologies. Such compartmentalized research and development efforts, spread across multiple facilities, demonstrate a deliberate strategy to reduce the risk of international detection while ensuring uninterrupted progress in militarily sensitive areas (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1). This operational complexity poses serious challenges to the ability of the international community to prevent or monitor covert weapons programmes.

The compartmentalization of Iran's nuclear programme served a dual purpose: safeguarding high-risk activities from external scrutiny and ensuring that advanced weaponization research could be pursued with minimal exposure. This approach underpins Iran’s ability to conduct high-stakes, militarily relevant nuclear research while complicating international verification efforts. By leveraging this organizational structure, Iran was able to make significant advancements in developing dual-use capabilities under the guise of civilian research, underscoring inherent vulnerabilities in treaty-based non-proliferation frameworks. These actions exemplify a broader pattern of state-led strategies to evade detection, challenging the efficacy of existing international policies aimed at curbing proliferation (Albright, 2015, p. 2).

The AMAD Plan exemplifies the concept of latent proliferation, where military dimensions of a nuclear programme are pursued under a civilian pretext. This phenomenon highlights a vulnerability in the global non-proliferation architecture. The scope, organization, and technical output of the AMAD Plan contradict Iran's assertions of peaceful intent and emphasize its strategy of maintaining a latent but rapidly actionable military capability (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1; Tertrais, 2020, p. 3). The structured nature of the programme underscores the intentional preservation of dual-use potential, a growing challenge for treaty-based oversight mechanisms, which often fail to address the blurred lines between civilian and military research.

The sophistication of Iran’s bureaucratic approach to documenting military nuclear research is evident in the institutional rigor and meticulous record-keeping demonstrated within the Atomic Archive. Work plans, organizational hierarchies, and research documentation highlight the systematic embedding of weapons knowledge within state structures, allowing Iran to preserve its ability to restart such activities should political conditions permit (Tertrais, 2020, p. 2). By ensuring the survivability of specialized expertise and technical documentation across generations, Iran has created a form of latent capability that presents a persistent challenge to counterproliferation measures. These practices emphasize the need for more robust international mechanisms to address the preservation and transfer of sensitive knowledge in proliferation-sensitive contexts.

Technical assessments of the AMAD Plan reveal that Iran had advanced beyond theoretical studies into practical experimentation in nuclear weapons construction. By 2003, evidence suggests one successful initiation of a high-explosive charge in a hemispherical shell, a critical step in developing operational implosion-type nuclear devices (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 12). Iran's progress toward functional designs further validates concerns over its technical independence in nuclear weapons engineering. This experimental success highlights the accumulation of critical hands-on expertise within Iran’s scientific community and raises questions about the adequacy of international counterproliferation strategies to identify and disrupt major technical milestones in covert programmes.

The engineering and testing activities surrounding the development of the "shock wave generator" reveal Iran's targeted focus on achieving first-generation nuclear weapon designs. The experimental progress achieved within this context signals a significant step toward operational readiness in weapons production. These advancements directly challenge arguments minimizing the military intent behind Iran's nuclear efforts, underscoring the programme’s highly advanced and goal-oriented nature (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1; Tertrais, 2020, p. 3). The technical milestones accomplished through these activities also serve as critical indicators for intelligence and monitoring agencies in identifying future proliferation risks.

The IAEA’s extensive documentation of Iranian violations, including undeclared enrichment activities, secret uranium imports, and covert military-linked facility construction such as Lavisan-Shian and Sanjarian, provides evidence of deliberate efforts to obscure military dimensions of the nuclear programme (Albright, 2015, p. 2; Wennerberg, 2018, p. 41). These systematic actions reinforce a pattern of intentional non-compliance, exposing the limitations of the IAEA’s safeguards mechanisms in addressing highly organized state-level deception. Such findings necessitate a reevaluation of international monitoring protocols, particularly in contexts where states employ sophisticated concealment strategies.

Iran’s concealment strategies—ranging from delayed reporting to the use of clandestine procurement networks—have provided critical lessons for future non-proliferation policy. The use of bureaucratic and technical sophistication to hide weapons-related activities demonstrates significant vulnerabilities in current counterproliferation frameworks. These practices have informed the development of more intrusive verification protocols, yet the persistence of such violations highlights the continuing need to adapt and strengthen international monitoring mechanisms (Albright, 2015, p. 2). The broader implications of Iran's actions extend to regional policies, as the exposure of these violations has heightened skepticism among Middle Eastern states regarding Iran’s compliance intentions.

In recent years, Iran’s incremental breaches of the JCPOA, including exceeding uranium stockpile limits and resuming advanced enrichment, have reinforced international concerns about its latent nuclear weapons capability. These actions reflect a tactical approach to maintaining flexibility in nuclear policy, using advancements both as leverage against external pressures and as a deterrent to intervention (Tertrais, 2020, p. 7; Wennerberg, 2018, p. 41). The strategic pattern of calibrated non-compliance aligns with Iran’s broader goal of preserving infrastructural and technical resilience, ensuring preparedness for military escalation if deemed necessary.

The JCPOA, while temporarily constraining certain activities, did not fundamentally dismantle Iran’s weaponization potential. Instead, the agreement allowed Iran to retain a state of nuclear latency, in which technical and managerial infrastructure for military purposes is maintained. This deliberate preservation of expertise, coupled with systematic reporting and knowledge retention strategies, underscores the enduring challenges of curbing latent proliferation capabilities through diplomatic measures alone (Tertrais, 2020, p. 7; Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1). Future counterproliferation efforts must account for such latent capabilities to address states’ abilities to rapidly activate nuclear ambitions.

The persistence of Iran’s nuclear knowledge infrastructure poses long-term challenges for non-proliferation efforts. The systematic preservation of technical expertise, as evidenced by the Atomic Archive, represents an institutionalized weaponization capability that can be reactivated in response to shifting security dynamics. This latent potential underscores vulnerabilities in international regulatory strategies, which must adapt to not only physical proliferation risks but also the entrenched organizational frameworks supporting nuclear ambitions (Tertrais, 2020, p. 2). The survival of such infrastructures reflects a broader proliferation risk, signaling the necessity for enhanced safeguards and innovative counterproliferation measures to address the evolving challenges of state-level nuclear latency.

2.3 IAEA Investigations and Western Intelligence

The ongoing challenge of verifying Iran’s nuclear ambitions is deeply intertwined with the capabilities and limitations of international oversight and intelligence efforts. This section examines the complexities of detecting covert activities, compliance violations, and weaponization efforts, highlighting the critical gaps and strategic hurdles faced by the IAEA and Western intelligence. Understanding these dynamics is essential for evaluating the effectiveness of current non-proliferation measures within the broader geopolitical and regional security context outlined earlier.

2.3.1 Verification Challenges and Compliance Issues

The verification challenges and compliance issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme have remained central to international counterproliferation debates, reflecting a complex interplay of intentional opacity, technical sophistication, and geopolitical considerations. Iran’s repeated failure to provide timely and comprehensive disclosures of its nuclear activities is emblematic of longstanding verification hurdles. A notable example is Iran’s secret import of natural uranium from China in 1991, along with undeclared enrichment experiments conducted at facilities such as Natanz and Fordow. These activities directly violated Iran’s obligations under its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Albright, 2015, pp. 2, 15). Such actions underscore a pattern of deliberate non-compliance, highlighting the limitations of existing verification frameworks, which rely heavily on state cooperation. This persistent opacity raises critical questions about the inherent vulnerabilities of such frameworks, particularly when states employ strategic concealment to advance dual-use capabilities.

The covert construction and initial operationalization of enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow exemplify Iran’s approach of reactive disclosure rather than proactive transparency. These sites were revealed through external exposure by Western intelligence agencies rather than Iranian self-reporting, a revelation that occurred only after critical infrastructure had already been completed. By deliberately delaying transparency, Iran undermined confidence in its stated peaceful intentions and created barriers to effective international oversight. Iran’s construction of several other facilities in secret, including the Kalaye Electric centrifuge research and development site, the Physics Research Center at Lavisan-Shian, and the Lashkar Ab’ad laser enrichment facility, further underscores its commitment to clandestine activities (Albright, 2015, p. 2). This reactive strategy not only compelled the IAEA to adopt stricter counterproliferation measures but also underscores the challenges faced by intelligence agencies and monitoring bodies in staying ahead of covert nuclear developments. Moreover, the political and security implications of such revelations further complicate diplomatic engagements, as trust deficits between Iran and the international community deepen.

Iran’s suspension of the implementation of Code 3.1 of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in 2006 further compounded verification challenges by preventing the IAEA from effectively verifying the completeness of Iran’s nuclear material inventories. The suspension was explicitly characterized by the IAEA as inconsistent with Iran’s legal obligations, signaling an additional layer of non-compliance that created significant gaps in verification capabilities (Albright, 2015, p. 3). This development demonstrated the importance of legally binding protocols such as Code 3.1 in enabling effective monitoring. The limitations resulting from Iran’s unilateral actions highlight the need for enhanced enforcement mechanisms to ensure that member states adhere to their obligations. Without such mechanisms, the IAEA's capacity to detect and deter illicit nuclear activities is fundamentally restricted.

The legacy of undisclosed procurement activities and undeclared facilities has entrenched international suspicion toward Iran’s nuclear intentions. Persistent reports of non-compliance by the IAEA have only reinforced this distrust, leading to calls for more robust and intrusive monitoring mechanisms. However, these demands must be critically examined for their feasibility, as the implementation of such mechanisms requires broad political consensus and operational resources that are often difficult to mobilize. Past instances highlight that even enhanced safeguards can be circumvented by states with sophisticated concealment strategies. For example, in 2011, Iranian entities sought to procure 100,000 ring magnets, which were of a dimension specifically suited to Iran’s IR-1 centrifuges, further demonstrating the state’s ability to operate under the radar despite international scrutiny (Albright, 2015, p. 17). Consequently, the ongoing failure to close verification gaps suggests the need for a paradigm shift in how international monitoring bodies address state-level deception.

Iran’s approach to cooperation with the IAEA has been characterized by inconsistency and strategic opportunism, with periods of increased transparency frequently interspersed with abrupt halts to voluntary measures. A stark example came in February 2021, when Iran ceased the implementation of certain JCPOA-mandated access provisions, thereby significantly reducing the IAEA’s ability to monitor sensitive activities (Kerr, 2025, p. 9). Such interruptions expose the frailty of voluntary transparency measures in ensuring consistent, long-term compliance. This intermittent cooperation strategy enables Iran to use transparency as a bargaining tool, leveraging it to gain concessions during diplomatic negotiations. While this tactical approach may offer Iran short-term advantages, it fundamentally undermines the credibility of its claims about the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and complicates the work of monitoring agencies aiming to provide definitive conclusions about compliance.

The halt of voluntary measures, including those related to the Additional Protocol and expanded IAEA access, has had far-reaching implications for international monitoring. The IAEA has openly acknowledged its inability to verify or monitor key nuclear weapons-related activities as a result of these restrictions (Kerr, 2025, p. 9). This admission underscores the inherent dependency of monitoring mechanisms on state cooperation and demonstrates the critical vulnerabilities such mechanisms face when access is curtailed. Until verification regimes are bolstered by provisions that ensure continuity of access, international bodies will remain constrained in their ability to detect and deter covert activities.

Iran’s pattern of partial compliance has allowed the state to wield transparency as a geopolitical tool, scaling back or increasing cooperation in response to external pressures. This strategic use of compliance as leverage has added a layer of complexity to the IAEA’s efforts to assess Iran’s nuclear programme. By selectively revealing information, Iran has shifted the burden of proof onto monitoring bodies, which must continually seek evidence of non-compliance without the benefit of assured access to key sites and materials. This dynamic further illustrates the limitations of current safeguard frameworks and highlights the pressing need for adaptations to address such calculated tactics.

The resulting monitoring gaps have fueled heightened suspicion among regional actors, further exacerbating the already volatile Middle Eastern security landscape. Regional actors, in turn, advocate for more intrusive verification measures, such as real-time monitoring or unannounced inspections, which raise legal and practical concerns about sovereignty and international law. While such measures could potentially address certain verification gaps, they risk intensifying tensions and diminishing the feasibility of multilateral agreements. The interplay between technical shortcomings in safeguard mechanisms and geopolitical mistrust underscores the multidimensional nature of the verification challenge in Iran.

Compounding these challenges are widespread misperceptions about the status of Iran’s nuclear programme, particularly among global publics. Empirical evidence indicates that a majority of respondents in the United States (60%) and nearly half in Europe (46%) mistakenly believe Iran already possesses nuclear weapons (Therme et al., 2022, p. 2). These misperceptions contribute to unnecessary political and security anxiety, creating an environment where perception, rather than technical reality, shapes strategic decision-making. This disconnect complicates diplomatic and policy responses, fueling support for aggressive counterproliferation measures even when evidence does not justify immediate alarm. Addressing this gap between perception and reality is critical, not only for reducing public alarm but also for fostering rational policy discussions grounded in verified facts.

The persistence of such misperceptions further emphasizes the importance of effective communication and outreach by monitoring agencies like the IAEA, which must navigate the dual challenges of technical verification and public confidence building. A lack of transparency in reporting can inadvertently widen the gap between public understanding and the realities of Iran’s nuclear status, reinforcing skepticism toward international monitoring bodies. Enhanced public engagement, involving clear and consistent explanations of technical findings, is necessary to bridge this divide and build broader support for measured and evidence-based policy approaches.

Iran’s efforts to preserve weapons-related documentation and expertise, exemplified by the “Atomic Archive,” reflect a deliberate approach to maintaining a latent nuclear weapons capability. The archive, containing tens of thousands of pages of detailed technical documents, underscores Iran’s intention to sustain knowledge that could easily be reactivated if strategic conditions evolve (Therme et al., 2022, p. 7). This practice raises fundamental questions about the adequacy of current counterproliferation frameworks in addressing latent proliferation. While the preservation of such records is not in itself a violation, it underscores the weakness of frameworks that focus solely on physical material and infrastructure rather than the broader organizational and technical capacities underpinning proliferation risks.

The sophisticated procurement networks utilized by Iran to bypass sanctions and acquire sensitive materials further expose the limitations of current enforcement mechanisms. For instance, Iran’s ability to maintain a robust knowledge and weapons-related framework despite sanctions highlights its strategic and bureaucratic agility (Albright, 2015, p. 17). These strategies demonstrate the necessity for more intelligence-led enforcement measures and underscore the adaptability of states like Iran in mitigating international restrictions.

The broader geopolitical context surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme compounds the difficulty of verification and compliance. Regional arms races, spurred in part by Iranian advancements, have motivated other Middle Eastern states, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, to explore nuclear-capable infrastructure. This dynamic creates a reciprocal opacity, where mutual suspicion drives states to adopt hedging strategies that further complicate international monitoring (Bacanovic et al., 2017, p. 221). The cyclical nature of these arms races necessitates a reevaluation of verification measures to ensure they are adaptable to the evolving security environment.

The verification and compliance challenges presented by Iran’s nuclear programme illustrate the profound limitations of current international technical measures, particularly when divorced from resilient diplomatic frameworks. As shifting political contexts further undermine traditional safeguards, the development of hybrid approaches that integrate technical, diplomatic, and intelligence strategies is essential for addressing the proliferation risks posed by Iran and similarly advanced states.

2.3.2 Evidence of Weapons-Related Activities

As has been mentioned before, The capture of the "Atomic Archive" provided a wealth of direct documentary evidence, shedding light on Iran’s systematic engagement in weapons-related nuclear activities. Contrary to Iran's public assertions of exclusively peaceful nuclear pursuits, the archive's contents, comprising 114 folders with over 55,000 pages and an additional 50,000 digital files, illustrated the existence of an organized and bureaucratically managed programme. This evidence exposes a programmematic focus on weaponization, including nuclear warhead design, high-explosive experiments, and work on neutron initiators, which are critical components of nuclear armaments (Tertrais, 2020, p. 2). The meticulous documentation of these activities signifies not only technical progress but also strategic intent, challenging claims that Iran’s programme is merely dual-use and highlighting inherent weaknesses in the global non-proliferation framework’s ability to detect and address covert operations of this scale.

Examination of the seized documents revealed detailed plans, personnel assignments, and internal reporting mechanisms, demonstrating how Iran invested heavily in institutional continuity. This continuity ensured the preservation of critical expertise and methodologies essential for future weapons development (Tertrais, 2020, p. 2). Such deliberate institutionalization indicates a long-term strategy for sustaining latent weaponization capabilities, insulating the programme from international pressure and potential sanctions. This form of bureaucratized knowledge retention questions the efficacy of treaty-based non-proliferation measures, which often focus on physical infrastructure rather than the equally critical organizational underpinnings of proliferation activities.

The discovery of the archive, stored in a secure warehouse with 32 large safes housed in mobile containers, underscores the regime's commitment to secrecy and operational flexibility. This calculated effort to consolidate and safeguard sensitive materials highlights the potential for rapid relocation or reactivation of knowledge and infrastructure in response to evolving external pressures (Tertrais, 2020, p. 2). This operational secrecy raises concerns about the structural vulnerabilities of current counterproliferation systems in addressing not only institutional opacity but also the logistical agility demonstrated by nuclear programmes operating under covert guises.

Technical assessments by both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western intelligence agencies corroborate that Iran’s covert nuclear activities extended beyond theoretical exploration into practical, weapons-oriented experimentation. By 2003, Iran had conducted significant high-explosive tests, including the initiation of hemispherical charges crucial for the development of implosion-type nuclear devices (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 12). Such progress reflects advanced technical capabilities, calling into question the adequacy of international safeguards to detect and mitigate covert military nuclear projects. Iran’s progress parallels tested designs in other nuclear-armed states, underscoring that its programme was not at the initial stages but rather at an advanced level of operational readiness.

Experimental efforts surrounding the manufacture and testing of the "shock wave generator," a key component for detonating nuclear devices, signify yet another stage of Iran’s technical expertise. The development of this highly specialized technology further indicates a move from basic research toward practical implementation. The implications of this advancement extend beyond Iran’s borders, as it challenges existing non-proliferation mechanisms and reinforces skepticism surrounding Tehran’s stated commitments to peaceful nuclear research (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1).

Evidence points to the integration of Iran’s civilian and military sectors, particularly under the umbrella of the AMAD Plan’s Project 110, which aimed to consolidate expertise by bringing together scientists, engineers, and explosives specialists dedicated to weaponization goals (Tertrais, 2020, p. 4; Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 3). This overlapping personnel structure exemplifies a dual-purpose strategy, enabling Tehran to exploit the blurred lines between civilian and military research frameworks. The orchestration of such efforts calls for a reconsideration of counterproliferation strategies, which have historically struggled to address the seamless intersection of civilian and military activities in contexts like Iran’s nuclear programme.

Iran’s latent capability for rapid weaponization is further supported by the preservation of expertise and infrastructure necessary for key processes, such as the development of high-explosive lenses and initiation systems. These activities were strategically maintained, even after overt weaponization efforts were reportedly suspended, ensuring that Iran retained a foundational ability to restart military applications of its nuclear programme if required by changing geopolitical circumstances (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1). This endurance highlights significant gaps in counterproliferation efforts, as latent capabilities present a long-term challenge to international security.

The IAEA has extensively documented multiple violations of Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement, particularly prior to 2004. These include undeclared enrichment experiments, the secret procurement of uranium, and the concealed operation of military-linked nuclear facilities such as Natanz, Fordow, and Lavisan-Shian (Albright, 2015, p. 2). These systemic breaches demonstrate a deliberate strategy of opacity, allowing Iran to circumvent international oversight mechanisms. The consistent nature of such violations reinforces the limitations of existing verification frameworks, which are heavily reliant on state reporting, and underscores the necessity for more intrusive and independent monitoring protocols.

In addition to these undisclosed activities, Iran engaged in a wide range of sensitive nuclear operations, from plutonium separation and laser enrichment to clandestine technical procurement, further obfuscating its intentions and complicating international monitoring efforts (Albright, 2015, p. 2). The deliberate non-disclosure of uranium imports and technology transfers also highlights Tehran’s capacity for strategic deception, raising doubts about the robustness of the IAEA’s safeguards to detect and deter similar actions by other states.

Iran’s unilateral halt of voluntary measures under its Safeguards Agreement, such as its suspension of Code 3.1 in 2006, further restricted the IAEA’s ability to verify undeclared facilities and activities (Albright, 2015, p. 3). These actions created significant gaps in international verification and underscore the importance of binding legal obligations for ensuring compliance. The failure to address these gaps through enhanced protocols highlights the structural deficiencies of the current global non-proliferation regime, which must be reinforced to counter future unilateral breaches of verification agreements.

Western intelligence assessments align with IAEA findings, concluding that Iran’s government-directed military entities pursued nuclear weapons development activities until at least late 2003 (Albright, 2015, p. 5). These coordinated efforts included the concealment of sensitive procurement and facility construction, further revealing Iran’s extensive strategy to maximize ambiguity in its nuclear programme. This deliberate opacity exemplifies the broader challenge facing counterproliferation tools reliant on trust and transparency, which are often undermined by states employing sophisticated concealment measures.

Iran’s procurement strategies also reflect a deliberate effort to maintain operational capacity despite international sanctions. For example, in 2011, a state-linked trading company attempted to procure 100,000 ring magnets for centrifuge use, demonstrating an intent to scale enrichment capabilities substantially (Albright, 2015, p. 17). Such actions illustrate Tehran’s strategic foresight in circumventing supply chain vulnerabilities and preserving core components necessary for nuclear advancements. These activities underscore the importance of intelligence-led enforcement measures in identifying and disrupting covert procurement networks.

Iran’s dual-track approach to engagement with the international system further complicates counterproliferation efforts. Periods of compliance and transparency, such as those observed during JCPOA negotiations, have been used tactically to consolidate gains in civil and military nuclear sectors. Meanwhile, incremental violations, like exceeding uranium enrichment limits, serve as strategic tools to increase negotiating leverage or deter external intervention (Tertrais, 2020, p. 7). This balance between compliance and defiance underscores the complexities of addressing latent proliferation risks, which extend beyond material controls to encompass broader strategic considerations.

Despite the exposure of weapons-related activities and international agreements like the JCPOA, Iran’s preservation of technical infrastructure, expertise, and documentation continues to pose a persistent proliferation risk. The knowledge base and infrastructure captured by Israeli intelligence demonstrate how such latent capabilities can be rapidly reactivated in response to shifting political or security dynamics (Tertrais, 2020, p. 7). Coupled with this is Iran's strategic use of regional instability to exert influence. For example, its involvement in external conflicts during the 2010s consolidated its image as a central regional actor capable of leveraging diverse conventional and unconventional methods, mirroring earlier strategies embedded in its geopolitical tradition (McInnis, 2017, p. 21). This enduring capability highlights fundamental weaknesses in the current international regime, underscoring the necessity for more adaptive and integrated approaches to counter emerging threats.

2.3.3 Technical Assessments and Findings

Technical assessments confirm the resilience and sophistication of Iran’s nuclear programme, characterized by a persistent pattern of clandestine facility construction and concealment of activities from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran’s nuclear programme has continually contradicted its obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), as evidenced by the secret development of key enrichment facilities such as Natanz and Fordow. These facilities only came to light through international exposure, not Iranian transparency, further eroding global confidence in the peaceful intent of the programme (Albright, 2015, p. 2; Kerr, 2025, p. 9). This deliberate cultivation of a latent nuclear weapons option raises critical questions about treaty compliance and reflects broader shortcomings in international non-proliferation monitoring systems. Analyzing this, it becomes evident that Iran’s deliberate opacity is not merely a function of technical sophistication but also of a strategic state behavior aimed at hedging against diplomatic and security risks. This dual-track strategy demands a reassessment of how the global community addresses latent proliferation threats, particularly in instances where a robust civilian infrastructure can be rapidly converted for military purposes.

The accumulation of enriched uranium in Iran, significantly exceeding Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) thresholds, remains a focal point of technical evaluations. By 2022, Iran had amassed over 4,500 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride enriched above 2% U-235, including notable quantities enriched to 5%, 20%, and 60%—all far beyond the JCPOA’s 3.67% cap (Kerr, 2025, p. 29; Samore, 2022, p. 4). Such stockpiles reflect not only technical progress but also a deliberate intensification of Iran’s enrichment activities as a political instrument to exert leverage over international actors. The strategic implications of these advancements are profound, as they reduce Iran’s breakout time—the period needed to produce weapons-grade fissile material—while also signaling defiance of international norms. Critically, this tactic challenges the efficacy of international agreements in containing enrichment thresholds over time, revealing the fragility of relying solely on voluntary compliance mechanisms without robust enforcement protocols.

The discovery of advanced weaponization expertise and the analysis of the Iranian Nuclear Archive has provided irrefutable evidence of Iran’s significant technical achievements. The archive revealed meticulous documentation of technologies critical for nuclear weapons development, such as the "shock wave generator" for implosion-type devices and the completion of high-explosive tests (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, pp. 1, 12; Albright, 2015, p. 2). These findings demonstrate that Iran’s nuclear programme extends well beyond enrichment capabilities, encompassing the managerial and technical competencies necessary to transition rapidly to nuclear weapons production if a political decision were made. This raises a troubling question about the adaptability of existing counterproliferation frameworks, which are largely designed to detect and deter material transfers but often fail to address the organizational and intellectual underpinnings of weaponization.

Iran’s attempt in 2011 to procure 100,000 specialized ring magnets for its IR-1 centrifuges illustrates the scale of its enrichment ambitions and its capacity to circumvent export controls (Albright, 2015, p. 17). The magnitude of this procurement effort highlights Iran’s long-term strategic planning in expanding its enrichment infrastructure. This procurement also exposes critical vulnerabilities within global export control systems and demonstrates the need for intensified multilateral cooperation to disrupt illicit supply chains. Furthermore, it underscores the adaptability and persistence of states with determined nuclear ambitions, raising concerns about the limitations of current enforcement mechanisms.

The cessation of JCPOA-mandated voluntary transparency measures in 2021 has significantly weakened the IAEA’s abilities to monitor Iran’s nuclear programme, raising the risk of undetected activities in enrichment and weaponization (Kerr, 2025, p. 9). Iran’s withdrawal from these provisions highlights a broader pattern of leveraging compliance as a bargaining chip in negotiations while pursuing parallel advancements in its nuclear programme. This tactical use of selective compliance poses a severe challenge to both technical verification and diplomatic trust-building processes. The erosion of IAEA access underscores the urgent need for more binding and enforceable transparency measures, coupled with proactive intelligence-led approaches to mitigate the consequences of such tactical shifts.

Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium and its incremental increases in enrichment levels have drastically reduced its breakout time for producing a nuclear weapon. Technical assessments now estimate that a single weapon’s worth of highly enriched uranium could be achieved in just one week, with the capacity for additional weapons within months (Samore, 2022, p. 4; Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 13; Kerr, 2025, p. 29). Such projections not only raise alarms about the immediacy of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions but also highlight the inadequacies of international response mechanisms in addressing rapid escalation scenarios. This reality necessitates a shift in counterproliferation strategies, moving away from reactive frameworks to more anticipatory and preventive approaches.

The ongoing evolution of Iranian centrifuge technology, exemplified by the development and operation of advanced models like the IR-6 and IR-8, further complicates non-proliferation efforts (Heinonen, 2013, p. 4; Albright, 2015, p. 2). These centrifuges, which operate with significantly greater efficiency than earlier models, enhance Iran’s ability to produce enriched uranium more rapidly and efficiently. Iran’s continued technological advancement, despite JCPOA restrictions, illustrates the limitations of phased agreements in containing scientific innovation. This underscores the need for counterproliferation strategies that go beyond limiting infrastructure to address the underlying drivers of technological progress in states pursuing nuclear latency.

Iran’s robust technical infrastructure, encompassing advanced centrifuge technology, explosive testing, and research on neutron initiators, ensures the maintenance of a latent weaponization capability (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1; Albright, 2015, p. 2). Latent capabilities of this nature present persistent challenges for international monitoring efforts, as they enable Iran to maintain a strategic ambiguity that complicates enforcement and trust-building initiatives. This ambiguity calls for an innovative rethinking of counterproliferation frameworks that address not only physical assets but also the institutional and intellectual foundations of such programmes.

The link between Iran’s nuclear and missile programmes has profound implications for regional security dynamics. Neighboring states, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have begun to align their security postures and, in some cases, pursue their own nuclear capabilities in response to Iran’s advancements (Russell, 2003, pp. 11, 13). This reactive proliferation risks fueling a regional arms race, where perceptions of imbalance exacerbate security dilemmas. The challenge for international policymakers lies not only in addressing Iran’s programme but also in managing the ripple effects of its advancements on regional instability and the proliferation of nuclear-related technologies.

The transformative impact of Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities on regional security cannot be overstated. As Iran’s breakout capability becomes more tangible, states in the region are increasingly adopting hedging strategies, including the procurement of advanced missile systems and the exploration of nuclear-capable infrastructure (Russell, 2003, p. 11; Samore, 2022, p. 3). This regional reaction creates a feedback loop of escalating militarization, further complicating efforts to stabilize a volatile security environment. The interplay between technical advancements and strategic uncertainties underscores the need for a comprehensive approach that integrates arms control, regional diplomacy, and robust international oversight.

Iran’s ability to recover and advance its nuclear programme despite sabotage and international agreements is a testament to the resilience of its technical infrastructure and organizational systems (Albright, 2015, p. 2; Samore, 2022, p. 3). This adaptability challenges the notion that episodic agreements can sufficiently dismantle proliferation pathways. Instead, enduring and integrated frameworks are required to address both the technical and strategic dimensions of this persistent challenge.

The durability of Iran’s nuclear knowledge base, as demonstrated during intervals of reduced activity, reinforces the importance of robust verification and monitoring regimes. Comprehensive assessments show that even during the JCPOA period, Iran preserved the scientific expertise and organizational structures necessary for rapid escalation if necessary conditions arise (Albright, 2015, p. 2; Samore, 2022, p. 3; Kerr, 2025, p. 29). This continuity highlights the limitations of agreements that focus on physical infrastructure while neglecting latent capabilities and long-term proliferation risks.

Iran’s nuclear capability illustrates the broader concept of latent proliferation as a strategic bargaining tool. By maintaining technical proficiency and an ambiguous nuclear posture, Iran has managed to influence international negotiations and regional debates without overtly crossing the threshold of weaponization (Albright, 2015, p. 2; Kerr, 2025, p. 9). This insight underscores the need for international counterproliferation efforts to adopt a more nuanced understanding of strategic latency and its implications for global and regional security.

3. The JCPOA Era and Its Aftermath

The subsequent analysis examines the diplomatic and policy developments following Iran’s nuclear negotiations, focusing on the key agreements, verification mechanisms, and enforcement challenges that shaped the international response. As the geopolitical landscape evolved with the U.S. withdrawal and rising tensions, these sections explore the successes, shortcomings, and long-term implications of attempts to curb proliferation through multilateral diplomacy, sanctions, and regional cooperation. Ultimately, this discussion situates Iran’s nuclear trajectory within the broader framework of global non-proliferation efforts, regional security dynamics, and strategic policymaking.

3.1 Negotiation and Implementation

This section explores the diplomatic frameworks and mechanisms that have shaped Iran’s nuclear negotiations, focusing on key agreements, verification protocols, and enforcement strategies. It highlights how international cooperation and trust-building efforts have aimed to curb proliferation while addressing the inherent challenges of compliance and compliance verification. Positioned within the broader context of global non-proliferation efforts, this discussion underscores the complexities and limitations of diplomatic diplomacy in managing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

3.1.1 Key Agreement Provisions

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015, represented a significant effort to limit Iran’s nuclear capabilities while balancing non-proliferation objectives with Iran’s insistence on its right to peaceful nuclear research. Central to the agreement were stringent limits on Iran's nuclear activities. Among these were caps on the number and type of centrifuges Iran could install, restrictions on uranium enrichment levels, and a maximum cap on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium. These measures targeted the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, aiming to prevent Iran from accumulating sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon. By limiting Iran to first-generation IR-1 centrifuges and requiring the secure storage of more advanced centrifuge models under international monitoring, the JCPOA effectively constrained Iran’s capacity for rapid uranium enrichment. Through this, the agreement significantly reduced Iran’s breakout time, ensuring that any diversion from peaceful activities would be delayed, detectable, and open to international scrutiny. However, these measures, while effective in the short term, also revealed the limitations of non-permanent restrictions, which could be undermined by political shifts or strategic recalculations by involved parties (Singh, 2015, p. 2; Babar et al., 2021, p. 2; Robinson, 2023, p. 2).

The restriction limiting uranium enrichment to 3.67% was specifically designed to keep Iran’s nuclear activities well below the threshold required for weapons-grade material, which necessitates uranium enriched to 90% U-235. This level was not only consistent with civilian nuclear energy purposes but also strategically chosen to prevent Iran from crossing the red line into weaponization. By restricting enrichment to such a low level, the JCPOA sought to eliminate any ambiguity surrounding the programme’s intentions. While this provision temporarily assured the international community of the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear work, it also underscored the inherent challenge of distinguishing between civilian and potential military applications in nuclear programmes. Despite the low cap, the knowledge and technical expertise retained by Iran remained a latent concern for proliferation experts, as it left open the possibility of a future escalation in enrichment activities if constraints were lifted or abandoned (Babar et al., 2021, p. 2; Robinson, 2023, p. 4).

The cap of 300 kilograms on Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium further reinforced the physical limits on its ability to produce a nuclear weapon. This ceiling, combined with requirements to ship excess stockpiles abroad or dilute them, ensured a tangible reduction in the material available for potential weaponization. This aspect of the agreement reflected a direct effort to address one of the most critical proliferation concerns: the accumulation of a sufficient quantity of enriched uranium to support a breakout scenario. However, as with other provisions, the long-term efficacy of this restriction depended on continuous verification and enforcement mechanisms. Without such safeguards, critics argued that Iran could bide its time, accumulate materials covertly, or exploit the sunset clauses embedded in the agreement to rebuild a larger stockpile once restrictions expired (Robinson, 2023, p. 2; Babar et al., 2021, p. 2).

Another key element of the JCPOA was Iran’s commitment to refrain from constructing new enrichment facilities for 15 years and to restrict enrichment activities to the Natanz facility. This limitation mirrored the broader strategy of confining Iran’s nuclear programme within specific parameters in order to increase transparency and manage the proliferation risk. However, this provision also highlighted the reliance on Iran’s ongoing cooperation to sustain compliance. With external monitoring heavily dependent on declared sites, any undisclosed facility could undermine the agreement’s foundational premise. Moreover, the singular focus on Natanz, while practical, arguably overlooked the potential for Iran to pursue covert enrichment activities elsewhere, a concern that has been at the forefront of counterproliferation debates (Singh, 2015, p. 2).

The JCPOA’s phased approach to restrictions, particularly in research and development on advanced centrifuges, reflected a careful balance between Iranian demands for technological progress and international objectives to limit proliferation risks. While Iran was permitted to continue developing more efficient centrifuge models, the deployment of these advanced technologies was delayed for several years. This compromise allowed Tehran to preserve its scientific expertise while simultaneously reducing the immediate risk of proliferation. Nonetheless, this aspect of the agreement was not without its critics, who pointed to the dangers of enabling Iran to retain a pathway to future nuclear advancements. By allowing technological progress to continue, the agreement arguably left open a door for Iran to scale up its nuclear capabilities once the restrictions expired, particularly given the absence of permanent prohibitions on the use of advanced centrifuge models (Singh, 2015, p. 2).

The sunset clauses embedded within the agreement added another layer of complexity. By design, these clauses set defined timeframes for the expiration of several key restrictions, effectively creating a predictable timeline for Iran to regain greater nuclear autonomy. While the phased expiration of limits was intended to incentivize compliance by offering a pathway to normalization, it also fueled concerns about Iran’s long-term intentions. Critics argued that the sunset provisions would allow Iran to gradually rebuild a more advanced and expansive nuclear programme, raising the specter of renewed proliferation risks. This issue became a focal point for opponents of the deal, including regional actors such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, who viewed the sunset timeline as a key weakness that undermined the agreement’s durability as a non-proliferation instrument (Singh, 2015, p. 2).

Iran’s insistence on preserving its broader economic interests under the JCPOA contributed to a significant increase in its international trade relations during the years following the agreement’s implementation. For example, bilateral trade between Iran and Russia saw a dramatic resurgence, increasing by 44.9% in 2022. This marked a noticeable shift from predominantly agricultural goods to more industrial products, reflecting Iran’s growing strategic emphasis on industrial and technological exchanges. Such developments raise broader concerns about secondary proliferation risks, as increased trade in industrial goods could indirectly aid the growth of Iran’s latent technological capabilities, which have implications for both civilian and military domains (Ceccatelli, 2023, p. 4, 5). These trends, coupled with the infrastructural development within Iran, such as the construction of 200 kilometers of transportation corridors and plans for an additional 400 kilometers of railways, highlight the role of economic normalization in augmenting Iran's strategic positioning (Ceccatelli, 2023, p. 5). These developments reinforce the argument that sanctions relief must be carefully calibrated to prevent unintended consequences, such as bolstering Iran’s capacity for future proliferation-related activities.

Further scrutiny has been directed at the JCPOA’s verification regime, which mandated unprecedented levels of access and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This included continuous surveillance of declared facilities using advanced technologies such as online enrichment monitors, ensuring real-time oversight. While these measures substantially improved upon previous verification frameworks, they were not without limitations. Iran’s right to limit access to undeclared sites under certain conditions, combined with a procedural delay of up to 24 days for access requests, created vulnerabilities within the system. Critics noted that clandestine nuclear activities could be concealed or sanitized within this window, potentially allowing Iran to evade detection even under an otherwise robust verification regime. This procedural gap underscored the inherent challenge of ensuring absolute transparency in a politically charged environment (Robinson, 2023, p. 2; Singh, 2015, p. 2).

Beyond technical verification, the JCPOA also tied compliance to an extensive sanctions relief package, granting Iran significant economic incentives to adhere to its commitments. These incentives, including the reintegration of Iran into global financial markets and the resumption of oil exports, offered tangible benefits that underscored the potential for cooperative diplomacy to yield constructive outcomes. However, the temporary nature of some provisions, particularly those related to ballistic missile development, left notable gaps in the agreement’s scope. For instance, while nuclear restrictions were robust and well-defined, missile-related sanctions were only partially addressed and later transitioned into nonbinding language. This uneven treatment of proliferation pathways fueled skepticism about the agreement’s comprehensiveness, particularly among regional adversaries and arms control experts who viewed missile development as an equally critical threat (Singh, 2015, p. 3; Robinson, 2023, p. 1).

Moreover, the slowly phased expiration of critical restrictions built urgency into the JCPOA’s diplomatic timeline. This design incentivized both Iran and international actors to optimize their strategies within the deal’s framework before the expiration of key provisions. While this structure created opportunities for constructive engagement during the agreement’s early years, it also planted the seeds for future contention. The predictable timeline for restriction expirations not only shaped diplomatic calculations but also amplified concerns that temporary measures could generate recurring crises as expiration dates approached. Such dynamics underscored the inherent tension between achieving immediate compromises and ensuring long-term non-proliferation objectives.

The JCPOA provisions reflected a careful balancing act between technical safeguards, economic incentives, and political compromise. While the agreement successfully delayed Iran’s breakout capability and created a framework for cooperative verification, it also exposed the limitations of relying on temporary solutions to address inherently long-term challenges. This tension between the agreement’s near-term successes and its structural vulnerabilities shaped subsequent debates over its adequacy as a non-proliferation tool, setting the stage for ongoing challenges in addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

3.1.2 Verification Mechanisms

The verification mechanisms established under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) represented a significant enhancement to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) ability to monitor Iran’s nuclear programme. By instituting continuous surveillance of declared nuclear facilities, the agreement expanded monitoring to cover the entire nuclear supply chain, including uranium mines, conversion plants, and enrichment installations. This comprehensive approach marked an unprecedented step forward in non-proliferation efforts, directly addressing Iran’s history of concealment and non-compliance with international safeguards (Persbo & Chalmers, 2015, p. 3; Albright, 2015, p. 2). However, despite its ambitious scope, the regime also faced criticism for its limitations, particularly regarding its reliance on Iran’s cooperation and the potential for gaps in monitoring undeclared activities.

One crucial improvement in the JCPOA verification regime was its response to earlier failures in detecting undeclared nuclear activities. Historically, Iran successfully concealed critical sites, such as the Natanz and Fordow enrichment facilities, and imported nuclear material from China without detection by international monitoring systems (Albright, 2015, p. 2; Albright, 2015, p. 15). These precedents influenced the JCPOA’s design, which obligated Iran to fully declare its nuclear-related supply chain, from extraction at uranium mines to enrichment processes. Routine access for IAEA inspectors was mandated to assess declared inventories and verify material accountancy, significantly reducing the opacity that had previously hindered oversight (Persbo & Chalmers, 2015, p. 3). Nevertheless, the agreement’s success was predicated on Iran’s continued compliance with these obligations, leaving open the possibility of future concealment efforts.

The expanded scope of verification under the JCPOA aimed to minimize Iran’s ability to covertly “break out” of its non-proliferation obligations. By subjecting the entire nuclear fuel cycle to routine scrutiny, the agreement sought to close gaps that had enabled the accumulation of enriched uranium for potentially illicit purposes. Regular monitoring of uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment activities targeted core vulnerabilities exploited in the past, thus reducing opportunities for undetected diversion (Persbo & Chalmers, 2015, p. 3; Albright, 2015, p. 2). However, questions about the sufficiency of these safeguards persisted, with experts noting that Iran’s technical sophistication and history of evasion could still permit small-scale, undetected activities within its complex nuclear infrastructure (Albright, 2015, p. 2; Singh, 2015, p. 2).

The introduction of a managed-access protocol for inspections of suspect undeclared sites was another key component of the JCPOA’s verification mechanisms. This protocol allowed Iran up to 24 days to comply with IAEA inspection requests, balancing sovereignty considerations with the need for transparency (Singh, 2015, p. 2; Albright, 2015, p. 3). While this measure represented a step forward in intrusive monitoring, critics argued that the delay provided an opportunity for Iran to sanitize facilities before inspections, undermining the regime’s effectiveness. Historical examples, such as the concealment of enrichment activities at Natanz and weaponization-related tests at Lavisan-Shian, underscored the risk that determined proliferators could exploit these procedural windows to evade detection (Albright, 2015, p. 2). The potential for rapid and sophisticated concealment raised significant concerns about the ability of environmental sampling and material detection technologies to conclusively verify compliance within such constraints (Singh, 2015, p. 2).

The managed-access approach, while innovative, also exemplified the broader tension between technical verification capabilities and political realities. By attempting to balance the inspection process with considerations for Iranian sovereignty, the system remained vulnerable to exploitation. Critics highlighted that the credibility of the mechanism ultimately depended on Iran’s willingness to cooperate and the IAEA’s capacity to enforce compliance effectively (Singh, 2015, p. 2). This vulnerability was compounded by the risk of political constraints on the IAEA’s mandate, potentially limiting the agency’s ability to act decisively in cases of non-cooperation (Albright, 2015, p. 3). Without robust enforcement mechanisms, the managed-access framework risked becoming another example of insufficiently enforced non-proliferation commitments.

One of the JCPOA’s most notable advancements was the deployment of advanced surveillance technologies, including online enrichment monitors and real-time camera systems, at enrichment facilities such as Natanz and Fordow. These technologies enabled continuous monitoring that significantly enhanced the IAEA’s capacity to detect anomalies or irregularities in enrichment activities. Tamper-proof seals, video surveillance, and automated enrichment level measurements provided inspectors with near real-time data, allowing for more efficient detection of any deviations from declared activities (Persbo & Chalmers, 2015, p. 3; Albright, 2015, p. 2). The integration of these technologies marked a departure from the limitations of prior agreements, which lacked the technological resources to provide such granular oversight.

Enhanced material accountancy checks complemented the use of surveillance technologies, further reducing the risk of diversion. By routinely cross-referencing declared inventories with material flows throughout the supply chain, the JCPOA created a system that could detect discrepancies more reliably than earlier frameworks (Albright, 2015, p. 2). This approach directly addressed vulnerabilities exploited by Iran in the past, including undeclared enrichment activities and unreported procurement efforts. However, the effectiveness of these measures depended on Iran’s continued cooperation and the IAEA’s ability to maintain unfettered access to key facilities. The suspension of voluntary transparency measures by Iran in February 2021 illustrated the fragility of this arrangement, demonstrating how political shifts could undermine even the most advanced verification systems (Albright, 2015, p. 2).

Despite these innovations, the JCPOA’s reliance on temporary provisions and sunset clauses introduced notable long-term vulnerabilities into the verification regime. Central restrictions on the number and type of centrifuges, enrichment levels, and uranium stockpile size were designed to phase out after 10 to 15 years, creating a predictable timeline for the erosion of these constraints (Singh, 2015, p. 2). Critics argued that this gradual removal of restrictions would enable Iran to rebuild its nuclear infrastructure with minimal warning, particularly if monitoring measures were simultaneously reduced. This concern was further amplified by the preservation of Iran’s technical expertise, which ensured that it could rapidly resume sensitive activities if political conditions permitted (Albright, 2015, p. 2).

The sunset clauses also had broader implications for regional dynamics, as neighboring states such as Israel and Saudi Arabia anticipated a future erosion of restrictions. This anticipation fueled hedging strategies and policy uncertainty, contributing to an increasingly militarized and unstable security environment in the Middle East (Albright, 2015, p. 2). Moreover, the structural design of the sunset provisions incentivized unilateral measures by regional actors.

Regional distrust of Iran’s compliance also stemmed from its record of clandestine activities, including the procurement of centrifuge components and unreported material imports. These activities repeatedly evaded detection by international agencies, highlighting critical gaps in pre-JCPOA monitoring systems (Albright, 2015, pp. 2, 15, 17). The interplay between these historical precedents and the limitations of the JCPOA’s verification framework emphasized the need for more adaptable and resilient counterproliferation measures. A comprehensive approach that integrates technical verification with geopolitical considerations is essential to address both the perception and reality of compliance (Adel, 2023, p. 2; Albright, 2015, p. 2).

The JCPOA’s verification mechanisms represented a significant technical and procedural advancement in international non-proliferation efforts. However, the system’s reliance on Iran’s cooperation, its vulnerability to exploitation under the managed-access protocol, and the long-term uncertainties introduced by sunset clauses raised critical questions about its durability. While the agreement effectively delayed Iran’s breakout capability and enhanced transparency in the short term, it also exposed enduring challenges in ensuring compliance and addressing regional proliferation risks. These structural limitations underscored the need for future frameworks to integrate both technical safeguards and broader strategic considerations to sustain long-term security.

3.1.3 Sanctions Relief Framework

The sanctions relief framework under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) played a pivotal role in shaping Iran’s nuclear compliance by linking economic incentives to verified rollback measures. Central to this framework was the release of nearly $100 billion in previously frozen assets and Iran’s reintegration into global financial markets. This substantial financial boost directly incentivized Iran’s initial adherence to the agreement’s limits on nuclear activities, as demonstrated by the remarkable reduction in its enriched uranium stockpile and operational centrifuges. However, while these measures demonstrated the potential for economic tools to foster initial compliance, they also generated significant criticism. Observers highlighted that the economic windfall strengthened Iran’s strategic regional position and indirectly bolstered its nuclear-related infrastructure by enabling dual-use technology transfers, which could potentially serve both civilian and military applications (Ade-Ibijola & Emmanuel, 2024, p. 4; Babar et al., 2021, p. 3). This dual-edged dynamic underscores the inherent complexities of employing sanctions relief as a means of non-proliferation and demands greater scrutiny of its unintended consequences.

The immediate economic impact of sanctions relief was most evident in the rapid growth of Iran’s oil exports. Following the agreement, exports surged by 30% during early 2022, reaching levels of approximately 1.2 million barrels per day—the highest recorded since the reimposition of U.S. sanctions (Einhorn, 2022, p. 5–6). This resurgence not only improved Iran’s fiscal stability but also raised significant concerns regarding the allocation of newfound revenues. While proponents argued that these economic gains could contribute to domestic infrastructure development, critics noted the potential for financial resources to be funneled into dual-use programmes, potentially advancing sensitive nuclear and military activities. This outcome illustrates the broader challenge of ensuring that sanctions relief effectively incentivizes peaceful activities without inadvertently enabling the very proliferation risks it seeks to contain.

The reintegration of Iran into global trade networks further complicated assessments of the JCPOA’s long-term efficacy. Iran pursued multi-billion-dollar agreements with key partners such as China and Russia, integrating itself into high-technology sectors and conventional arms trade. While these agreements facilitated economic recovery, they exacerbated concerns among Western states and arms control experts regarding indirect proliferation risks. Technology transfers and industrial cooperation, even when nominally civilian, carried the latent possibility of enhancing Iran’s technological base, which could be repurposed for military applications. This highlights how sanctions relief, while fostering cooperation with global powers, simultaneously intensified proliferation fears by blurring the lines between legitimate economic development and potential dual-use advancements (Babar et al., 2021, p. 3, 5).

The security implications of sanctions relief have also been widely debated, particularly regarding how the influx of economic resources affected regional dynamics. Iranian military affiliates, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), benefited indirectly from sanctions relief as the country’s economic position strengthened. This bolstered its regional influence in ways that critics argue undermined the non-proliferation goals of the JCPOA. While the deal successfully curtailed Iran’s nuclear capabilities in the short term, opponents viewed the economic engagement as a trade-off that risked entrenching Iran’s regional power, creating new security challenges for neighboring states. This critique demonstrates that while sanctions relief can buy time through cooperative reductions in proliferation risks, it does not necessarily alleviate broader geopolitical tensions that may indirectly fuel future instability.

A central element of the JCPOA’s sanctions framework was its explicit linkage to verified compliance, which initially led to a dramatic 98% reduction in Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile and a two-thirds decrease in active centrifuges (Singh, 2015, p. 2; Einhorn, 2022, p. 3). These reductions directly addressed critical proliferation pathways and illustrated how economic incentives tied to technical benchmarks can yield tangible disarmament results. However, the gradual expiration of key provisions through the deal’s sunset clauses raised persistent concerns about its long-term sustainability. Observers pointed out that the phased lifting of missile-related sanctions after only eight years left gaps in the agreement’s overall deterrent effect, potentially allowing Iran to reconstitute its sensitive capabilities over time. The expiration structure thus posed fundamental questions about whether sanctions relief could generate lasting non-proliferation benefits or merely defer future crises.

Critics of the JCPOA repeatedly stressed the structural vulnerabilities created by the frontloading of sanctions relief. Iran’s early access to significant economic benefits was intended to foster trust and reinforce compliance, but this approach proved fragile in the face of external shocks, such as the U.S. withdrawal from the deal in 2018. The subsequent reimposition of unilateral U.S. sanctions eliminated much of the agreement’s economic incentives, prompting Iran to reverse many of its commitments, including increased uranium enrichment and stockpile accumulation (Einhorn, 2022, p. 6). This dynamic illustrated the limitations of frontloaded incentives when long-term enforcement mechanisms are undermined by policy instability. It also underscored the importance of designing economic frameworks that are resilient to political fluctuations and capable of sustaining compliance even when external conditions change.

The lifting of sanctions under the JCPOA was seen by some as a double-edged sword, enabling both economic growth and military modernization. For instance, the subsequent $8.1 billion arms deal between Iran, China, and Russia involved precision-guided weaponry, advanced missiles, and high-tech transfers that alarmed international security experts (Babar et al., 2021, p. 5). These developments reinforced concerns that the economic relaxation could indirectly contribute to proliferation risks by strengthening Iran’s broader military infrastructure. The challenge of compartmentalizing nuclear-related sanctions relief from conventional arms concerns highlights the difficulty of aligning economic incentives with comprehensive non-proliferation objectives, particularly in a region as complex as the Middle East.

Proponents of the JCPOA have defended the sanctions framework by emphasizing its initial success in delaying Iran’s breakout capability and creating opportunities for cooperative engagement. However, they also acknowledge that broader regional trends, including destabilization and increased military procurement, may have indirectly undermined the agreement’s goals. The JCPOA experience thus highlights the duality of modern non-proliferation measures: while economic engagement can yield tangible rollback in proliferation-sensitive activities, it can also introduce new vulnerabilities by fueling regional arms races and eroding confidence in long-term restraint mechanisms.

The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA further exposed the fragility of the sanctions relief framework as a tool for sustaining Iranian compliance. The reversal of economic incentives under the “maximum pressure” campaign triggered technical advancements in Iran’s nuclear programme, including increased enrichment levels, rather than incentivizing further compliance. The erosion of sanctions relief revealed that punitive measures alone were insufficient to ensure restraint and may have reinforced perceptions within Iran that non-compliance was a rational strategy for regaining leverage (Einhorn, 2022, p. 6). This cyclical dynamic, where the breakdown of sanctions relief led to renewed proliferation risks, underscores the need for frameworks that align economic incentives with robust, enduring verification and enforcement measures.

A critical limitation of the JCPOA’s sanctions relief framework was its failure to secure controls over advanced research activities. Iran continued its research on new-generation centrifuges and laser enrichment technology, capabilities with clear dual-use potential and military implications (Albright & Kelleher-Vergantini, 2013, p. 13; Singh, 2015, p. 2). While the agreement placed significant restrictions on operational systems, it allowed Iran to retain the organizational and technical base needed for future advancements. Critics thus argued that economic benefits, absent permanent constraints on technical progress, may defer rather than prevent the proliferation of sensitive capabilities. This exemplifies the enduring dilemma in counterproliferation efforts: balancing immediate compliance with measures that ensure long-term security in an evolving geopolitical context.

Ultimately, the sanctions relief framework of the JCPOA highlights the complexities and trade-offs inherent to modern non-proliferation agreements. While the initial economic incentives successfully elicited compliance and reduced proliferation risks in the short term, the structural limitations of temporary measures, coupled with regional and global geopolitical challenges, underscored the limitations of relying on economic engagement alone as a counterproliferation strategy. This underscores the necessity of integrating economic, technical, and political dimensions into future agreements to address both immediate and long-term proliferation risks effectively.

3.2 U.S. Withdrawal and Maximum Pressure

The decision of the United States to withdraw from the JCPOA and implement maximum pressure policies significantly reshaped Iran’s nuclear trajectory, prompting widespread violations and strategic recalibrations. This dynamic underscores the complexities of enforcement and compliance, illustrating how unilateral measures influence regional security and proliferation risks amidst shifting geopolitical alliances. Examining these developments reveals critical insights into the limitations and consequences of coercive strategies within the broader efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

3.2.1 Impact on Iranian Compliance

The U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 had immediate and profound repercussions for Iran’s compliance with the agreement. From 2020 onward, Iran began systematically breaching the pact’s key provisions, which was evident as it exceeded limits on uranium enrichment levels, stockpile sizes, and operational centrifuges. By resuming enrichment up to 60%, far beyond the JCPOA’s stipulated 3.67%, Iran signaled both its technical capabilities and political strategy. This escalation demonstrated a deliberate leveraging of nuclear advancements to maximize pressure on European stakeholders and highlighted the strategic interplay between external pressures and Iran’s calculated non-compliance (Loft & Mills, 2025, p. 2; Kerr, 2025, p. 29). The JCPOA’s dissolution also reintroduced pre-2013 zero-enrichment demands by the U.S., signaling a hardline approach that further fueled Iranian defiance (Erästö, 2020, p. 2).

Iran’s methodical reduction in compliance followed a clear sequence of steps. After the U.S. exit from the JCPOA, Iran initially provided European signatories an opportunity to mitigate the economic fallout of U.S. sanctions. When these efforts failed to produce tangible results, Iran gradually escalated its breaches of the agreement. This began with surpassing the cap on its enriched uranium stockpile, continued with enrichment above the 3.67% threshold, advanced to the installation of more sophisticated centrifuges, and culminated in the cessation of voluntary transparency measures by February 2021. This progression of violations illustrated a deliberate strategy to incrementally increase its breakout capacity while maintaining a façade of reversible actions, thus maximizing diplomatic leverage while avoiding irreversible escalations that might provoke a stronger international response (Kerr, 2025, p. 9; Erästö, 2020, p. 2).

Iran’s uranium enrichment activities rapidly intensified post-2020, with the announcement of enrichment to 20% at Fordow in January 2021 marking a critical breach. This was followed by IAEA inspectors detecting uranium enriched up to 83.7% at Fordow by early 2023, a level alarmingly close to weapons-grade material. These technical breaches not only underscored Iran’s advanced nuclear capabilities but also revealed a political calculus aimed at redefining red lines established by the JCPOA. The ability to enrich uranium at such high levels reflected both the technical sophistication of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and its willingness to push the boundaries of international tolerance. This duality of technical advancement and political signaling was emblematic of Iran’s broader strategy of calculated escalation to extract concessions or force mediation efforts from European stakeholders (Loft & Mills, 2025, p. 7; Kerr, 2025, p. 29).

Iran’s violations of the JCPOA were not solely technical maneuvers but were deeply intertwined with its broader economic and strategic objectives. By linking nuclear escalation to economic relief, Iran sought to compel European nations to resist U.S. sanctions and restore trade channels. The calculated nature of these breaches further signaled that Iran viewed compliance not as an obligation but as a tool for diplomatic bargaining. This strategic linkage of nuclear activity to economic incentives reflected a posture of transactional compliance, where adherence to international norms was conditional upon favorable external actions. It also emphasized the inherent vulnerabilities in using economic benefits as the primary mechanism for enforcing compliance in non-proliferation agreements (Mortlock, 2020, p. 1; Loft & Mills, 2025, p. 7).

As Iran began systematically exceeding operational limits, its decision to halt voluntary transparency measures in early 2021 marked a significant turning point. The suspension of these provisions created substantial verification gaps, significantly impairing the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) ability to monitor the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Without the additional layers of access provided under the JCPOA framework, the IAEA was left with limited capacity to assess whether Tehran’s activities had crossed into weaponization. This reduction in transparency not only alarmed the international community but also underscored the fragility of non-proliferation regimes in the absence of robust enforcement mechanisms. The diminished capacity for oversight exacerbated concerns about the potential resumption of clandestine activities, a risk magnified by Iran’s history of concealment and non-compliance (Kerr, 2025, p. 9).

By February 2025, the cumulative effect of Iran’s incremental breaches was starkly evident, with its enriched uranium stockpile ballooning to 8,294.4 kg—nearly forty times the JCPOA limit. Concurrently, the number of operational centrifuges at facilities such as Natanz and Fordow steadily increased. This dramatic expansion not only highlighted Iran’s capability to enhance its breakout potential but also reflected the accelerating pace of its non-compliance. These developments revealed the limitations of gradualist approaches to non-proliferation, as Iran exploited the phased breakdown of restrictions to methodically advance its nuclear capacity. The scale of these breaches demonstrated Iran’s strategic calculus, wherein technical advances were used as leverage while avoiding immediate escalation to weapons-grade production, thus sustaining a posture of ambiguity that complicated international responses (Loft & Mills, 2025, p. 8-9; Kerr, 2025, p. 29).

The economic distress induced by the maximum pressure campaign—which cut Iran’s oil exports by over 80% and resulted in GDP contractions of 3.6% and 7.6% in 2018 and 2019, respectively—also played a critical role in shaping Iran’s response. The severe economic strain created by sanctions not only incentivized Tehran to view nuclear escalation as a tool for extracting concessions but also reinforced a strategic culture defined by resilience and self-sufficiency. The contraction of Iran’s economy, coupled with currency devaluation and stark inflation, pushed Iranian policymakers to adopt increasingly assertive measures to counteract external pressure, further entrenching the nuclear programme as a cornerstone of Tehran’s retaliatory strategy (Mortlock, 2020, p. 4–5).

The unprecedented scope of reimposed U.S. sanctions targeted nearly every sector of the Iranian economy, including oil and finance, while secondary sanctions dissuaded foreign entities from engaging with Tehran. These measures drastically reduced oil exports from 2.3 million barrels per day to approximately 1 million barrels within a year and created substantial fiscal challenges for Iran. In response, Iran multiplied its violations of the JCPOA, underscoring the ineffectiveness of sanctions as a tool for compelling compliance without corresponding diplomatic engagement. Iran’s calculated breaches demonstrated a clear recognition that non-compliance offered greater leverage over international actors than adherence to an agreement whose economic benefits had evaporated (Mortlock, 2020, p. 5).

Rather than diminishing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the maximum pressure campaign catalyzed the expansion of its nuclear programme. By incrementally breaching restrictions, Iran effectively used its advancing capabilities as bargaining chips, showcasing the resilience of its technical base in the face of external coercion. This dynamic revealed a critical flaw in the assumption that economic pressure alone could compel compliance, as Iran’s stepwise escalation demonstrated that sanctions could backfire by reinforcing Tehran’s strategic resolve to expand its nuclear leverage (Mortlock, 2020, p. 1; Loft & Mills, 2025, p. 2).

The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA also heightened Iran’s perception of Western unreliability, further solidifying its prioritization of self-sufficiency and the retention of nuclear know-how as core security principles. The reversal of negotiated economic gains reinforced a mistrust in international agreements, leading Iran to view the preservation of its nuclear programme as a necessary safeguard against external unpredictability. This perception of unreliability amplified Iran’s reliance on nuclear escalation as a multifaceted signal—to impose costs on adversaries, extract economic relief, and assert its autonomy—thus highlighting the strategic interplay between economic incentives and compliance behavior (Mortlock, 2020, p. 5).

The organized sequence of breaches also allowed Iran to maintain strategic ambiguity regarding its ultimate intentions. By avoiding an immediate sprint to weaponization, Iran sustained the prospect of reversible compliance, which enabled it to interact tactically with both domestic and international constituencies. This ambiguity complicated the efforts of European nations to mediate and maintain the JCPOA, as they were forced to balance escalating breaches with the hope of restoring diplomatic engagement. Iran’s calculated restraint in not fully weaponizing its programme underscored the interplay of escalation and diplomacy in its broader non-proliferation strategy (Loft & Mills, 2025, p. 8).

Iran’s refusal to implement key transparency measures, such as halting the Additional Protocol and the modified Code 3.1, drastically weakened the verification capacity of the IAEA. This refusal created additional layers of uncertainty around Iran’s nuclear activities and raised fears of concealed advancements in weaponization. The operation of more advanced centrifuges, combined with the detection of high-enriched uranium and the ongoing growth of its stockpile, underscored the complexity of monitoring Iran’s nuclear programme in the absence of robust transparency mechanisms. These developments not only validated longstanding concerns about the limitations of the JCPOA’s verification framework but also reinforced the need for more adaptive and enforceable safeguards to address such challenges (Kerr, 2025, p. 9).

Iran’s escalating activities, particularly the installation of IR-6 centrifuges and developments at key facilities, demonstrated a growing technical capacity to regain or exceed pre-JCPOA levels of enrichment activity. This rapid recovery diminished the credibility of gradualist approaches to non-proliferation, exposing critical weaknesses in the enforcement-verification chain. Iran’s ability to use controlled breaches as leverage reinforced the limitations of temporary non-proliferation agreements and highlighted the broader strategic consequences of non-compliance for regional security (Loft & Mills, 2025, p. 9; Kerr, 2025, p. 29).

Iran’s breaches served not only as technical advancements but also as strategic signals to European states, urging them to resist U.S. pressure and provide economic relief. This approach placed European stakeholders in a complex position, where they were forced to weigh the risks of further proliferation against the need to preserve diplomatic channels. By holding open the prospect of compliance while continuing nuclear advancements, Iran accentuated the tensions inherent in balancing enforcement with diplomacy, complicating the international response (Loft & Mills, 2025, p. 7).

The broader context of increasing regional instability further compounded the consequences of the JCPOA’s collapse. Incidents such as the September 2019 attacks on Saudi Arabian oil facilities and Iran’s missile strikes on U.S. military bases in Iraq following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020 illustrated the integration of Iran’s nuclear posture with its conventional and asymmetrical strategies. These actions not only heightened regional tensions but also underscored the transactional and reactive nature of Iran’s compliance behavior in the post-JCPOA era (Erästö, 2020, p. 3).

The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and Iran’s subsequent reduction in compliance demonstrated a cyclical dynamic of escalation and mistrust that eroded the stability of international counterproliferation efforts. The interplay between Iran’s calculated breaches, strategic ambiguity, and the limitations of the JCPOA structure underscored the challenges of maintaining both short-term compliance and long-term non-proliferation objectives in the face of shifting geopolitical pressures.

3.2.2 International Response

The international response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 was characterized by notable divisions among global and regional actors, significantly shaping the trajectory of nuclear diplomacy with Iran. European signatories to the agreement, namely France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, made concerted efforts to preserve the JCPOA by emphasizing diplomatic engagement and developing trade mechanisms such as the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). These initiatives were rooted in the belief that sustained dialogue and economic incentives could prevent further Iranian escalations while keeping channels open for future negotiations. However, the effectiveness of these measures was constrained by the structural dominance of U.S.-controlled financial systems, which discouraged European and global firms from participating in INSTEX out of fear of secondary sanctions. This limitation highlighted the difficulties Europe faced in asserting its economic independence from U.S. policy, as well as the challenges of maintaining multilateral agreements when one party significantly alters the terms of engagement (Alcaro & Castelli, 2025, p. 2; Albarasneh & Khatib, 2019, p. 12).

In contrast to Europe’s emphasis on dialogue, regional actors such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates welcomed the U.S. withdrawal and aligned themselves with the maximum pressure campaign. These countries supported the reimposition of sanctions and advocated for an uncompromising approach to Iran, reflecting their deep-seated mistrust of Tehran's intentions and the perception of the JCPOA as insufficient in addressing security concerns. In particular, Israel’s vocal opposition to the agreement, combined with its active intelligence and military operations targeting Iranian nuclear capabilities, underscored wider regional skepticism about the viability of multilateral non-proliferation efforts. The divergent strategies between European and Middle Eastern states exposed a critical weakness in international counterproliferation: the absence of a unified approach undermined efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions and created opportunities for Iran to exploit divisions among its adversaries (Alcaro & Castelli, 2025, p. 2; Mortlock, 2020, p. 1).

The reimposition of U.S. sanctions after its exit from the JCPOA had far-reaching consequences beyond Iran, showcasing the extraterritorial reach of American economic policies. Secondary sanctions imposed by the United States discouraged international companies from engaging with Iran, leading to the cessation of commercial operations even among European and Asian entities. This effectively amplified the economic impact of U.S. measures and isolated Iran from global financial systems. Iran’s oil exports, a critical source of national revenue, plummeted by around two million barrels per day, contributing to severe economic contraction and domestic instability. These sanctions highlighted the power imbalance in the global economy, where American controls over financial networks can override the policies of other states. However, this approach also deepened international criticisms of unilateral actions and raised questions about the long-term implications of relying on coercive economic tools without broader diplomatic backing (Mortlock, 2020, p. 5).

European diplomatic efforts to mediate the fallout of the JCPOA’s collapse focused on maintaining engagement with Iran while counterbalancing U.S. pressure. Proposals such as INSTEX were intended to shield European companies from U.S. sanctions and preserve economic incentives for Iranian compliance. Nevertheless, the limited participation of European firms due to fears of U.S. penalties eroded the practical utility of these mechanisms. The failure to deliver meaningful economic relief to Iran despite sustained diplomatic overtures exposed the gap between Europe’s political ambitions and its structural dependence on U.S.-dominated global systems. This shortfall fueled frustration in Tehran and contributed to Iran’s progressive breaches of the JCPOA, reaffirming the transactional nature of nuclear diplomacy. The European response, while intended to offer an alternative path, lacked the leverage necessary to prevent escalation, raising broader questions about the effectiveness of purely diplomatic tools in high-stakes proliferation crises (Albarasneh & Khatib, 2019, p. 12; Mortlock, 2020, p. 1).

The regional security environment became increasingly unstable in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal, with military incidents escalating in parallel to the deterioration of the JCPOA. Israeli airstrikes against Iranian-linked targets in Syria, sabotage operations in the Gulf of Oman, and retaliatory attacks by Iran on Saudi Arabia’s critical infrastructure all underscored the interconnectedness of military and nuclear postures in the Middle East. These incidents, often seen as part of broader strategic recalibrations by all parties, highlighted the limitations of confrontation-based strategies in producing sustainable outcomes. Iran’s gradual breaches of the JCPOA were not isolated technical actions but part of a broader pattern of signaling its resilience and resolve. These escalatory dynamics showcased the risks of a fragmented international response, where regional rivalries and unilateral measures heightened tensions rather than contributing to a unified containment strategy (Mo'awadh, 2018, p. 5; Alcaro & Castelli, 2025, p. 3).

The lack of a unified international approach to the JCPOA crisis revealed deeper systemic divisions over how to balance coercion and diplomacy in addressing proliferation and regional stability. The U.S. strategy of maximum pressure, supported by key regional allies, stood in stark contrast to Europe’s preference for engagement. This polarization limited the ability of the international community to coordinate an effective containment strategy, leaving space for Iran to navigate between competing positions. Furthermore, the hardening attitudes within both Iran and its adversaries contributed to an environment of mistrust and reactive escalation, making future agreements even more challenging to negotiate. The crisis underscored the need for cohesive and coordinated global action to address proliferation risks, as well as the broader consequences of undermining multilateral frameworks (Albarasneh & Khatib, 2019, p. 12; Mortlock, 2020, p. 1).

The international response to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and subsequent Iranian breaches highlighted the complexities and unintended consequences of unilateral policies in a multilateral context. The divisions between European, regional, and American approaches to counterproliferation exposed vulnerabilities in the collective management of security threats, illustrating the fragility of multilateral arms control agreements when enforcement mechanisms lack consensus and coordination. This fragmentation not only failed to prevent escalation but also incentivized further brinksmanship by all parties involved. A cohesive and balanced approach that integrates economic, diplomatic, and security dimensions is essential to restore stability and address the challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear programme effectively.

3.2.3 Economic Consequences

The reinstatement of U.S. sanctions following the withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 triggered a significant collapse in Iran's oil sector, drastically cutting exports by over 80 percent within two years. Oil exports, which accounted for a critical portion of government revenue, fell from approximately 2.3 million barrels per day at the beginning of 2018 to around 1 million barrels per day by April 2019. This sharp decline severely undermined the Iranian government’s ability to balance its national budget, destabilizing public finances and creating acute fiscal pressures. These economic conditions not only weakened Iran's capacity to fund domestic programmes but also curtailed its ability to maintain wider regional engagements. This raised questions about the effectiveness of sanctions as a counterproliferation tool, particularly regarding whether the economic damage inflicted on a state’s main revenue streams can translate into desired changes in nuclear policy (Mortlock, 2020, p. 5).

The fiscal strain from diminished oil revenues cascaded into reductions in public services and development projects, exacerbating dissatisfaction among Iranian citizens. The government faced growing difficulties in meeting obligations to domestic constituencies, which undermined its legitimacy and spurred social unrest. Furthermore, the economic contraction gravely impacted Iran’s capacity to import essential goods such as food and medicine. Shortages in these critical areas fueled additional public dissatisfaction and created humanitarian concerns, demonstrating how sanctions designed to target elite decision-makers often disproportionately affect the broader population. This highlighted an inherent flaw in sanctions regimes, as their broader societal consequences risk further alienating domestic populations from international actors rather than fostering conditions conducive to policy shifts.

The loss of oil revenues also had a significant impact on Iran’s regional policies, as financial constraints necessitated re-evaluations of resource prioritization. Tehran was forced to reduce or alter its support for allied non-state actors and its operational activities across the region, which diminished its capacity to assert influence. These adjustments led to debates within Iran’s leadership regarding the allocation of diminished resources, exposing internal divisions about the relative importance of domestic stability versus external regional engagements. This dynamic demonstrated how economic isolation reshapes not only a state’s fiscal framework but also its strategic calculus, leading to broader security ramifications. However, these shifts in regional policy also underscored a paradox: while reduced resources constrained Iran's reach, they simultaneously fueled arguments within its leadership that increased nuclear leverage and self-reliance were essential for preserving national security and survival (Mortlock, 2020, p. 5).

The contraction of oil revenues was accompanied by a sharp decline in Iran’s gross domestic product (GDP), which fell by 3.6 percent in 2018 and by an even steeper 7.6 percent in 2019 (Mortlock, 2020, p. 5; Dadmehr, 2013, p. 2). These contractions illustrated the immediate effectiveness of economic pressure in destabilizing the macroeconomic foundation of a target state. However, the ripple effects extended far beyond macroeconomic data. Widespread unemployment, business closures, and diminished investment created severe socio-economic challenges. The private sector, particularly reliant on international trade and financial connectivity, sustained significant losses, further exacerbating inequalities and deepening socio-economic divides. These conditions rendered long-term economic recovery more uncertain and raised questions about whether sanctions merely induce short-term instability or systematically degrade a state's potential to reintegrate into the global economy.

A substantial fall in the value of the Iranian rial compounded these challenges, with the currency losing over two-thirds of its value amid rising inflation (Peters & Robinson, 2024, p. 8; Dadmehr, 2013, p. 2). Hyperinflation reached levels as high as 40 percent, making everyday life difficult for much of the population. Basic goods became prohibitively expensive, further reducing purchasing power and forcing many Iranians into poverty. This economic reality exacerbated domestic dissatisfaction, fueling protests that presented both political and social challenges to the ruling regime. Furthermore, inflation and currency devaluation disproportionately affected lower-income groups, reinforcing socio-economic disparities and creating conditions that allowed for the rapid growth of black-market activities. The devaluation also undercut Iran's strategic stability, as the failure to stabilize the economy discouraged foreign investment and led to widespread uncertainty about the state’s future trajectory.

The "maximum pressure" campaign exacerbated Iran’s economic isolation on a global scale, targeting key sectors such as finance, shipping, and trade with major actors like China, India, and the European Union (Mortlock, 2020, p. 1; Ellner, 2011, p. 3). American secondary sanctions amplified this isolation by deterring international companies from engaging with Iran for fear of facing punitive measures themselves. This led to the disruption of essential trade channels and further constrained Iran’s ability to conduct financial transactions, even for humanitarian goods. While alternative mechanisms, such as the European-created Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), sought to circumvent these penalties, their limited scale proved insufficient to address the structural challenges posed by U.S. economic coercion. This demonstrated the significant leverage inherent in control over global financial systems and raised concerns about the broader implications of unilateral economic power for multilateral diplomacy.

The economic pressure did not merely weaken Iran's international economic ties; it also fundamentally reshaped its foreign policy orientation. Faced with reduced options for engagement with Western powers, Iran increasingly turned to non-Western partners such as China and Russia. These relationships, however, often involved exploitative terms, such as barter arrangements or steep discounts on Iranian oil, further eroding Iran’s economic sovereignty (Mortlock, 2020, p. 1; Ellner, 2011, p. 3). While this shift enabled Tehran to maintain some degree of international commerce, it also entrenched patterns of dependency that limited its strategic flexibility. This highlighted the broader trade-offs states face when seeking alternative partnerships in response to sanctions, as the terms of engagement may compromise long-term economic and political agency.

Despite the acute economic hardship inflicted by sanctions, they ultimately failed to compel a meaningful change in Iran’s nuclear policies. Instead, the Iranian leadership increasingly viewed sanctions as evidence of Western unreliability and bad faith, further reinforcing a strategic culture that prioritized self-sufficiency and nuclear leverage as critical tools of regime security (Ellner, 2011, p. 4; Dadmehr, 2013, p. 2). This perspective marginalized moderate voices advocating for diplomatic engagement and strengthened hardline factions within the state apparatus. The resulting entrenchment of a resistant posture made future negotiations significantly more challenging, illustrating that coercive measures risk backfiring by hardening a state’s resolve instead of fostering concessions.

The leadership’s framing of sanctions as economic warfare against Iran justified an acceleration of nuclear advancements as a means of acquiring negotiation leverage. This approach further delayed opportunities for diplomatic progress, as compliance was seen not as a strategic advantage but as a liability in an environment characterized by mistrust and antagonism. Additionally, sanctions-induced hardships spurred external escalatory measures, such as outreach to non-Western states and support for regional actors, which amplified regional instability. This convergence of economic distress and a harder foreign policy posture highlighted the risks of sanctions inadvertently fueling the very behaviors they aim to contain.

The broader implications of the economic consequences of sanctions were felt within Iran and across the region. Domestically, periodic waves of unrest linked to economic grievances created short-term challenges for regime stability. Internationally, Iran’s policies became more confrontational, as it attempted to externalize blame for its economic hardships while asserting itself through nuclear escalation. These dynamics underscored the paradoxical effects of economic coercion as a counterproliferation strategy: while effective in inflicting economic damage, they often generate feedback loops that entrench resistance rather than fostering negotiated compromise (Peters & Robinson, 2024, p. 8; Ellner, 2011, p. 4). This underscores the need for more nuanced policy approaches that balance economic tools with broader diplomatic and security initiatives, addressing both immediate and longer-term proliferation risks.

3.3 European Preservation Efforts

European efforts to uphold the nuclear non-proliferation framework in the aftermath of the JCPOA's breakdown reveal both strategic initiatives and significant limitations. Focusing on trade mechanisms, diplomatic negotiations, and regional stabilization, these actions illustrate the broader challenges of maintaining multilateral cohesion and trust. Within the wider context of regional security and international response, these policies highlight the complexities of balancing verification, engagement, and coercion in a fractured geopolitical environment.

3.3.1 INSTEX and Trade Mechanisms

The Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), established in January 2019 by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, emerged as a European initiative designed to counteract the reimposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran and to sustain legitimate, non-dollar trade between Europe and Iran. This mechanism was conceived to facilitate trade in humanitarian goods, such as food and medicine, while alleviating the pressures of extraterritorial U.S. financial restrictions on Iran. However, a detailed examination of INSTEX reveals its fundamental limitations, both in terms of design and implementation, which ultimately rendered it an inadequate tool for addressing the broader economic challenges faced by Iran under renewed sanctions pressure (Mohammadian & Farazmandfar, 2016, p. 18).

Despite its ambitious premise, INSTEX suffered from structural weaknesses that severely limited its practical scope. The mechanism was initially capitalized with a mere 3,000 euros, a symbolic figure that reflected more of a mechanistic demonstration of European intent than a substantive effort to provide meaningful economic relief to Iran. This minimal financial backing underscored the limited political commitment of its European architects, exposing their inability or unwillingness to provide robust support. Furthermore, INSTEX’s operational framework focused almost exclusively on humanitarian trade, failing to address the broader economic damage suffered by Iran's oil and industrial sectors. This narrow focus undermined its potential impact and contributed to Tehran’s growing mistrust of European assurances (Mohammadian & Farazmandfar, 2016, p. 18).

INSTEX, while symbolically significant as an expression of Europe’s desire to assert strategic autonomy in the face of U.S. unilateralism, ultimately failed to deliver meaningful results. The dominance of U.S.-controlled financial systems, coupled with the threat of secondary sanctions, dissuaded European and global firms from participating in INSTEX. This reluctance illustrated the enduring influence of American financial hegemony and the practical constraints on Europe’s ability to counterbalance U.S. policy. As a result, INSTEX became a largely ineffective mechanism, with few actual transactions taking place. This failure not only eroded Iranian trust in European diplomatic commitments but also reinforced perceptions in Tehran that European states lacked the political will and economic capacity to uphold the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (Parsi & Tabrizi, 2020, p. 2).

The ineffectiveness of INSTEX also had significant implications for Iran’s strategic calculations. With limited economic incentives provided by Europe, Tehran increasingly viewed nuclear escalation as a rational strategy to extract concessions. The insufficiency of mechanisms like INSTEX to offer tangible economic benefits contributed to Iran’s incremental reduction in compliance with the JCPOA, as Tehran sought to leverage its nuclear advancements to compel greater international engagement. This dynamic revealed the recursive nature of the relationship between failed economic mechanisms and proliferation behavior, wherein diplomatic and economic impotence incentivized further nuclear escalation as a bargaining tool (Mortlock, 2020, p. 1).

The symbolic nature of INSTEX was further highlighted by the inability of European governments to shield their companies from U.S. penalties, which deterred participation and undermined the mechanism’s credibility. This failure demonstrated the structural asymmetry within international economic relations, where the economic dominance of the U.S. curtailed European efforts to implement independent policies. For Iran, this reinforced frustrations about the reliability of multilateral agreements, as the anticipated economic benefits of the JCPOA failed to materialize in the wake of American repudiation (Parsi & Tabrizi, 2020, p. 10).

Iran’s response to the shortcomings of INSTEX was marked by a shift in strategic focus, evidenced by its invocation of Article 36 of the JCPOA to justify partial suspensions of nuclear commitments. This represented a recalibration of Iranian policy, wherein compliance became increasingly transactional rather than multilateral. By tying its actions to the perceived failures of European states to counterbalance U.S. sanctions, Iran sought to highlight the inadequacy of symbolic economic measures and to assert its own agency in the diplomatic arena. This approach underscored the challenges of sustaining non-proliferation agreements in the absence of enforceable and effective multilateral commitments (Mohammadian & Farazmandfar, 2016, p. 19).

The structural and operational failures of INSTEX also shed light on a recurring historical pattern of broken economic promises in Iran’s nuclear engagement. For example, the experiences of Iranian investments in international nuclear projects, such as the Shah’s stake in the Eurodif uranium enrichment consortium, revealed a long-standing mistrust of Western actors. Both cases reflected how geopolitical risk aversion and shifting policies in the West left Iran with negligible strategic benefits, perpetuating a sense of economic and diplomatic alienation (Bahgat, 2013, p. 4).

The broader implications of INSTEX’s limited scope are reflected in the persistent gap between the political aspirations of European states and their dependence on U.S.-dominated global systems. This disparity not only constrained Europe’s ability to act independently but also reinforced Iran’s rationale for prioritizing “maximum resistance” as a means of advancing its strategic interests. The cyclical nature of this dynamic, where ineffective economic measures triggered further nuclear escalation, revealed the shortcomings of trade-based mechanisms in altering the strategic calculus of states facing intense sanctions pressure (Parsi & Tabrizi, 2020, p. 6).

The failure of INSTEX to provide a credible economic safety net for Iran further exposed the limitations of non-coercive measures in the international counterproliferation strategy. By failing to mitigate the financial impact of secondary sanctions or to facilitate meaningful economic ties, INSTEX accelerated Tehran’s breaches of the JCPOA and slowly eroded the viability of diplomatic engagement as a path to contain proliferation risks. These developments demonstrated how economic mechanisms lacking robust guarantees can exacerbate mistrust, strengthen hardline factions within a state, and complicate the prospects for future negotiations (Parsi & Tabrizi, 2020, p. 10).

Ultimately, INSTEX’s shortcomings underscored the critical importance of addressing the structural asymmetries in international economic relations and aligning transatlantic policies to ensure the success of non-proliferation agreements. The symbolic and technical inadequacies of INSTEX rendered it incapable of influencing Iran’s strategic behavior, thereby contributing to the escalation of nuclear tensions. This highlighted the need for more coherent and enforceable economic tools that align with broader diplomatic and security goals, providing a foundation for sustainable solutions to proliferation challenges (Mortlock, 2020, p. 1).

3.3.2 Diplomatic Initiatives

European diplomatic initiatives in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 represented a multifaceted effort to preserve the agreement and prevent further escalation in Iran's nuclear programme. Central to these efforts were the sustained engagements and dialogues led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, collectively known as the E3. These European actors undertook numerous rounds of discussions aimed at maintaining Iran's compliance with the JCPOA framework, despite the deteriorating trust between the parties. Through public advocacy and private negotiations, the E3 sought to emphasize the value of multilateral diplomacy in addressing proliferation concerns. However, their ability to provide effective diplomatic leverage was constrained by several structural and geopolitical factors, which limited the overall impact of their initiatives and highlighted significant limitations in the European approach to non-proliferation policy (Parsi & Tabrizi, 2020, p. 2; Mohammadian & Farazmandfar, 2016, p. 19).

A significant obstacle to European diplomatic effectiveness stemmed from the continent's reliance on U.S.-centered financial and commercial systems. The reimposition of U.S. sanctions under the “maximum pressure” campaign forced European banks and businesses to withdraw from the Iranian market, thereby curtailing Europe’s capacity to offer Tehran concrete economic incentives. Despite their advocacy for continued JCPOA compliance, European governments were unable to implement meaningful measures to shield their firms from the punitive effects of U.S. sanctions. This economic vulnerability undermined the credibility of the E3’s diplomatic assurances and reinforced Iranian skepticism regarding the feasibility of Europe serving as an effective counterweight to U.S. pressure (Mortlock, 2020, p. 1; Parsi & Tabrizi, 2020, p. 10).

In response to these constraints, European states sought to innovate by introducing mechanisms such as the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). Conceived as an alternative trade channel, INSTEX aimed to facilitate humanitarian transactions without violating U.S. sanctions. However, bureaucratic inefficiencies and narrow operational parameters, which limited the mechanism’s scope to non-oil-related goods, diminished its impact. Iranian policymakers, who had anticipated broader financial relief under the JCPOA, perceived this initiative as inadequate and symbolic rather than substantive. Consequently, the failure of INSTEX contributed to Tehran’s growing disillusionment with European diplomatic efforts, further straining the already fragile relationship between the parties (Mohammadian & Farazmandfar, 2016, p. 18; Parsi & Tabrizi, 2020, p. 6).

Iran’s strategic response to perceived European shortcomings involved a recalibrated approach to the JCPOA, wherein compliance was increasingly tied to tangible economic and political outcomes. Invoking Article 36 of the agreement, which allows for the suspension of commitments when other signatories fail to fulfill their obligations, Tehran began reducing its compliance incrementally. This move underscored the transactional nature of Iran’s diplomacy and highlighted its reliance on leverage to extract concessions. By framing these actions as a justified response to European failures, Iran sought to pressure the international community while maintaining a veneer of legality under the JCPOA framework. This shift from trust-building to reciprocal pressure revealed a critical challenge for non-proliferation agreements: the difficulty of sustaining compliance when economic benefits are absent or uncertain (Mohammadian & Farazmandfar, 2016, p. 19).

The effectiveness of European diplomatic initiatives was further undermined by internal divisions among JCPOA parties regarding how to address Iran's partial non-compliance. While the E3 pursued technical discussions and dispute resolution mechanisms, they lacked a coordinated strategy capable of reconciling divergent interests, particularly in the absence of direct U.S.-Iran negotiations. These limitations, combined with the absence of enforceable “carrots and sticks,” rendered European diplomatic efforts largely symbolic. The inability to craft a unified and actionable response signaled a broader weakness in multilateral non-proliferation frameworks, where competing priorities among key actors often stall substantive progress (Parsi & Tabrizi, 2020, p. 2).

Despite the challenges, European initiatives were not purely ineffective, as they managed to keep the "shell" of the JCPOA intact, ensuring some degree of diplomatic engagement with Iran. The commitment to ongoing dialogue, even amidst incremental breaches by Tehran, preserved channels for de-escalation and crisis management. For instance, during periods of heightened military tensions—including attacks on oil infrastructure in the Gulf and retaliatory strikes by Iranian forces—communication facilitated by European actors helped mitigate the risk of uncontrolled escalation. These efforts demonstrated the potential value of sustained engagement, even if their practical impact on altering Iranian behavior remained minimal (Parsi & Tabrizi, 2020, p. 2; Mohammadian & Farazmandfar, 2016, p. 19).

However, the persistent gap between Europe’s diplomatic ambitions and practical outcomes reinforced Iran’s growing skepticism toward multilateral agreements. Iranian policymakers frequently voiced frustrations over Europe’s inability to deliver on promises of economic relief, viewing this failure as emblematic of systemic asymmetries within international relations. This dissatisfaction, coupled with the steady erosion of European leverage, intensified Tehran’s nuclear escalation and undermined the prospects for meaningful de-escalation. These developments underscored a key shortcoming of European diplomacy: the reliance on symbolic gestures in the absence of enforceable mechanisms often exacerbated rather than resolved tensions, highlighting the limits of non-coercive approaches to counterproliferation (Parsi & Tabrizi, 2020, p. 6).

The broader implications of these diplomatic efforts revealed critical lessons for future non-proliferation initiatives. First, the inability to provide tangible benefits or credible security guarantees diminished the appeal of compliance for states like Iran, reinforcing a pattern of escalation and mistrust. Second, fragmented international responses—such as the divergence between Europe’s diplomatic preferences and the U.S. reliance on maximum pressure—exposed vulnerabilities in the global counterproliferation architecture. Addressing these weaknesses will require a reimagining of multilateral diplomacy to bridge the gap between political aspirations and practical enforcement. Finally, the European experience with the JCPOA served as both a cautionary tale and a call to action for aligning economic, diplomatic, and security tools to create sustainable pathways for de-escalation and stability (Katzman, 2021, p. 9).

European diplomatic efforts to preserve the JCPOA highlighted the complexities of addressing nuclear proliferation in an environment marked by asymmetric power dynamics and competing geopolitical priorities. While these initiatives demonstrated a commitment to multilateralism, their inability to deliver measurable outcomes ultimately limited their effectiveness, leaving unresolved challenges for future diplomatic and policy endeavors.

3.3.3 Regional Stabilization Attempts

European efforts to stabilize the Middle East following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA have largely centered on diplomatic engagement and open dialogue, reflecting a strategic preference for preventing escalation through non-coercive means. The objective has been to preserve channels of communication and maintain some level of collaboration between Iran, its neighbors, and international actors, even as trust between these parties has eroded. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have played central roles by hosting high-level meetings and seeking to sustain participation from all remaining JCPOA signatories. However, the effectiveness of these initiatives was hampered by Europe's limited economic and security leverage, stemming from its structural dependence on U.S.-dominated financial systems. The inability of European states to protect their domestic firms from secondary sanctions imposed by the U.S. undermined their influence. This limitation not only highlighted the constraints of diplomacy in isolation but also demonstrated the wider challenges of fostering meaningful stabilization in an environment dominated by geopolitical and economic asymmetries (Parsi & Tabrizi, 2020, p. 6; Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 17).

Concrete European-led stabilization efforts have faced significant challenges due to the absence of an inclusive and effective regional security framework. Existing attempts to establish forums for arms control and conflict resolution have yielded limited results, as demonstrated by the 2019 United Nations conference on a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. With only 22 regional states participating and Israel declining to attend, the event exposed the deep-rooted mistrust and diverging threat perceptions that persist in the region. This lack of broad participation underscores the difficulty of forging consensus in an area characterized by complex rivalries and unresolved conflicts. The failure of such initiatives reflects the inadequacy of external diplomatic interventions to address regional security concerns comprehensively, particularly in the absence of internal political will among regional actors (Erästö, 2020, p. 9). Without a robust and inclusive architecture, European stabilization proposals struggle to make meaningful progress, underscoring the need for frameworks that ensure participation from all relevant parties.

The success of European engagement has also been limited by ongoing instability and the continuation of proxy conflicts across the Middle East. For instance, the September 2019 drone and missile attacks on Saudi oil facilities, widely attributed to Iran, epitomized the fragile and volatile security environment of the region. These events highlighted the inability of JCPOA-era diplomatic mechanisms or post-JCPOA European interventions to address or mitigate such direct confrontational acts. Furthermore, these incidents reinforced the perception among regional states that European initiatives are insufficient to guarantee national security in the face of escalating threats. This skepticism surrounding the practical utility of stabilization efforts reveals a gap in Europe's ability to offer enforceable solutions and rapid responses required for effective conflict management. As a result, the capacity of European actors to influence regional dynamics has diminished, leaving unaddressed concerns about both Iran’s regional activities and broader security challenges (Erästö, 2020, p. 3; Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 18).

Despite these shortcomings, there remains strong regional interest in advancing security discussions and confidence-building measures, reflecting a broader recognition of the need for dialogue to reduce tensions. Surveys and empirical studies support this notion, with a 2021 Chatham House survey reporting that 91 percent of stakeholders prioritized urgent regional security dialogue as a means to build consensus and lower tensions. This sentiment indicates that, while European efforts have resulted in limited practical outcomes, they have preserved essential channels for engagement and de-escalation. These existing communication platforms could potentially serve as a foundation for designing more effective stabilization frameworks in the future. The continuous advocacy for such measures highlights a persistent demand for improved conflict resolution mechanisms, although the design and implementation of these measures will need to be more comprehensive and inclusive to address the diverse concerns of regional stakeholders effectively (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 25).

A critical examination of the trajectory of European stabilization initiatives reveals their paradoxical outcomes. While diplomatic engagement and dialogue have successfully averted unintended escalation in some instances and sustained limited technical discussions, their impact on containing Iran’s nuclear advances or stabilizing the broader regional security environment has remained minimal. This disconnect largely stems from the lack of comprehensive international cooperation, credible security guarantees, and an inclusive approach to addressing security dilemmas. Moreover, the incapacity to provide enforceable assurances or mechanisms has left many regional actors doubting whether European efforts can translate into tangible security or political outcomes. These shortcomings suggest that effective stabilization in the Middle East cannot rely solely on incremental diplomatic efforts; instead, it requires significant structural reforms to the regional security architecture, addressing the aspirations and concerns of all relevant parties, and creating actionable strategies to mitigate both state and broader security dilemmas (Sauer, 2024, p. 8; Parsi & Tabrizi, 2020, p. 2).

Ultimately, European regional stabilization attempts, while notable for their intent and persistence, have encountered substantial limitations in addressing the complexities of the Middle Eastern security landscape. The absence of an inclusive framework, coupled with ongoing regional instability and unresolved geopolitical rivalries, has significantly curtailed their efficacy. Nevertheless, the initiatives have maintained minimal channels for engagement and de-escalation, preserving opportunities for dialogue and technical discussions. These efforts, though constrained by structural and operational limitations, provide a basis for refining future international policy approaches to regional stabilization.

4. Current Nuclear Infrastructure and Capabilities

This section delves into Iran’s evolving nuclear infrastructure, examining key facilities, technological advancements, and supporting systems that underpin its strategic nuclear capabilities. By exploring both the development of enrichment sites and the sophistication of delivery systems, it provides a comprehensive understanding of Iran’s current operational landscape. Placed within the broader context of regional proliferation risks and international responses, it underscores the challenges of monitoring and countering Iran’s nuclear progress amid ongoing technological and organizational resilience.

4.1 Enrichment Facilities

Iran's nuclear infrastructure, especially its enrichment facilities, serves as a cornerstone of its strategic capabilities and resilience amid international scrutiny. The ongoing development, concealment, and technological advancements at sites like Natanz and Fordow illustrate the country's persistent efforts to sustain and expand its nuclear potential. Understanding these facilities' evolution and operational complexities is crucial within the broader regional security and non-proliferation challenges detailed throughout this work.

4.1.1 Natanz Complex Operations

The Natanz enrichment complex represents a cornerstone of Iran’s nuclear programme and an emblematic case of the challenges inherent in counterproliferation efforts. Its covert construction and delayed declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) showcased a foundational pattern of non-transparency that significantly undermined international trust. The facility was exposed in 2002 by external sources rather than through a voluntary disclosure by Iran, reinforcing the perception that Iran was deliberately evading its international safeguards commitments. This event not only heightened suspicion but also established a precedent for scrutiny and escalated counterproliferation measures. The initial revelation of the Natanz complex marked a pivotal moment in the global discourse on nuclear proliferation, as it exemplified how undisclosed infrastructural developments can destabilize the international non-proliferation regime (Albright, 2015, p. 2; Goldschmidt, 2010, p. 1).

The concealment of the Natanz facility led to profound diplomatic repercussions, including the IAEA Board of Governors’ 2003 resolution demanding the suspension of all enrichment-related activities. As the focal point of early calls for Iranian transparency, Natanz became a litmus test for Iran’s willingness to comply with international norms. The crisis of confidence that emerged from this episode demonstrated the intricate link between facility-specific revelations and the broader shaping of international responses to perceived proliferation risks. The lack of transparency not only showcased the difficulties in maintaining effective safeguards but also highlighted the reactive nature of the international community’s approach toward addressing clandestine nuclear activities. These dynamics underscored the necessity for robust, proactive measures to counter the opacity that often accompanies state-led nuclear programmes (Goldschmidt, 2010, p. 1).

The exposure of Natanz also prompted multilateral interventions and justified future preventive measures. These included demands for increased verification and enforcement mechanisms to address potential proliferation risks. The temporary suspension of Natanz’s operations in 2003, following the IAEA resolution, reflected Iran’s attempt to navigate growing international pressure. However, this suspension proved to be short-lived, as Iran resumed enrichment activities by December 2006 under IAEA supervision and began the installation of approximately 3,000 centrifuges (Goldschmidt, 2010, p. 2). This oscillation between compliance and defiance illustrated Iran’s strategic flexibility, with its actions shaped by the external geopolitical environment and its desire to maintain leverage in ongoing negotiations. The pattern of temporary concessions followed by incremental escalation became a hallmark of Iran’s nuclear strategy, complicating efforts to achieve a comprehensive and enduring resolution.

Iran’s decision to resume enrichment activities at Natanz, despite heightened scrutiny, underscored its determination to maintain a robust enrichment infrastructure. This perseverance reflected an underlying objective to use its nuclear advancements as a form of latent political and strategic leverage in future negotiations. By balancing selective transparency with technical progress, Iran sought to retain bargaining power, even as international demands for compliance intensified (Goldschmidt, 2010, p. 2). The resumption of operations tested the limits of the IAEA’s verification capabilities and demonstrated the inherent challenges of monitoring nuclear programmes in environments characterized by mistrust and partial disclosure. This episode provided critical lessons on the limitations of safeguards regimes, particularly in contexts where non-compliance is pursued incrementally to avoid triggering severe international repercussions.

The period between 2009 and 2013 saw a rapid acceleration of technical capacity at Natanz, with operational centrifuges increasing from approximately 5,400 to nearly 19,000 units. This expansion reflected Iran’s ability to exploit gaps in international scrutiny and diplomatic inertia to fortify its enrichment infrastructure (Fleitz, 2016, p. 35). Such an increase not only intensified global concerns but also demonstrated Iran’s capability to augment its nuclear programme during periods of reduced enforcement. The parallel rise in uranium production, including low-enriched and 20% enriched uranium, amplified these proliferation risks and highlighted the dual-use nature of enrichment technology. This dynamic revealed the inadequacy of periodic inspections in containing the growth of enrichment capabilities and underscored the importance of continuous and comprehensive monitoring.

Iran’s strategic escalation after the dissolution of the JCPOA exhibited a deliberate shift in its nuclear approach, with the introduction of advanced centrifuges such as the IR-6 and IR-8 at Natanz. These advanced models represented a significant technical leap, allowing Iran to enrich uranium up to 60%, edging closer to weapons-grade material (Bluth, 2025, p. 3). This development suggested not only an adaptive response to renewed international pressure but also a deliberate strategy to reduce the timeframe required for a potential nuclear breakout. The deployment of advanced centrifuges served as both a practical enhancement of capabilities and a symbolic assertion of resilience, challenging the efficacy of the JCPOA-era non-proliferation framework. This escalation highlighted the role of technological advancement as a political tool, effectively shifting the regional security calculus and complicating the global counterproliferation landscape.

The episode in 2011, where an Iranian company attempted to procure 100,000 ring magnets suitable for IR-1 centrifuges, offered concrete evidence of the ambitious scope of Iran’s procurement strategies. This effort, which could have equipped 50,000 centrifuges, exposed significant vulnerabilities in international export control regimes (Albright, 2015, p. 17). The scale of this procurement attempt underscored a systematic approach to stockpiling critical components in anticipation of future sanctions or disruptions. It also revealed the interconnectedness of Iran’s enrichment supply chain, showcasing the lengths to which Tehran would go to ensure infrastructural resilience. The incident further highlighted the limitations of export controls as standalone measures and pointed to the need for intelligence-led interventions to complement traditional non-proliferation strategies.

The ability of Natanz to rapidly resume and expand enrichment activities in the face of international opposition demonstrated a calculated Iranian strategy to sustain latent nuclear capabilities. This resilience allowed Iran to exploit moments of decreased scrutiny or weakened enforcement to bolster its technical and strategic standing (Goldschmidt, 2010, p. 4; Albright, 2015, p. 3). By maintaining and expanding its nuclear infrastructure, Iran positioned itself to respond flexibly to shifting geopolitical conditions, using its programme as both a deterrent and a bargaining chip. This adaptability illustrated the multidimensional nature of Iran’s enrichment strategy, where technical innovation and strategic ambiguity were employed to maximize political leverage while avoiding outright confrontation.

The persistent expansion and adaptability of operations at Natanz exemplify the challenges posed by facility-specific counterproliferation efforts. The interplay of concealment, rapid escalation, and technological advancement highlighted the need for enforcement strategies that go beyond traditional verification mechanisms. These strategies must include real-time monitoring, enhanced intelligence sharing, and contingency planning to address the vulnerabilities of specific facilities and prevent further proliferation (Goldschmidt, 2010, p. 4; Albright, 2015, p. 3). The case of Natanz underscores the broader complexity of managing nuclear capabilities in a politically charged environment, where infrastructural fortification serves as both a technical necessity and a strategic instrument.

4.1.2 Fordow Facility Development

The Fordow enrichment facility holds a significant place in the discourse on Iran's nuclear programme due to its controversial construction and operational profile. Initially built in secrecy and only revealed to the international community in 2009, the discovery of this hardened underground facility escalated global concerns about Iran's nuclear intentions. The deliberate concealment of Fordow’s existence exemplifies a strategy Iran frequently employs to frustrate international monitoring efforts and safeguard clandestine developments. This secrecy-driven approach significantly challenged the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, underscoring the need for more robust mechanisms to identify and address undeclared nuclear facilities. The revelation of the site, initiated not by Iranian transparency but by Western intelligence disclosures, revealed patterns of obfuscation that have consistently undermined trust between Iran and the global community. These actions also reinforced perceptions that Iran’s programme was designed to retain a breakout capability by ensuring operational continuity even under worsening diplomatic conditions (Mangini, 2024, p. 12).

Recent advancements in Fordow’s infrastructure illustrate a systematic expansion of Iran’s enrichment capacity, signaling a broader pivot toward technical escalation in response to mounting geopolitical tension. In June 2024, Iran formally informed the IAEA of its plan to install 1,400 advanced centrifuges at Fordow within a span of three to four weeks. This rapid deployment represents a substantial technological leap, particularly when contrasted with earlier reliance on IR-1 centrifuges. The use of advanced models has exponentially increased the facility's enrichment throughput, cutting the time required to produce weapons-grade uranium. Such developments underline Iran’s prioritization of fortified enrichment capabilities within its overall strategy, especially following the dissolution of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The pace and scale of these upgrades further illustrate Iran's ability to circumvent the structural limitations previously imposed by the JCPOA, reflecting a deliberate recalibration of its nuclear policy to enhance both technical independence and strategic leverage (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 8).

The operational trajectory of Fordow, particularly post-JCPOA, highlights its transformation into a strategic asset within Iran’s nuclear posture. Inspections conducted by the IAEA in February 2023 revealed the presence of uranium particles enriched to 83.7%, an enrichment level that approaches weapons-grade material. This discovery starkly violated Iran’s commitments under earlier agreements to limit enrichment levels to much lower thresholds. The technical capacity demonstrated by this enrichment level signals Iran's growing mastery of high-grade enrichment processes while simultaneously challenging the assertion that its nuclear activities are exclusively for civilian purposes. These developments not only send a sharp geopolitical message but also directly test the international community’s ability to enforce non-proliferation norms effectively. The shift toward more overtly provocative activities at Fordow underscores the dual role of Iran’s nuclear programme as both a technological demonstration and a diplomatic bargaining tool (Peters & Robinson, 2024, p. 2).

The Fordow facility’s history and operational model highlight recurring weaknesses in international verification frameworks. Similar to earlier revelations about the Natanz and Arak facilities in 2002, Fordow was only acknowledged by Iranian authorities after it was exposed by foreign intelligence. This pattern of concealment suggests a calculated Iranian approach to mitigating oversight by constructing critical nuclear infrastructure underground and out of the IAEA’s immediate reach. The site's design, specifically its location deep within a mountain, is a tactical feature intended to protect it from potential sabotage or military strikes, thereby complicating both external intervention and inspection efforts. This strategic choice reflects Iran’s anticipation of external threats and its dedication to preserving the operational integrity of its nuclear programme in scenarios of heightened geopolitical tension. The historical concealment of Fordow and its subsequent transformation into a flashpoint for international concerns reveal the inadequacies of the IAEA’s existing tools for identifying undeclared facilities, particularly those equipped with hardened infrastructure (Nikou et al., 2018, p. 12).

The technical advancements and expanded capabilities at Fordow have significantly reduced the warning time available to the international community should Iran decide to pursue weapons production. These developments grant Fordow a latent breakout capability, meaning Iran could transition to weapons-grade enrichment rapidly if a political decision were made. This capacity undermines regional stability and exacerbates proliferation risks, as it reduces the time and options available for international actors to respond to escalation. The advancements in Fordow’s enrichment potential, combined with Iran’s continued deployment of advanced centrifuges in violation of JCPOA-era restrictions, signal a deliberate strategy to maintain high levels of technical readiness. This approach highlights the dual-track nature of Iran’s strategy, which relies on achieving operational resilience while retaining the flexibility to escalate enrichment activities as a response to unfolding geopolitical circumstances (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 13; Mangini, 2024, p. 12; Peters & Robinson, 2024, p. 2; Nikou et al., 2018, p. 12).

Fordow’s strategic importance is further amplified by its structural characteristics, which make it exceptionally resistant to external intervention. Its deep underground location serves as a “breakout insurance policy,” allowing Iran to sustain its nuclear project under conditions of intensified external pressure or military threats. This defensive positioning reinforces Iran’s dual objective of deterrence and negotiation leverage. By presenting Fordow as both a protected asset and a potential proliferation point, Iran signals its capacity for resilience while projecting bargaining strength in future negotiations. This strategy challenges the effectiveness of international responses to proliferation and demonstrates Iran’s capacity to adapt its infrastructure and policies to changing geopolitical realities, thereby maintaining its broad strategic objectives (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 13; Mangini, 2024, p. 12).

Recent developments, including the installation of advanced centrifuges and high-level enrichment activities, underscore the pressing need to address the vulnerabilities of current verification and enforcement mechanisms. The persistent enhancement of Fordow’s capabilities, despite international opposition, exemplifies the challenges of counterproliferation efforts in a politically charged environment. The facility’s ongoing expansion represents both a technical milestone for Iran and a stark reminder of the international community's limited capacity to constrain such advancements without broader structural reforms in global non-proliferation strategies.

4.1.3 Supporting Infrastructure

The supporting infrastructure of Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities is a critical component of its nuclear programme. This expansive network encompasses numerous elements essential to the operation and resilience of high-consumption sites such as Natanz and Fordow. The deliberate concealment of the Natanz facility until its exposure in 2002 underscores Iran's strategic emphasis on redundancy and secrecy. The facility's covert construction revealed the substantial challenges international monitoring agencies face in detecting and verifying undeclared activities and supporting infrastructure. This practice of constructing concealed facilities exemplifies the calculated measures taken to evade international scrutiny, reflecting Iran's broader strategy to sustain its nuclear ambitions despite regulatory frameworks (Albright, 2015, p. 2).

One of the defining characteristics of Iran’s infrastructure is the integration of concealed electrical and logistical support systems. Underground power lines and secondary access roads are examples of infrastructure designed to enable the rapid resumption and expansion of enrichment activities. These systems demonstrate a deliberate approach to ensuring operational resilience while minimizing vulnerabilities to sabotage or military strikes. This strategic foresight highlights Iran's understanding of the importance of protecting critical infrastructure against external threats, revealing a calculated approach to maintaining the continuity of its enrichment programme under adverse conditions (Albright, 2015, p. 3).

Iran's domestic procurement and manufacturing of specialized nuclear components further illustrate its commitment to minimizing foreign dependency. The attempt in 2011 to acquire 100,000 ring magnets suitable for IR-1 centrifuges provides a clear example of the lengths to which Iran is willing to go to circumvent international export controls. Such an acquisition, which could have supported the operation of up to 50,000 centrifuges, underscores a systematic strategy focused on stockpiling critical components. This approach not only highlights the vulnerabilities in existing export control regimes but also demonstrates Iran’s capacity to adapt and sustain its nuclear ambitions through internal resource development (Albright, 2015, p. 17).

The coordination of procurement efforts through front companies and industrial sectors emphasizes Iran’s adaptive strategies in countering international constraints. By embedding sensitive procurement activities within broader civilian industries, Iran has complicated detection efforts by intelligence agencies and export control bodies. This model of decentralized and covert procurement allows the programme to disperse risk while maintaining a steady supply of critical components. Such actions reveal a sophisticated understanding of international regulatory systems and expose the weaknesses in current enforcement mechanisms designed to limit nuclear proliferation (Albright, 2015, p. 17).

The operation of uranium conversion and fuel fabrication facilities is another cornerstone of Iran’s infrastructure. The Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan, which produced approximately 550 tons of uranium hexafluoride by 2004, exemplifies Iran's commitment to achieving technological self-sufficiency. The ability to process both indigenous and imported uranium feedstock at Isfahan and other sites demonstrates Iran’s technical proficiency and deliberate efforts to insulate its nuclear programme from external disruptions. This strategy not only reflects Iran’s pursuit of vertical integration within the nuclear fuel cycle but also highlights the programme’s resilience to external interdiction efforts (Heinonen, 2013, p. 3; Albright, 2015, p. 15).

Iran’s strategy of balancing self-reliance with targeted foreign procurement is further evidenced by its historical actions, such as the undisclosed purchase of foreign-origin uranium in 1991 from China. This acquisition exemplifies Iran's ability to exploit gaps in international regulatory frameworks while simultaneously bolstering its domestic processing capabilities. The dual approach of relying on both indigenous resources and foreign procurement has allowed Iran to navigate international restrictions effectively, thereby sustaining the growth of its nuclear programme over time (Albright, 2015, p. 15).

Legacy infrastructure plays a crucial role in Iran’s nuclear programme, as exemplified by the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Constructed in 1967 with international assistance, the TRR represents how Iran has systematically integrated older assets into its broader nuclear framework. The periodic upgrades to the TRR demonstrate Iran’s ability to leverage initial international cooperation to lay the groundwork for future advancements. This ability to modernize and sustain older assets reveals the strategic value Iran places on maximizing the utility of historical infrastructure to meet contemporary needs (Nikou et al., 2018, p. 1).

The investment in technical training and safety systems necessary for the maintenance and upgrade of legacy infrastructure signals Iran’s pragmatic recognition of the importance of programme continuity. These efforts ensure the reliability of supporting infrastructure, which is as crucial to the overall programme as the enrichment technology itself. The emphasis on human resource development and institutional capacity reinforces the resiliency of Iran’s nuclear programme and its preparedness to withstand external pressures (Nikou et al., 2018, p. 1).

Iran’s ability to overcome external economic and technological sanctions is further evidenced by its development of robust logistics systems and human resource mobilization. This adaptability mirrors broader trends observed in other sanctioned states and demonstrates Iran’s capacity for rapid technological advancement despite significant external constraints. The use of decentralized procurement, modular facility construction, and flexible logistics networks illustrates Iran’s anticipation of potential disruptions. These measures allow the programme to recover quickly from interruptions caused by sabotage, sanctions, or military action, ensuring the continued progress of its nuclear advancements (Albright, 2015, p. 17).

The historical actions and broader strategies of Iran’s nuclear programme provide a unique model for circumventing external pressures through domestic capacity-building. This model, while potentially inspiring for other states under similar constraints, poses significant long-term challenges for the international non-proliferation regime. The effectiveness of current counterproliferation measures is brought into question, as Iran’s adaptability and resilience have allowed it to sustain and expand its nuclear programme despite stringent sanctions and controls (Morreale, 2021, p. 17).

In conclusion, the supporting infrastructure of Iran’s nuclear programme reveals a carefully calculated and adaptive approach to sustaining enrichment capabilities while circumventing international restrictions. By combining strategic concealment, domestic capacity-building, and systematic exploitation of regulatory gaps, Iran has maintained the momentum of its nuclear advancements. However, this adaptability simultaneously underscores the limitations of current counterproliferation efforts, necessitating a critical reassessment of international strategies to address these enduring challenges.

4.2 Technical Advancement

Iran’s ongoing pursuit of technical innovation underpins its strategic nuclear and missile programmes, demonstrating rapid advancements in centrifuge and missile technologies. This dynamic underscores the country's ability to maintain and expand its capabilities despite international restrictions, further complicating verification and non-proliferation efforts within the broader regional security landscape.

4.2.1 Centrifuge Technology

The development of Iran's centrifuge technology represents a crucial and evolving dimension in its nuclear programme, reflecting a progression from reliance on imported designs to indigenous innovation. Initially, Iran's enrichment programme was heavily dependent on external blueprints and components, particularly focusing on the P-1 centrifuge model acquired from the A.Q. Khan network. The IR-1 centrifuges, based on this Pakistani design, were instrumental in establishing the foundational infrastructure for uranium enrichment at facilities such as Natanz. This reliance on foreign designs underscores the critical role of external proliferation networks in jumpstarting Iran's nuclear ambitions, while also highlighting the challenges facing international non-proliferation efforts that aim to prevent the dissemination of sensitive nuclear technologies (Heinonen, 2013, p. 4).

As international export controls tightened, Iran increasingly relied on reverse engineering and domestic innovation to advance its centrifuge technology. Models such as the IR-2m and IR-4 marked significant improvements over the IR-1 centrifuges. These advancements in efficiency and speed allowed for higher uranium enrichment rates, even as efforts by international agencies attempted to hinder Iran’s programme. The shift to indigenous production reflects Iran's adaptive capacity to overcome external constraints, demonstrating its ability to navigate restrictions while incrementally enhancing its technical capabilities. The emergence of these more advanced designs poses a direct challenge to existing counterproliferation measures, which often fail to address the complexity and persistence of states with determined nuclear agendas (Heinonen, 2013, p. 4; Albright, 2015, p. 2).

Iran's deliberate progression from IR-1 to the development and deployment of more advanced models such as the IR-6 and IR-8 underscores a strategic effort to optimize its enrichment capabilities while minimizing detection risks. These advanced models require fewer centrifuges to achieve more substantial enrichment results, reducing the physical footprint of installations and enhancing resilience against sabotage. This strategy reinforces Iran’s potential for a rapid nuclear breakout, effectively compressing the timeline to weapons-grade enrichment. Such developments illuminate the shortcomings of verification regimes established under agreements like the JCPOA, which failed to curtail Iran's R&D efforts in the long term (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 13).

The importance of ongoing research and development becomes evident in the context of Iran's violations of JCPOA restrictions, as the resumption and acceleration of sensitive nuclear activities reflect the strategic value of sustained technical innovation. Developing centrifuges capable of enriching uranium at increasingly higher rates illustrates both Iran’s commitment to maintaining its nuclear ambitions and the inadequacies of international frameworks to anticipate and neutralize such advancements. The consistent expansion of domestic capabilities undermines the effectiveness of externally imposed limitations, necessitating a reevaluation of strategies to address this evolving proliferation challenge (Heinonen, 2013, p. 2; Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 8).

Concerns about the rapid pace of Iran’s centrifuge advancements extend beyond technical achievements. The acquisition and use of critical components, such as the 2011 attempt to procure 100,000 ring magnets suitable for IR-1 centrifuges, exemplify systemic vulnerabilities in global export control regimes. This procurement effort, sufficient to equip 50,000 centrifuges, highlights the sophistication and scale of Iran’s clandestine supply chains, as well as the challenges posed by dual-use technologies that can serve both civilian and military purposes. The episode raises pressing questions about the adaptability of export controls and the broader international community’s capacity to address systematic loopholes that enable nuclear development (Albright, 2015, p. 17).

Iran’s ability to circumvent international restrictions is further evidenced by its covert procurement operations and the strengthening of domestic manufacturing capacities. By embedding sensitive procurement efforts within civilian industrial activities, Iran has successfully concealed its intentions while maintaining a steady progression of its enrichment programme. The 2011 case of ring magnet acquisition highlights the limitations of current enforcement mechanisms, illustrating the need for a more intelligence-driven and interconnected approach to disrupt such clandestine networks. These challenges emphasize the necessity of enhancing international coordination and oversight to address the persistent threat posed by covert procurement strategies (Albright, 2015, p. 17).

The rapid expansion of Iran's centrifuge infrastructure is also apparent in significant surges in operational capacity, such as the 2024 announcement of plans to install approximately 1,400 advanced centrifuges at the Fordow facility. This escalation highlights the effectiveness of Iran’s logistical and procurement networks, as well as its ability to mobilize resources quickly, even in the face of international sanctions. The resilience and scalability of this infrastructure further demonstrate the insufficiency of conventional counterproliferation measures, which often struggle to keep pace with Iran's technical advances and adaptive strategies (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 8).

Iran’s consistent success in scaling its centrifuge capabilities reveals critical gaps in global non-proliferation policies. The failure of simple embargoes and export controls to prevent such advances underscores the importance of coordinated, intelligence-led interventions. The persistence of Iran's procurement strategies raises concerns about the resilience and adaptability of its networks, which have proven capable of sustaining the nuclear programme despite formidable obstacles. These developments point to the need for greater international coherence in monitoring and enforcement efforts to limit the proliferation risks posed by increasingly sophisticated clandestine operations (Rautio et al., 2017, p. 36).

The installation of advanced centrifuge cascades at both Natanz and Fordow highlights a deliberate strategy to reduce the time required for producing weapons-grade uranium. As of May 2024, Iran’s estimated breakout time was assessed at one week for a single weapon’s worth of material, demonstrating the operational impact of transitioning from IR-1 to IR-6 and IR-8 models. This compressed timeline has profound implications for international security, as it significantly reduces the window available for diplomatic or military intervention. The strategic nature of these advancements suggests a deliberate effort to maximize bargaining power while deterring adversaries and complicating global counterproliferation responses (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 13).

Iran’s shift to more advanced models capable of higher enrichment rates illustrates the broader trend of nuclear hedging, whereby the state preserves and enhances its technical capabilities to maintain strategic flexibility. This approach allows Iran to adapt its nuclear posture to respond dynamically to geopolitical circumstances, leveraging its programme both as a deterrence tool and a negotiating chip. The pattern of halting and resuming enrichment activities, often in response to external developments, demonstrates the complexity of Iran's strategy and its ability to exploit diplomatic shifts to further its nuclear objectives (Heinonen, 2013, p. 2; Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 8).

The evolution of Iran’s centrifuge programme underscores the interconnectedness of technical innovation, strategic resilience, and geopolitical signaling. By blending indigenous development with components derived from foreign sources, Iran has built a programme that is both sustainable and technically sophisticated. The challenges posed by these advancements necessitate a reassessment of international monitoring capabilities, as well as the effectiveness of existing non-proliferation agreements. Addressing these issues will require dynamic and forward-looking counterproliferation strategies that can adapt to the rapid pace of technological progress and anticipatory procurement efforts (Rautio et al., 2017, p. 36).

The persistent expansion and modernization of Iran's centrifuge infrastructure, despite external pressure, underscore the challenges faced by international non-proliferation regimes. The ability of Iran to scale and intensify its enrichment activities reflects a deeply rooted strategy that bridges technological advancement with strategic ambiguity. The sustained evolution of centrifuge technology calls for continuous reassessment of counterproliferation measures to mitigate the risks of nuclear latency and breakout potential.

4.2.2 Enrichment Levels and Stockpiles

The escalation of Iran’s uranium enrichment levels since the dissolution of the JCPOA demonstrates a calculated and strategic shift in its nuclear policy. Enrichment levels have now reached up to 60%, far exceeding the 3.67% ceiling established under the agreement and placing Iran alarmingly close to the threshold of weapons-grade uranium, which requires enrichment to approximately 90% (Kerr, 2025, p. 29; Samore, 2022, p. 4; Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 27). This progression is emblematic of a deeper political strategy, as Iran intentionally uses these advancements to signal its capabilities to regional and international actors while reducing the breakout time required for weaponization. Such calculated measures pose significant challenges to global non-proliferation norms and frameworks, raising concerns about the adequacy of existing mechanisms to address rapid and deliberate breaches by determined state actors.

The technical leap enabling these higher levels of enrichment has been underpinned by advances in centrifuge technology and the deployment of more efficient models, such as the IR-6 and IR-8, at facilities like Natanz and Fordow (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 8). These technical upgrades not only reflect Iran’s prioritization of infrastructural resilience and self-sufficiency but also demonstrate its ability to maintain nuclear progress despite international restrictions and sanctions. By exceeding 20% enrichment as early as 2010 and now consistently enriching to 60%, with particles enriched up to 84% discovered at Fordow, Iran has blurred the lines between civilian and military nuclear applications (Nikou et al., 2018, p. 9; Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 27). This ambiguity complicates international verification efforts and underscores the urgency of addressing the proliferation risks posed by Iran’s growing nuclear proficiency.

Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles now vastly surpass the 300-kilogram cap imposed by the JCPOA, with the IAEA estimating an inventory of approximately 4,537 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride enriched to varying levels above 2% U-235 (Kerr, 2025, p. 29; Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 13; Samore, 2022, p. 4). These quantities include significant amounts enriched to 5%, 20%, and 60%, drastically shortening Iran’s breakout timeline and its ability to produce weapons-grade material. This stockpile expansion is not purely a technical development but a strategic one, responding to external pressures such as reimposed U.S. sanctions. It serves as both a means of enhancing Iran’s latent deterrence capabilities and as leverage in potential negotiations (Kerr, 2025, p. 29; Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 13). The diversity in enrichment levels within the stockpile further provides Iran with the technical flexibility to escalate its nuclear programme while complicating monitoring and intervention efforts by international actors.

The scale and composition of Iran’s uranium stockpile reflect a broader strategy of strategic ambiguity and hedging. By amassing material that could be rapidly weaponized, Iran increases regional insecurity while maintaining plausible deniability regarding its ultimate intentions (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 13). The partial transparency exhibited in Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA exacerbates this challenge, as inconsistent collaboration undermines robust verification efforts while intentionally complicating threat assessments (Kerr, 2025, p. 9). This approach exposes vulnerabilities in the global non-proliferation framework, highlighting the limitations of existing mechanisms to address such a calculated and deliberate proliferation strategy.

The pace of Iran’s enriched uranium production underscores the significance of its technical advancements. The IAEA documented monthly production rates of approximately 10 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium and 5 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium by mid-2022, illustrating Iran’s ability to sustain high levels of output despite external constraints (Samore, 2022, p. 5; Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 13). This acceleration reveals a systematic approach to maximizing output and minimizing detection time for a potential breakout scenario (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 8; Samore, 2022, p. 4). Additionally, the resilience and scalability of Iran’s nuclear programme, evident in its ability to sustain high operational capacities, highlight the inadequacy of traditional counterproliferation measures and call for the development of more adaptive and intrusive verification mechanisms.

The rapid escalation in enrichment rates does not merely have technical and strategic implications but also raises significant geopolitical concerns. It serves as a warning sign to other regional actors, potentially encouraging reciprocal hedging strategies or latent proliferation activities that could exacerbate the fragile security environment in the Middle East. Historical patterns of Iran’s nuclear development further underscore its calculated strategy of alternating between periods of acceleration and transparency. For instance, the IAEA’s discovery of 27% enriched uranium at Fordow in 2012 and Iran’s achievement of 20% enrichment in 2010 demonstrate its use of nuclear advancements as both a bargaining tool and a means of deterrence (Nikou et al., 2018, pp. 9, 12; Švejdová, 2017, p. 7). This strategic pattern complicates the ability of international actors to implement consistent and effective measures to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Iran’s approach to uranium enrichment and stockpiling is deeply integrated into its broader strategy of maintaining latent breakout capabilities without openly pursuing weaponization. This dual-use strategy maximizes diplomatic leverage while minimizing direct confrontation with international regulators (Švejdová, 2017, p. 7; Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 13; Kerr, 2025, p. 29; Samore, 2022, p. 3). The timing and scale of compliance or non-compliance with international agreements illustrate the deliberate and adaptive nature of Iran’s strategy, which seeks to exploit diplomatic openings while retaining the technical means to escalate its programme as circumstances dictate (Samore, 2022, p. 3). This calculated ambiguity not only undermines global non-proliferation efforts but also fuels regional security dilemmas, as neighboring states may view Iran’s actions as a license to pursue their own nuclear capabilities.

The correlation between Iran’s uranium enrichment and stockpiling activities and its broader geopolitical calculations necessitates a more integrated and multi-layered approach to counterproliferation strategies. Iran’s technical advances in the form of higher enrichment rates and expanded stockpiles are not merely the result of internal scientific aspirations but are embedded within a broader framework of strategic ambiguity and calculated risk-taking (Švejdová, 2017, p. 7; Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 13; Kerr, 2025, p. 29; Samore, 2022, p. 3). These actions reveal the limitations of current counterproliferation approaches and the urgent need for adaptive, intelligence-driven, and anticipatory measures to mitigate the risks posed by such evolving nuclear capabilities.

4.2.3 Research and Development Programmes

Iran’s research and development (R&D) programmes in the nuclear sector have been defined by a deliberate and systematic focus on advancing centrifuge technology while maintaining strategic ambiguity. Starting with reliance on external designs, such as the IR-1 model based on Pakistani blueprints acquired through the A.Q. Khan network, Iran gradually shifted toward self-sufficiency and innovation. This progression allowed the development and deployment of more efficient centrifuge models, including the IR-6 and IR-8, which not only enhance uranium enrichment rates but also reduce the physical footprint of enrichment facilities, thereby complicating international detection and intervention efforts. The evolution of Iran’s R&D underscores its long-term ambition to simultaneously strengthen its technical capabilities and to insulate itself from external constraints. Notably, the 2011 attempt to procure 100,000 ring magnets sufficient for 50,000 centrifuges demonstrates the scale of Iran’s efforts and its commitment to stockpiling critical components (Albright, 2015, p. 17). This approach not only highlights vulnerabilities in global export control mechanisms but also underscores Iran’s focus on achieving strategic autonomy, leveraging technical advancements to minimize its reliance on foreign suppliers. The consistency of these R&D activities, even during periods of apparent international compliance, illustrates a calculated effort to retain military latency potential, emphasizing that Iran’s adherence to agreements like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has been more tactical than transformative.

One critical aspect of Iran’s nuclear R&D strategy lies in its reliance on covert facilities and compartmentalized research to sustain and advance weaponization-oriented capabilities. The AMAD Plan in the early 2000s, including the “Shock Generator Project” at the Sanjarian facility, exemplifies this approach. The work conducted at this facility, which focused on manufacturing and testing exploding bridgewires (EBWs) that are critical components for nuclear device triggers, highlights a calculated method to shield sensitive advancements from both external scrutiny and internal transparency (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 12). By maintaining a robust and compartmentalized infrastructure, Iran ensured that its weaponization research could be insulated from political and diplomatic pressures. This model not only facilitates the preservation of technical capabilities but also allows for rapid escalation should geopolitical circumstances demand it. The resilience of this approach demonstrates a calculated balancing act where Iran seeks to retain the option for reconstitution while carefully managing external perceptions. Such activities reveal the inherent limitations of international verification mechanisms which, even when robust, struggle to detect and address deeply entrenched and fragmented research frameworks.

The seizure of Iran’s “Atomic Archive” provides direct and unequivocal evidence of the sustained nature of its nuclear R&D efforts. The archive, composed of over 55,000 physical documents and 50,000 digital files, offers insight into Iran’s systematic establishment of institutional frameworks designed to preserve knowledge related to nuclear weaponization (Tertrais, 2020, p. 2). For example, “Project 110” aimed to advance the production of five implosion-type nuclear devices and involved extensive participation by specialized personnel under the leadership of Mohsen Fakrizadeh (Tertrais, 2020, pp. 3–4). The deliberate retention of technical specifications, test plans, and project management records, even after Iran ostensibly halted weaponization work, reflects a strategic orientation toward maintaining continuity of knowledge. This practice not only highlights the challenges faced by international regimes tasked with ensuring compliance but also underscores the importance of addressing bureaucratic and technical infrastructures that can perpetuate latent nuclear capabilities. Iran’s ability to compartmentalize and archive its R&D efforts ensures that it can respond swiftly to strategic shifts, thereby maintaining a credible deterrent posture while evading more stringent scrutiny.

Since 2018, following the partial dissolution of the JCPOA, there has been renewed evidence of accelerated Iranian R&D activities despite the economic and diplomatic consequences. Iran publicly resumed enrichment to 60%, exceeded JCPOA thresholds for heavy water retention, and installed advanced centrifuge cascades at its Natanz and Fordow facilities (Eisenstadt, 2015, p. 5; Tertrais, 2020, p. 7). By openly challenging the boundaries of international agreements, Iran has demonstrated its willingness to escalate technical capacities as a form of political leverage. The rapid deployment of advanced models like the IR-6 and IR-8 reflects not only Iran’s incremental technical progress but also its aim of reducing breakout timelines while bearing the risks of renewed sanctions or potential military confrontation. This calculated approach highlights the inherent weakness of agreements like the JCPOA, which, despite short-term successes in curbing enrichment levels, failed to address the underlying infrastructure and expertise critical to sustaining Iran’s programme. The reversibility of Iran’s compliance exposes the fragility of global non-proliferation efforts and raises questions about the long-term viability of treaties that do not impose permanent constraints on R&D or dismantle key infrastructures.

A recurring theme in intelligence assessments and IAEA reports is Iran’s strategic use of diversity, concealment, and incremental innovation to sustain its R&D programmes and to maintain latent nuclear capabilities. By dispersing sensitive research across multiple facilities and embedding projects within civilian frameworks, Iran has systematically reduced the risk of detection while ensuring continuity in its technical advancements (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 12; Tertrais, 2020, pp. 2–4). The AMAD Plan’s use of specialized teams and compartmentalized workflows exemplifies this broader strategy, in which the ambiguity of dual-use technologies further complicates regulatory efforts. The existence of latent capabilities not only sustains Iran’s deterrent posture but also furthers the possibility of a deliberate breakout scenario, where the technical and organizational groundwork significantly reduces the time and resources required to construct nuclear weapons. This multifaceted R&D framework poses significant challenges to international non-proliferation regimes, which must contend with both the technical sophistication of Iran’s advancements and its strategic calculus in leveraging these capabilities for diplomatic and security gains.

Iran’s ability to sustain continuity in its R&D programmes, both technologically and institutionally, underscores the importance of addressing the structural and strategic dimensions of its nuclear approach. By maintaining a calculated balance between compliance and defiance, Iran has effectively challenged the efficacy of existing counterproliferation measures. The persistence and progression of its R&D efforts highlight the need for more adaptive, intelligence-driven strategies that go beyond the enforcement of static agreements. Addressing the latent capabilities embedded within Iran’s nuclear framework will require a reevaluation of current approaches, emphasizing greater transparency, enhanced verification mechanisms, and a more comprehensive understanding of Iran’s broader strategic objectives.

4.3 Delivery Systems

The chapter explores Iran’s evolving missile and delivery systems, emphasizing their technological advancements, operational capabilities, and strategic integration. Within the broader context of regional security and proliferation risks, these systems serve as crucial components of Iran’s deterrence posture and regional influence, demanding careful analysis of their development and implications.

4.3.1 Missile Programme Evolution

The origins of Iran’s missile programme can be traced back to the strategic vulnerabilities it faced during the Iran-Iraq War. Lacking an effective means of retaliation against Iraq’s missile assaults, Iran turned to external suppliers, such as Libya, Syria, and North Korea, to acquire Scud-B systems. This period marked the beginning of Iran's focus on missile-based deterrence and power projection, which would become central to its national defence strategy (Taleblu, 2023, p. 11; Tarzi, 2007, p. 2). The strategic significance of missiles during the war not only fulfilled immediate defensive needs but also institutionalized the perception that missile technology was vital for national survival. This institutional shift catalyzed long-term investments in missile development and reinforced a doctrinal emphasis on asymmetric deterrence, whereby missiles would serve as a low-cost but effective tool to counterbalance the conventional military superiority of adversaries.

Over the span of four decades, Iran’s missile development transitioned from reliance on foreign suppliers to robust indigenous production. This transformation was largely driven by Tehran’s success in procuring complete missile systems and associated technologies from North Korea, which became a critical external partner in the early stages of Iran’s programme (Taleblu, 2023, p. 14). By combining imported designs with domestic adaptations, Iran gradually established a self-sufficient infrastructure for missile research and development. This evolution enabled the production of a diversified arsenal that includes both liquid-fueled and solid-fueled systems, circumventing international embargoes and sanctions (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). However, the ability to sustain this transition also reflects the inadequacies of global counterproliferation measures, which failed to close critical gaps in technology transfer controls. The progression from dependency to domestic innovation underscores Iran’s resilience in overcoming technical and logistical hurdles, allowing the programme to flourish despite sustained international opposition.

The pace and scale of Iran’s missile activities experienced a notable acceleration following the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Between July 2015 and December 2022, Iran conducted at least 228 ballistic missile launches, encompassing surface-to-surface tests and the development of satellite launch vehicles (Taleblu, 2023, pp. 9, 23). This uptick in missile testing demonstrates a deliberate strategy to signal technological resilience and readiness in response to international scrutiny. The high frequency of tests highlights Iran’s prioritization of operational readiness, a factor that enhances its capacity to deter adversaries and project power. Moreover, these activities illustrate the dual role of missile advancements as both a technical milestone and a diplomatic tool for managing external pressures. The consistent testing of missiles, even during periods of heightened sanctions, underscores the Iranian leadership’s determination to sustain and expand its missile programme, further challenging international norms against missile proliferation.

Iran’s missile arsenal has evolved into an expansive inventory of both liquid-fueled and solid-fueled systems, reflecting the nation’s growing technical sophistication and strategic ambitions. Currently, the inventory includes six to eight models of liquid-fueled ballistic missiles and up to twelve solid-fueled systems. These systems are tailored to operate within a self-imposed range limit of 2,000 kilometers, a restriction widely interpreted as an effort to mitigate international backlash while maintaining the capability to target regional adversaries (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). Notable examples include the Qiam-1, with an 800-kilometer range and a 500-kilogram warhead, and the modular Fateh family, which spans ranges from 300 to 1,400 kilometers. The Sajjil medium-range ballistic missile, with its 2,000-kilometer range and 700-kilogram warhead capacity, exemplifies Iran’s focus on enhancing payload delivery and guidance precision (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). These advancements are emblematic of a broader strategy to improve the reach, accuracy, and survivability of its missile forces, while simultaneously challenging counterproliferation initiatives that rely on traditional mechanisms such as sanctions and embargoes.

One of the defining characteristics of Iran’s missile development programme is its integration into the nation’s broader regional strategy, which includes the transfer of missile technology and expertise to allied non-state actors. The export of missiles and related technologies to groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and militias in Gaza serves as a force multiplier for Iran’s influence in the region. Official Iranian military statements have openly acknowledged this support, framing it as a strategy that reinforces the deterrence capabilities of aligned non-state actors (Taleblu, 2023, p. 24; Tarzi, 2007, p. 4). This approach not only extends Iran’s strategic depth but also complicates efforts to counter missile proliferation, as the line between state and proxy capabilities becomes increasingly blurred. The proliferation of missile systems among non-state actors further destabilizes the region by amplifying asymmetric warfare capabilities, thereby exacerbating existing security dilemmas and undermining conventional military balances.

Despite decades of sustained international efforts aimed at curbing missile proliferation, Iran has consistently demonstrated an ability to adapt and innovate in response to external constraints. Sanctions, export controls, and diplomatic pressure have all been employed to restrict missile development, yet these measures have failed to reverse or even significantly slow the programme’s progress (Taleblu, 2023, p. 10; Albright, 2015, p. 2). Iran’s continued expansion of its missile arsenal underscores the resilience of its development efforts and the integration of missile technologies into its national security doctrine. The enduring advancements in missile capabilities highlight the limitations of static counterproliferation measures, which lack the flexibility to respond to the dynamic strategies employed by determined state actors. Addressing the persistent proliferation challenges posed by Iran’s missile programme will require innovative and multilayered approaches that combine technical, diplomatic, and intelligence-driven solutions.

4.3.2 Technical Specifications

Iran’s diverse missile arsenal represents a deliberate and strategic focus on advancing both liquid- and solid-fuel ballistic missile systems, underscoring operational flexibility and resilience in the face of counterproliferation efforts. With six to eight liquid-fueled models and up to twelve solid-fueled variants, the programme reflects a methodical approach to maintaining a robust deterrence capability. The technological resilience demonstrated by this range of systems highlights Iran’s ability to adapt its missile technology to circumvent restrictive sanctions and international monitoring measures aimed at curbing its proliferation activities (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). The emphasis on diversity and adaptability allows Iran to tailor its missile systems to specific regional security challenges while complicating adversarial defence planning.

A prime example of Iran’s technical advances is the Qiam-1 missile, which has an operational range of 800 kilometers and features a 500-kilogram separable warhead. The warhead’s ground-based guidance augmentation enhances its accuracy, making it a potent tool for regional strikes (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). This missile demonstrates Iran’s growing capability to produce customized systems adapted to various operational contexts. The separable warhead design represents a significant leap forward in missile precision and versatility, enabling the Qiam-1 to evade missile defence systems more effectively than earlier designs. This adaptation underscores Iran’s prioritization of enhanced targeting capabilities while maintaining cost-effective production methodologies.

The Emad missile exemplifies Iran’s push towards regional power projection with its claimed range of 1,800 kilometers. This capability extends Iran’s reach far beyond its immediate neighbors, posing potential threats to more distant adversaries while signaling its growing strategic ambitions (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). Such advancements in range not only elevate Iran’s power projection capabilities but also demonstrate the effectiveness of its missile research and development programmes. However, the Emad’s extended range raises questions about the underlying strategic intentions, particularly in the context of regional and international security dynamics. It reflects an ongoing tension between Iran’s stated defensive posture and its actions, which increasingly appear aimed at solidifying a position of regional hegemony.

The development of the Sajjil medium-range ballistic missile further advances Iran’s missile technology. With a range of 2,000 kilometers, the Sajjil is capable of covering the entire Middle East and parts of Europe, while its solid-fuel propulsion ensures quicker launch times, making it less vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). The Sajjil demonstrates Iran’s prioritization of survivability and operational readiness in its missile programme, reflecting a strategic calculation to enhance deterrence by improving missile launch capabilities. This move toward solid-fuel technology marks a critical evolution in Iran’s missile capabilities, minimizing logistical constraints while complicating adversaries' attempts at early detection and neutralization.

Iran’s choice to adhere to an operational range limit of 2,000 kilometers in its deployed missiles may represent either a technical constraint or a strategic decision to temper international backlash while maintaining substantial regional coverage (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). By self-imposing this range limit, Iran may aim to manage perceptions of its intentions, reducing the risk of escalating international pressures or military confrontations. Nevertheless, the strategic implications of this decision remain contentious, as it raises the possibility that Iran is calibrating its missile programme to maximize deterrence and leverage without crossing critical thresholds that provoke more severe repercussions.

The origins of Iran’s missile programme trace back to imported Scud models, which served as the technological foundation for its indigenous production and innovation efforts. Over time, Iran achieved independence from foreign suppliers, gradually developing its own extensive missile arsenal through iterative advancements in both liquid- and solid-fuel technologies (Taleblu, 2023, p. 14; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). This progression highlights both the inadequacy of international counterproliferation mechanisms in preventing technology transfers and Iran’s resilience in overcoming technical and logistical challenges. The reliance on imports in the programme’s early stages evolved into a capacity to produce sophisticated indigenous systems, a transformation that underscores Iran’s ability to sustain long-term investments in missile development. Iran’s willingness to test missiles of varying ranges, from long-range systems of 3,000–4,000 kilometers to shorter-range variants like the 1,200-kilometer missiles fired into Syria in 2017, also highlights its adaptability in aligning testing with strategic and political goals (Landau, 2017, pp. 3, 5).

The Fateh family of missiles further illustrates Iran’s adaptation capabilities, with ranges spanning from approximately 300 kilometers to a claimed 1,400 kilometers in their latest models (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). These solid-fuel missiles are particularly notable for their modular construction, which enables rapid upgrades and increases operational flexibility. The incremental improvements seen in the Fateh family demonstrate Iran’s determined focus on enhancing missile performance and adaptability. However, these advancements also raise concerns about the potential integration of nuclear capabilities into these systems, given their high level of precision and payload versatility.

Indigenous missile design and production provide Iran with critical strategic advantages, allowing it to tailor missile characteristics to specific operational needs while insulating its development programmes from external supply chain disruptions (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4; Taleblu, 2023, p. 24). This self-sufficiency is essential to sustaining the resilience of its missile forces, particularly under the constraints of international sanctions and restrictive measures. Iran’s continued investment in missile infrastructure and research reflects a calculated effort to maintain and expand its capabilities as a cornerstone of its national defence strategy. The proliferation of these capabilities has, however, raised significant concerns, exemplified by the placement of sanctions on 25 individuals and entities tied to Iran’s ballistic missile programme following missile tests in 2016, tests which demonstrated ranges that could theoretically carry nuclear warheads (Landau, 2017, p. 3).

Technological advancements in missile guidance and warhead separation are evident in systems like the Qiam-1 and newer Fateh variants. These features significantly enhance precision and the effectiveness of Iran’s missile arsenal, further complicating regional adversaries' defence planning (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). The development of such capabilities highlights the dual-use nature of Iran’s missile advancements, which can serve both conventional military objectives and potential nuclear delivery roles. This expanding technological sophistication underscores the strategic challenges posed by Iran’s missile programme to global and regional security frameworks.

The modularity of Iranian missile designs ensures that they remain adaptable to future technological innovations, including improved guidance systems and alternative warhead configurations (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). This strategic foresight allows Iran to extend the operational relevance of its missile systems, ensuring they remain effective against evolving defence technologies. The ability to integrate new components into existing systems further increases the resilience and versatility of Iran’s missile arsenal, enhancing its deterrence value while complicating international counterproliferation efforts.

Iran’s sustained development of space and satellite launch vehicles, which share dual-use technologies with ballistic missiles, highlights the overlap between military and civilian applications. These programmes provide Iran with valuable technical knowledge that can be applied to the development of intercontinental delivery systems, raising suspicions about its long-term intentions (Chubin, 2010, p. 1; Taleblu, 2023, p. 9). The dual-use nature of such technology complicates international verification efforts, as it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate between civilian and military objectives. Iran’s advances in this area demonstrate its ability to circumvent restrictions while maintaining a technically credible deterrent.

Since the implementation of the JCPOA, Iran’s missile testing activities have increased substantially, with at least 228 ballistic missile launches recorded between July 2015 and December 2022 (Taleblu, 2023, pp. 9, 23). This testing regime demonstrates Iran’s commitment to maintaining an operationally ready and advanced missile arsenal despite international scrutiny. The frequency and scale of these tests provide Iran with critical data for improving missile reliability, range, and accuracy. These activities also serve to signal Iran’s technological achievements and political resolve to domestic, regional, and international audiences, further enhancing its deterrence posture.

By conducting regular missile tests, Iran has been able to refine its missile designs while countering international diplomatic pressures. The testing programme underscores the resilience of Iran’s missile capabilities, which have persisted despite sustained sanctions and monitoring efforts (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). The continuation of these activities reflects Iran’s strategic calculation to balance its domestic and international priorities while maintaining a robust deterrent framework. However, this persistent advancement challenges the effectiveness of traditional counterproliferation measures, emphasizing the need for more adaptive policy responses.

Iran’s missile development strategy prioritizes both quantitative expansion and qualitative enhancement, ensuring that its arsenal remains credible and flexible across a range of operational scenarios. This approach not only reinforces its deterrence capabilities but also provides leverage in regional and international negotiations (Taleblu, 2023, p. 24; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). The improvement in missile targeting precision and modularity further strengthens Iran’s ability to adapt its arsenal to emerging threats and operational requirements, underscoring the strategic value of its missile programme.

The technological priorities evident in Iran’s missile programme, including modular designs and advanced guidance systems, illustrate its intention to sustain a credible deterrent while preserving strategic flexibility. These advancements complicate the efforts of international actors to mitigate the proliferation risks associated with Iran’s ongoing missile activities (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). The persistence of Iran’s missile development, despite international scrutiny and restrictive measures, demonstrates the limitations of current counterproliferation approaches and the need for more comprehensive strategies to address the underlying drivers of proliferation.

4.3.3 Integration Capabilities

The integration of nuclear weapons design with delivery systems represents a complex and strategic dimension of Iran's broader nuclear ambitions. Evidence from the Iranian Nuclear Archive reveals a concerted effort under the AMAD Plan’s Project 110 to overcome technical challenges in mating implosion-type nuclear warheads with ballistic missile platforms. Detailed documentation, including technical drawings, project timelines, and progress reports, underscores that this was a state-level initiative aimed at operationalizing the deliverability of nuclear devices. This level of institutionalization reflects the importance Iran attaches to ensuring that its nuclear programme remains a credible component of its strategic deterrence posture. Notably, the detailed focus on warhead-to-missile integration challenges the narrative that Iran’s nuclear activities have solely peaceful purposes (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1).

The manufacturing of five implosion-type nuclear devices as part of Project 110 was both a theoretical and practical undertaking, demonstrating advanced engineering capabilities. Key subcomponents, such as “shock wave generators,” and high-explosive testing at facilities like Sanjarian were instrumental in advancing Iran’s knowledge base. The development of compact warhead designs compatible with missile re-entry vehicles highlights the tangible progress made by Iran towards achieving functional integration. These technical advancements surpass what would be required for civilian nuclear applications, providing further evidence of a military dimension that underpins Iran's nuclear research efforts. The systematic nature of these activities reinforces that Iran's nuclear programme is deeply rooted in long-term strategic planning, with weapon deliverability acting as a cornerstone of its approach (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, pp. 1, 12).

Facilities like Sanjarian played pivotal roles in facilitating the integration process, specifically in the development of components essential for reliable nuclear warhead deployment. Exploding bridgewires, high-explosive tests, and other critical technologies were developed in highly specialized and compartmentalized environments. This approach to research and development highlights Iran’s strategy of shielding sensitive advancements from scrutiny, ensuring that critical infrastructure and knowledge remain preserved even under international inspections or external pressures. Such compartmentalization ensures that Iran retains the ability to revive or accelerate weaponization efforts at short notice, should geopolitical conditions shift in its favor. This deliberate insulation of sensitive projects demonstrates a calculated balance between compliance with international agreements and the preservation of strategic readiness (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, pp. 1, 12; Tertrais, 2020, p. 2).

The findings from Project 110 challenge Iran’s public claims about the peaceful nature of its nuclear ambitions. The integration of warhead and missile development reveals an explicit military intent and preparation that extend beyond civilian nuclear needs. The maintenance of detailed archives, complete with structured reporting and institutional frameworks, supports the argument that Iran has pursued latent capabilities to keep its options open. Such practices emphasize the failure of international verification mechanisms to fully address the dual-use nature of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. While agreements like the JCPOA aimed to curtail uranium enrichment and impose restrictions on specific activities, they did little to dismantle the latent capacities preserved through compartmentalized R&D and documentation retention (Tertrais, 2020, p. 2; Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1).

Analysis of Iran’s existing missile capabilities further underscores a deliberate strategy to achieve nuclear deliverability. Medium-range ballistic missiles like the Sajjil, capable of delivering a 700-kilogram warhead over a range of 2,000 kilometers, are a clear example of systems designed with nuclear payloads in mind. The technical design of other systems, such as the Qiam-1 and the modular Fateh family, reflects adaptability for dual-use functionality. By emphasizing flexibility and survivability, Iran has ensured that its missile force remains potent under a variety of mission profiles, including the potential deployment of nuclear warheads. The increasing sophistication of these platforms underscores how Iran has managed to preserve capabilities that strategically enhance its deterrence while remaining publicly ambiguous about its nuclear intentions (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4).

Iran's history of importing complete missile systems, particularly from North Korea, played a critical role in establishing the initial technical foundation for its indigenous missile development efforts. This transfer of dual-use technology and expertise enabled progress in warhead miniaturization, guidance systems, and re-entry vehicle optimization, all of which are directly relevant to nuclear weapon delivery. The persistence of these capabilities highlights the inefficacy of global counterproliferation measures in preventing the transfer of sensitive technologies. Moreover, Iran’s ability to indigenize such technologies underscores its determination and technical resilience in the face of sustained international sanctions and embargoes (Taleblu, 2023, p. 14; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4).

The consistent focus on improving missile guidance systems and warhead separation technology within Iran’s missile development programme further bolsters its military adaptability. Features like ground-based guidance augmentation and modular missile designs enhance accuracy and operational flexibility, serving dual-use purposes for both conventional and nuclear missions. This strategic emphasis on precision aligns with the requirements of a limited nuclear arsenal, where high accuracy is crucial for deterrence credibility. Despite assertions of peaceful intent, such advancements point to a broader strategy aimed at maintaining a latent nuclear posture with rapid breakout potential (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4; Taleblu, 2023, p. 24).

Iran’s self-imposed missile range limit of 2,000 kilometers appears to be a calculated decision aimed at mitigating international backlash while maintaining sufficient reach to target regional adversaries. This operational constraint aligns with a deterrence-by-denial doctrine, complicating external efforts to preemptively neutralize Iran’s missile force. Although this range limit may appear as a form of self-restraint, it is also pragmatic, enabling Iran to position itself as a regional power without crossing red lines that might provoke direct military intervention. Nevertheless, the survivability and dispersal potential of Iran’s missile systems further complicate strategic calculations for its adversaries, ensuring that Iran retains a credible second-strike capability (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4).

The significant increase in missile testing since the implementation of the JCPOA highlights Iran’s commitment to ensuring operational readiness while leveraging its advancements for political signaling. The frequency and scale of these tests, including at least 228 launches between 2015 and 2022, provide valuable data for improving reliability while simultaneously conveying resolve to both domestic and international audiences. This systematic testing regime illustrates Iran’s approach to maintaining a latent nuclear delivery capability, creating uncertainty among adversaries and enhancing deterrence. Such activities demonstrate the limitations of traditional counterproliferation measures, emphasizing the need for adaptive and intelligence-driven approaches to effectively monitor and address these developments (Taleblu, 2023, pp. 9, 23).

Finally, Iran’s missile development and integration capabilities are closely tied to its broader regional strategy, which includes the transfer of missile technologies to allied non-state actors. By providing such support to groups like Hezbollah and militias in Gaza, Iran extends its strategic depth and complicates regional security dynamics. This proliferation by diffusion not only strengthens Iran’s deterrence posture but also undermines international efforts to curb missile technology transfers. Furthermore, the possibility of sharing nuclear-capable designs with proxies presents a critical challenge for verification regimes, as it blurs the lines between state and non-state actors in the proliferation landscape. Addressing these vulnerabilities will require a reevaluation of current strategies to incorporate more robust enforcement mechanisms and collaborative intelligence-sharing frameworks (Samson, 2023, pp. 6-7; Taleblu, 2023, p. 24).

Iran’s persistent focus on preserving nuclear weaponization knowledge and its ability to integrate this with advanced delivery systems represents a significant challenge to international non-proliferation efforts. Intelligence confirmed the dual-track nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, where public compliance masks the retention of long-term capabilities. This calculated strategy not only complicates efforts to ensure transparency but also exacerbates regional arms racing dynamics, further destabilizing the Middle East. The findings illustrate the profound limitations of current international counterproliferation measures, highlighting the need for innovative approaches that address both the technical and strategic dimensions of Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

5. Strategic Implications and Regional Security

The regional security landscape of the Middle East is profoundly shaped by Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its expanding strategic influence. This section explores the complex power dynamics, alliances, and military balances that influence stability and proliferation risks across the region. As Iran’s capabilities evolve, neighboring states and regional actors continuously adjust their strategies, creating a high-stakes environment of competition and mistrust that underscores the importance of coordinated responses and security frameworks. These developments are central to understanding the broader implications of Iran's nuclear trajectory within the global effort to maintain peace and non-proliferation.

5.1 Middle Eastern Power Dynamics

The intricate power relationships and strategic alliances shaping the Middle East are deeply influenced by Iran’s expanding nuclear and missile capabilities. As regional actors respond to Iran’s ambitions through formal and informal measures, these dynamics significantly impact regional stability and security. Understanding these evolving interactions is essential for grasping the broader implications of Iran’s nuclear trajectory within the complex geopolitical landscape. This analysis situates Iran’s influence within the regional context, highlighting shifts in alliances, military balances, and emerging proliferation risks.

5.1.1 Interstate Relations

The intensification of interstate rivalries in the Middle East is significantly influenced by Iran’s evolving nuclear programme, which has contributed to the emergence of new regional security arrangements. One such formation is the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT), announced by Saudi Arabia in 2015. This alliance, consisting of 34 states, was not merely a symbolic gesture but a strategic response to Iran’s growing regional power and its interventions in neighboring states (Tehsin, 2017, p. 9). The creation of IMAFT highlights a collective apprehension among Sunni-majority states about Iran’s perceived ambitions, particularly in terms of its nuclear capabilities and the broader scope of its influence across the Middle East. The alliance’s military focus underscores a willingness to coordinate on active measures to counterbalance what is often described as Iran’s expansionist agenda. The subsequent formation of a nine-state military coalition to intervene in Yemen, aimed at combating the Iran-backed Houthi movement, represents another critical milestone in this pattern of securitized alliance-building (Tehsin, 2017, p. 12). This military intervention was shaped by the perception that Iran’s activities in Yemen, such as arms transfers and logistical support to the Houthis, constituted a projection of influence beyond its borders. However, these interventions have not resolved regional tensions, instead contributing to a self-reinforcing security dilemma. The cycle of escalation and counter-escalation remains a defining feature of Middle Eastern geopolitics, where measures taken to contain Iranian influence often provoke further entrenchment of its proxies and strategic initiatives.

Iran’s regional influence strategy is characterized by a dual approach of direct intervention and proxy engagement, particularly in conflict zones such as Lebanon and Iraq. Tehran has provided advanced weaponry, military training, and operational support to proxy groups, most notably Hizballah, thereby enabling these actors to achieve substantial military upgrades. The 2006 war between Hizballah and Israel vividly illustrated the effectiveness of this strategy, with Iran-supplied rockets and expertise enabling Hizballah to launch 4,000 rockets into Israeli territory (Rubin, 2006, p. 6). This conflict not only altered the tactical balance in the Levant but also reinforced Iran’s capacity to project power indirectly. Beyond Lebanon, Iran’s support for Shi’a groups across the Arab world has bolstered its influence while complicating the strategies of its adversaries (Rubin, 2006, p. 4). These activities are part of a broader deterrence-by-proxy strategy, which serves to undermine rival powers while avoiding direct confrontation. This approach also draws adversaries into prolonged asymmetric conflicts, placing strain on their resources and political cohesion. Consequently, Iran’s reliance on proxy groups has become a cornerstone of its regional strategy, solidifying its influence while simultaneously heightening regional instability.

The dissolution of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, following the U.S. withdrawal, directly exacerbated diplomatic mistrust and security anxieties among states opposed to Iranian nuclear ambitions, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The U.S. decision to reimpose sanctions was perceived by Iran as an act of aggression, prompting retaliatory actions that further escalated tensions (Erästö, 2020, p. 2). Notable incidents include attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019 and missile strikes on U.S. bases in Iraq, both of which highlighted the fragility of counterproliferation frameworks in the absence of sustained diplomatic engagement (Erästö, 2020, p. 3). These events demonstrate how the breakdown of negotiated arms control agreements can lead to a deterioration in regional stability, replacing diplomatic engagement with kinetic confrontations and hardening adversarial postures. The ensuing cycle of hostility highlights the fragility of counterproliferation efforts that rely heavily on mutual compliance and trust. The dissolution of the JCPOA revealed the challenges of maintaining such agreements in a polarized geopolitical landscape, particularly when key stakeholders are unwilling or unable to uphold their commitments. This period of heightened tensions underscores the dire consequences of abandoning diplomatic solutions in favor of unilateral action.

Iran’s decision to expand its nuclear capabilities, including the resumption of enriched uranium and heavy water stockpiling after 2019, compounded threat perceptions among its regional adversaries (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 18). This development coincided with missile attacks and other retaliatory measures that reinforced the urgency of addressing Iran’s regional activities. In response, GCC states, along with Israel, began to cooperate more extensively, despite historical rivalries. The formal resolution of the GCC rift at the Al Ula summit in January 2021 reflected a shared recognition of the need to counteract Iranian advancements (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 17). This newfound cooperation among Arab states underscores the unintended consequences of Iran’s nuclear trajectory, namely, the consolidation of opposing alliances. Furthermore, the growing urgency for regional security dialogue, as evidenced by survey data indicating overwhelming support among stakeholders, highlights the desire for collective action to mitigate escalating threats (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 25). However, such efforts remain hampered by the deeply rooted mistrust and competing interests that characterize the region, making the prospects for sustainable security cooperation tenuous at best.

The strategic complexities of the Middle East are further intensified by Iran’s strengthening of extra-regional partnerships, particularly with Russia and China. The 25-year economic and security agreement signed with China in 2021 and the deepening ties with Russia, facilitated by Iran’s provision of missiles and drones for use in the Ukraine conflict, have reshaped the regional security equation (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 9; Asghedom et al., 2024, p. 10). These partnerships challenge U.S. and Western influence in the region, forcing states to reevaluate their security priorities and alliances. Russian military deployments in Syria since 2015 have further solidified this realignment, complicating traditional alliance structures and introducing multipolar competition into an already volatile geopolitical environment (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 9). This convergence of interests between Iran, Russia, and China also raises concerns about the emergence of a new axis of power that could further destabilize the region. For Middle Eastern states, the growing influence of these external actors necessitates a recalibration of their own foreign policies, often leading to a preference for hedging strategies rather than outright alignment with any single power bloc.

Iran’s ability to accumulate fissile material and advance its technical capabilities has brought the region closer to a proliferation tipping point. Countries such as Saudi Arabia have openly declared their interest in pursuing nuclear capabilities as a hedge against potential Iranian breakout scenarios (Asghedom et al., 2024, pp. 2–3). This shift toward nuclear latency reveals the broader implications of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, namely, the erosion of the nonproliferation regime in the Middle East. The delay in implementing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification standards by regional actors further exacerbates this trend, as states position themselves to respond rapidly to any perceived threat (Erästö, 2020, p. 6). This growing climate of insecurity perpetuates mutual distrust, driving further arms races and undermining efforts to establish a stable security architecture in the region. The persistent ambiguity surrounding Iran’s nuclear intentions continues to fuel these dynamics, amplifying the risks of miscalculation and unintended escalation.

Iran’s nuclear programme and its associated regional activities have profoundly shaped Middle Eastern power dynamics, fostering new security arrangements, intensifying rivalries, and triggering a resurgence of arms racing behaviors. These developments emphasize the interconnectedness of regional and extra-regional factors, highlighting the need for innovative and inclusive approaches to counterproliferation and regional stability.

5.1.2 Alliance Structures

The formation of regional alliance structures in the Middle East has been heavily influenced by expanding concerns over Iran’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities, as well as its perceived involvement in destabilizing activities across the region. These alliances represent an effort by Sunni-majority Arab states to counterbalance Tehran’s growing influence and to strengthen their collective deterrence capacity. An important example is the Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT), which was announced by Saudi Arabia in December 2015 and comprises 34 states. Although officially framed as a counterterrorism coalition, its creation can also be interpreted as a response to Iran’s dual-track strategy of nuclear development and proxy warfare. Saudi Arabia’s leadership in this alliance demonstrates its ambition to spearhead a unified Sunni Arab front against Iran’s regional ambitions. Similarly, the nine-state coalition that intervened militarily in Yemen in March 2015 illustrates how Iran’s support for the Houthi movement has catalyzed active resistance from its regional adversaries (Tehsin, 2017, pp. 9, 12). These alliances underscore how perceived Iranian expansionism has prompted new security initiatives that extend beyond counterterrorism, reflecting a broader securitized response to Tehran’s multifaceted strategy. However, these measures often exacerbate regional tensions, creating a security dilemma where efforts to counter Iran’s influence provoke further escalation from Tehran and its proxies.

The dissolution of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and subsequent withdrawal of the United States from the agreement in 2018 acted as a major catalyst for new realignments among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Escalating threats from Iran, in the form of both nuclear advancements and missile developments, drove these states toward greater strategic coordination. The 2021 Al Ula agreement, which formally ended the intra-GCC crisis, represents one such realignment. The reconciliation between previously estranged Gulf states demonstrates the extent to which external threats, particularly those posed by Iran, can supersede longstanding disputes to foster collective action. This collaboration reflects heightened recognition of the shared vulnerability to Iran's activities, as evidenced by its resumed uranium enrichment and heavy water stockpiling since 2019 (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, pp. 17–18). The heightened coordination among GCC members has also facilitated greater openness toward extra-regional actors, particularly the United States and Israel. Although covert channels of cooperation between Arab states and Israel have existed for years, the deteriorating security landscape following the collapse of the JCPOA has led to a more public acknowledgment of their shared interests in countering Iran. These developments demonstrate the complexities of regional alliance formation, where cooperation is often driven less by shared values and more by immediate strategic imperatives to mitigate perceived threats (Erästö, 2020, p. 3).

Iran’s cultivation of a sophisticated and expansive threat network, consisting of both state and non-state actors, has further transformed the nature of alliances in the Middle East. Rather than relying exclusively on traditional state-based partnerships, Tehran has adopted a hybrid model that integrates its formal alliances with support for proxies and paramilitary groups. Its coordination with militias such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and broader efforts to sustain what has been termed its “threat network” illustrate its ability to operate across multiple domains, including conventional military, cyber, and asymmetric warfare. This multifaceted threat network operates not only militarily but also on a proselytization (“Dawah”) level, recruiting individuals from Shia communities in regions marked by weak central governments (Mróz et al., 2024, p. 7). This strategy has presented significant challenges to traditional alliance structures in the region, particularly those dominated by U.S. or Western influence. Counterproliferation and regional deterrence strategies must now account for the additional complexity introduced by the presence of proxy actors, whose decentralized operations allow Tehran to exert influence without direct attribution. This approach has enabled Iran to exploit regional divisions and protracted conflict zones, such as Iraq and Syria, to consolidate its influence while simultaneously undermining the cohesion of adversarial alliances.

The deepening strategic partnerships between Iran and major non-Western powers, especially China and Russia, have added another layer of complexity to the regional alliance landscape. The 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement signed between Iran and China in March 2021, encompassing economic, energy, and security dimensions, provides Tehran with an alternative to Western economic and diplomatic channels (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 9). Similarly, Russia’s military deployments in Syria since 2015, as well as its increased collaboration with Iran in areas like arms transfers and intelligence sharing, have reinforced Tehran’s ability to resist Western pressures (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 9). These developments have introduced a multipolar dynamic to the region, challenging the traditional dominance of U.S.-led alliances and forcing Middle Eastern states to reevaluate their own security strategies. As a result, regional actors have increasingly adopted hedging strategies, cultivating relationships with both Western and non-Western powers to maximize their strategic flexibility. This recalibration of alliances underscores the enduring appeal of pragmatic, interest-driven partnerships in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment, where allegiance to a single bloc often carries significant risks.

The potential for a nuclear tipping point, driven by Iran’s advances in uranium enrichment and missile technology, has further intensified alliance behaviors in the region. Saudi Arabia’s explicit declarations linking its own nuclear ambitions to Iran’s progress highlight the growing risk of a proliferation cascade. Riyadh has planned to build 16 nuclear reactors by 2040 but has yet to implement its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), the minimum IAEA verification standard, reflecting a broader trend toward hedging and contingency planning (Erästö, 2020, p. 6). The reluctance of regional states to adopt rigorous verification protocols underscores a pervasive lack of trust in the international community’s ability to address Iran’s nuclear developments. Instead, many regional actors are positioning themselves to respond with indigenous nuclear capabilities, should Iran achieve a breakout scenario. This interplay between proliferation dynamics and alliance formation has redefined the regional security landscape, promoting a form of security cooperation that balances reassurance with strategic ambiguity. While new forms of alignment have emerged, particularly among Sunni Arab states, the persistence of mutual mistrust and the possibility of further nuclear latency undermine prospects for a cohesive, trust-based security architecture. Instead, regional alliances are evolving into mechanisms for managing uncertainty and preparing for worst-case scenarios, contributing to an environment of sustained strategic competition.

In conclusion, the structure and dynamics of alliances in the Middle East reflect the profound influence of Iran’s nuclear and regional policies. These alliances are shaped by a complex blend of security imperatives, geopolitical rivalries, and external influences, creating a volatile and multifaceted landscape. The interconnectedness of alliance behaviors, proliferation risks, and regional power dynamics underscores the need for innovative and adaptable policy approaches to address the challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

5.1.3 Military Balance

The reduction in Iran’s nuclear breakout timeline, especially in the aftermath of the United States' withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and Iran’s subsequent escalations in uranium enrichment, has introduced a profound shift in the region’s strategic calculations. By May 2024, Iran was evaluated as being capable of producing enough weapons-grade uranium for a single nuclear bomb within just one week, with the potential to produce material for thirteen nuclear weapons within four months (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 13). This drastically shortened timeline not only underscores the advancements in Iran’s nuclear technology but also generates a heightened sense of urgency among regional and global actors. The implications of such a timeline are significant, as it leaves little room for detection, judgment, or preventive intervention. This creates a strategic environment fraught with the risk of hasty, miscalculated military actions by Iran's adversaries, thereby undermining regional stability. The compressed timeline also shifts the conventional narrative of deterrence and enables Tehran to operate under the threat of near-immediate breakout capabilities. Such developments necessitate a recalibration of the military and diplomatic approaches traditionally employed in counterproliferation frameworks.

A critical technical development in Iran’s nuclear programme has been the installation of advanced centrifuges in its main enrichment facilities. For instance, in June 2024, a reported plan to deploy 1,400 advanced centrifuge units at Fordow, coupled with enrichment escalations to 60 percent purity since April 2021, demonstrates Iran’s capacity to rapidly increase its stockpile of highly enriched uranium (Kittrie et al., 2024, pp. 8, 27). The improved efficiency and redundancy offered by these advanced machines significantly enhance Iran’s enrichment capabilities. On top of that, the physical hardening and concealment of key sites, such as the Fordow facility, diminish the effectiveness of potential military interventions aimed at disrupting Iran’s nuclear programme. These advancements not only complicate military calculations but also shift the regional power balance, as adversaries are forced to consider the unpredictable outcomes of a direct strike on Iran's nuclear infrastructure. This evolution undermines traditional deterrence methods, such as the threat of external military intervention, as Iran’s defences and operational redundancies now allow it to sustain its programme despite potential attacks.

Iran’s expanding missile programme has further altered the regional military landscape, providing Tehran with a credible second-strike capability that bolsters its deterrence posture. Since the dissolution of the JCPOA, Iran has launched at least 228 missiles, acquired advanced systems from North Korea, and developed domestic systems like the Sajjil medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which features a range of up to 2,000 kilometers (Taleblu, 2023, pp. 9, 14, 23; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4). These developments create tangible risks for adversarial states in the region, particularly those within the range of Iran’s enhanced missile arsenal, such as Israel and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Additionally, Iran’s missile capabilities are perceived as a robust retaliatory mechanism in response to external aggression, complicating the cost-benefit calculus for those considering military action against Tehran. This capability broadens Iran’s strategic influence and forces its adversaries to account for potentially devastating retaliatory strikes before engaging in conventional or nuclear deterrence scenarios. In this context, Iran’s missile programme serves as both a deterrent and a mechanism for regional power projection, adding complexity to the operational strategies of its rivals.

The technical innovations in Iran’s missile development have amplified its strategic leverage in the region. Advances in range, accuracy, and payload flexibility, particularly evident in modular warhead designs associated with the Emad and Fateh missile families, have increased Iran’s capacity to threaten high-value targets with precision (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021, p. 4; Taleblu, 2023, p. 24). These capabilities enhance Iran’s deterrence-oriented posture, as the possibility of strikes on critical infrastructure heightens the political and military costs for adversaries considering intervention. Furthermore, the potential integration of nuclear warheads with these systems further complicates the security calculations of regional actors. This progression toward a more credible delivery mechanism for nuclear weapons adds a layer of strategic ambiguity, reinforcing Iran’s deterrence through uncertainty. It also escalates the regional arms race, prompting neighboring countries to invest in missile defence or retaliatory capabilities, thus solidifying a security dilemma that perpetuates instability.

The enduring ambiguity surrounding Iran’s nuclear weapons programme further accentuates the challenges faced by its adversaries. Although assessments, such as those by U.S. officials, suggest that Iran’s organized nuclear weapons programme was suspended in 2003, its continued advancements in fissile material production and missile delivery systems indicate a latent capability for rapid weaponization (Einhorn, 2014, p. 5). This posture contributes to what has been termed “deterrence through ambiguity,” wherein adversaries are forced to operate under the assumption that Iran could pivot to weaponization at short notice. This ambiguity intensifies the region’s strategic uncertainty, leading to increased hedging behaviors by states like Saudi Arabia, which have expressed the potential to pursue nuclear capabilities in response to an Iranian breakout scenario. Consequently, this dynamic fuels a proliferation cascade, further destabilizing the regional security architecture.

Iran’s reliance on asymmetric tactics, including proxy activities and indirect confrontation, serves as another critical factor that disrupts the regional military balance. Between October 2023 and February 2024, there were over 160 attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, illustrating Iran’s ability to challenge adversaries indirectly while avoiding direct confrontation (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 8). These proxy activities serve several purposes, including pressuring adversaries to divert resources and deterring direct military action against Iran itself. However, such tactics also heighten the risk of inadvertent escalation, as regional actors may interpret proxy or missile attacks as precursors to full-scale conflict. This multi-dimensional strategy, combining conventional military advancements with asymmetric warfare, complicates external military planning while fostering a volatile environment of mistrust and heightened alertness.

In conclusion, the military balance in the region has been fundamentally reshaped by Iran’s nuclear advancements, missile programmes, and reliance on asymmetric strategies. Each of these elements contributes to a regional security landscape characterized by heightened tensions, strategic uncertainty, and a precarious security dilemma. This dynamic underscores the challenges faced by regional and global actors in managing the risks associated with Iran’s evolving capabilities and posture.

5.2 Proliferation Risks

The proliferation risks stemming from Iran’s nuclear advancements and regional ambitions pose significant challenges to global and Middle Eastern security stability. Examining regional nuclear ambitions, technology transfer concerns, and security dilemmas reveals how strategic ambiguity and technological resilience threaten efforts to contain atomization. Placing this discussion within the broader context of international response options underscores the complexity of managing and mitigating these escalating proliferation threats.

5.2.1 Regional Nuclear Ambitions

The pursuit of nuclear capabilities in response to Iran's advancements has emerged as a central concern for regional actors, particularly in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia stands out as a key example, where its explicit nuclear hedging strategy reflects a direct reaction to Iran’s nuclear trajectory. Statements from high-ranking Saudi officials have unambiguously linked the kingdom’s potential pursuit of nuclear capabilities to Iran’s progress in this domain (Yadlin & Golov, 2012, p. 2). This resolve has been translated into substantial investments, such as the establishment of a so-called “nuclear city” in 2010, with costs exceeding $100 billion, aimed at exploring all facets of nuclear development (Yadlin & Golov, 2012, p. 3). Despite the scale of these investments, Saudi Arabia has notably refrained from adopting Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This deliberate resistance to adherence to the minimal standards of international verification highlights a significant challenge to established non-proliferation norms, raising questions about how effective global efforts have been in curbing such ambitions. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s ambitious plan to construct 16 nuclear reactors by 2040, while avoiding comprehensive safeguards, not only illustrates the scale of its ambitions but also signals a strategic intent to remain ambiguous. This ambiguity, coupled with material preparations, sets a dangerous precedent that could encourage other states to follow suit, thereby intensifying the proliferation risk across the region and undermining global non-proliferation frameworks (Erästö, 2020, p. 6).

The shift in public opinion within the region further exemplifies growing normalization regarding nuclear hedging as a viable strategic option. This is evident in surveys conducted in Turkey, where over half of the respondents in 2012 supported the development of nuclear weapons should Iran acquire them (Yadlin & Golov, 2012, p. 7). This trend in public sentiment is matched by significant state-level investments in nuclear infrastructure, such as Turkey’s plans to commit over $100 billion to nuclear reactor development within a decade (Yadlin & Golov, 2012, p. 8). Such investments not only enhance technological capabilities but also reduce the political and technical barriers to nuclearization. This trend reflects a broader shift in regional security perceptions, where the pursuit of nuclear options is increasingly viewed as a necessary counterbalance to Iran’s advancements. It also raises concerns about a potential “bandwagon” effect, where the pursuit of dual-use capabilities becomes not just a response to perceived threats but an emerging norm. The normalization of such ambitions further erodes the normative foundations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), creating additional challenges for the international system.

Procurement patterns and the buildup of dual-use delivery systems among regional actors further underscore the accelerating security dilemma driven by Iran’s progress. Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of 36 CSS-2 surface-to-surface missiles from China in the early 1990s exemplifies the long-standing regional appetite for strategic capabilities (Yadlin & Golov, 2012, p. 4). These missiles, capable of delivering nuclear warheads over a range of up to 3,000 kilometers, provided a latent deterrent that prefigured the current trajectory of arms buildups in response to Iran. Such acquisitions reveal a preparedness to operate outside of established non-proliferation norms, heightening mistrust among neighboring states. This pattern of long-term investment indicates that regional states are not merely reacting to immediate threats but are also engaging in latent hedging strategies that can be operationalized if an adversary, such as Iran, crosses the nuclear threshold. This dynamic not only complicates efforts to establish a regional non-proliferation architecture but also fuels mutual suspicion, further destabilizing the security environment.

Iran’s advancements in uranium enrichment have been a key driver of heightened regional tensions and insecurity. Enrichment levels reaching 60%, and even 84%, according to international inspectors, signify a critical reduction in the technical barriers to weaponization (Goldberg & Dubowitz, 2025, p. 2). At these levels of enrichment, Iran could theoretically achieve weapons-grade uranium (90% purity) within days, providing sufficient material for a crude nuclear device within mere months (Goldberg & Dubowitz, 2025, p. 2). These technical milestones amplify fears of Iran’s imminent breakout capacity, compelling neighboring states to consider hedging or overt nuclear capability as a countermeasure. The erosion of technical constraints coupled with an increasingly short timeline for breakout undermines the perceived reliability of external security guarantees. This, in turn, shifts the focus of security strategies toward autonomous national capabilities, reinforcing a regional environment where self-help becomes the dominant approach to addressing perceived threats. These developments underscore the escalating risks of miscalculation and inadvertent proliferation, threatening to accelerate the collapse of the already fragile non-proliferation regime in the region.

Iran’s practice of nuclear latency, wherein research, development, and preservation of weaponization knowledge are maintained without overt weaponization, serves as a powerful operational model for other states. Since the formal suspension of its organized nuclear weapons programme in 2003, Iran has strategically kept its options open, demonstrating the benefits of ambiguity in deterring adversaries while limiting international backlash (Tertrais, 2020, p. 3). This posture not only enhances Iran’s leverage in negotiations but also presents an attractive blueprint for other regional actors seeking to maximize security while minimizing diplomatic and economic costs. The practice of latency inherently threatens non-proliferation norms, eroding the clarity of detection and enforcement mechanisms necessary for effective oversight. The growing appeal of such strategies among Iran’s regional competitors poses significant challenges for the enforcement of the NPT and highlights the inadequacy of current frameworks in addressing evolving nuclear ambitions.

Efforts to establish robust and universal verification mechanisms across the Middle East have consistently faced significant obstacles, further exacerbating the proliferation risks. The 2019 United Nations conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone, which lacked participation from key regional actors such as Israel, underscores the persistent challenges in establishing inclusive and effective non-proliferation initiatives (Erästö, 2020, p. 9). The absence of Israel, a crucial stakeholder in the region’s security dynamics, reflects a deep mistrust and skepticism among regional powers about the impartiality and effectiveness of international non-proliferation efforts. For states like Saudi Arabia and others considering latent nuclear capabilities, the perception that compliance with safeguards weakens their relative security positions serves as a disincentive to engage fully with international norms. Such dynamics perpetuate a cycle of mistrust, wherein states prioritize self-help and national capabilities over cooperative security measures. The lack of confidence in both regional and global non-proliferation regimes further compounds the challenges of preventing a proliferation cascade in an already volatile region.

The interplay of Iran’s nuclear advancements and the responses of its regional rivals highlights the precarious balance of security and proliferation dynamics in the Middle East. As Iran’s progress continues to undermine confidence in non-proliferation norms and international enforcement mechanisms, neighboring states increasingly view nuclear hedging as a necessary strategy. This shift not only intensifies regional arms races but also exacerbates existing tensions, further destabilizing the security architecture of the region.

5.2.2 Technology Transfer Concerns

Iran's longstanding engagement in the acquisition of military and dual-use technologies from Russia has significantly shaped its technical capacity while simultaneously introducing serious concerns about technology transfer risks. Between 1992 and 2000, arms and technology transfers between Iran and Russia were estimated at over $4 billion, illustrating the depth of their collaboration. This relationship facilitated the growth of Iranian expertise in advanced weapon systems and nuclear-related technologies. In particular, the reported inclusion of a 10-year arms and military technology programme, which involved training Iranian military personnel and engineers in Russian academies, demonstrates how such partnerships not only elevated Iran’s technical competency but also established networks through which sensitive technology and expertise could flow. The payment of up to $25 million for advanced Russian technology underscores the opacity of the channels involved, raising the likelihood of uncontrolled proliferation. While such collaborations bolstered Iran’s capabilities, they have also amplified concerns regarding the potential onward transfer of sensitive technologies to third parties, whether state or non-state actors. Analyzing this dynamic requires critical attention to how these networks may be leveraged for purposes that undermine non-proliferation regimes, as well as to the inadequacy of accountability measures in such high-value exchanges (Cohen & Phillips, 2001, pp. 2–3).

Iran’s breaches of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) after 2017, including surpassing agreed limits on uranium enrichment and amassing uranium hexafluoride beyond the thresholds specified in the agreement, further illustrate the country's willingness to defy international controls. This pattern of behavior signals Iran's intent to demonstrate its technological self-reliance and political autonomy, both of which can embolden other regional actors to mimic such defiance. Adding further weight to these concerns is Iran’s bureaucratic organization of nuclear knowledge, exemplified by the retention of detailed documents on weaponization research in the so-called “Atomic Archive.” This deliberate preservation of expertise and data represents a latent form of proliferation risk, as it creates a repository of knowledge that could be disseminated either deliberately or incidentally to external parties. The combination of technical capacity, political willingness, and strategic ambiguity significantly aggravates regional insecurities and sets a precedent that undermines the credibility of international non-proliferation frameworks, particularly given Iran’s broader strategy of maintaining a latent nuclear weapons capability (Tertrais, 2020, pp. 2, 7).

The systemic vulnerability of nuclear and radiological material in the broader Middle East and North Africa region further exacerbates the risks associated with Iranian-origin technology or expertise falling into the wrong hands. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Illicit Trafficking Database reported 1,773 incidents between 1993 and 2009, including 500 cases involving theft or loss of nuclear or radioactive material. This data highlights the critical gaps in securing sensitive materials and underscores the broader proliferation risks tied to Iran’s nuclear advancements. Historical cases, such as Al Qaeda’s documented attempts to acquire uranium in Sudan and their regular engagement in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) activities, illustrate the dire consequences of nuclear material entering the black market or non-state networks. Iran’s position as a regional leader in nuclear technology, combined with the existence of organized documentation and expertise, elevates the potential for such materials to become accessible to malicious actors, whether through lapses in control or deliberate policy decisions. This possibility necessitates stronger regional safeguards and enforcement mechanisms to mitigate the substantial global security implications of these risks (Saenz, 2013, pp. 3, 6).

Iran’s proactive approach to preserving and compartmentalizing nuclear expertise within specialized personnel networks adds another layer of complexity to the issue of potential technology transfer. Key figures, such as Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, played pivotal roles in weaponization-related projects, and their leadership underscores the strategic importance Iran places on sustaining human capital in its nuclear programme. The systematic establishment of research teams and the retention of specialized knowledge ensure that Iran's nuclear competencies remain robust even in the absence of active weaponization efforts. This organizational strategy raises significant concerns about the horizontal proliferation of nuclear expertise, particularly if such knowledge is shared with regional allies or non-state actors as part of Iran’s broader strategy to exert influence. This deliberate cultivation of expertise ensures that the risks associated with nuclear proliferation go beyond physical material transfers, complicating international efforts to contain these dangers in a region already marked by instability (Tertrais, 2020, p. 4; Bowen & Moran, 2015, p. 4).

The demand for nuclear capabilities among regional states, as demonstrated by the extensive investments of countries like Saudi Arabia and Turkey in dual-use missile systems and nuclear infrastructure, significantly heightens the risks of proliferation cascades. Iran’s position as a regional innovator, coupled with its history of procurement and its documented ability to bypass international export controls, serves as a model for other states seeking to achieve similar capabilities. This dynamic poses a serious challenge to non-proliferation regimes, as Iran’s behavior normalizes the pursuit of sensitive technologies while undermining established norms. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s and Turkey’s investments signal their intent to hedge against Iran’s advancements, reflecting a broader regional trend toward prioritizing self-reliant security strategies over adherence to international frameworks. The resulting security dilemma not only fuels competition but also creates an environment where norm violations may proliferate unchecked (Bowen & Moran, 2015, p. 4; Tertrais, 2020, p. 7).

Empirical evidence of Iranian procurement patterns demonstrates the persistent vulnerability of international controls in preventing the illicit acquisition of sensitive materials. For example, the 2011 attempt by Iran to acquire 100,000 ring magnets, which could equip 50,000 centrifuges, exposed critical weaknesses in global monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Such incidents reveal the feasibility of circumventing export restrictions with sufficient resources and determination, thereby encouraging other proliferation-minded actors to pursue similar strategies. This dynamic both increases the risk of technology transfer from Iran and undermines collective counterproliferation efforts. By signaling the porous nature of existing safeguard measures, these incidents reinforce the need for robust, multilateral efforts to strengthen enforcement mechanisms and close the loopholes that allow such transactions to occur (Albright, 2015, p. 17).

Iran’s nuclear advancements, its preservation of expertise, and its established procurement networks underscore the multifaceted nature of proliferation risks associated with the country. Each of these elements contributes to an increasingly volatile security environment that demands comprehensive and adaptive policy responses to limit the potential for regional and global destabilization.

5.2.3 Security Dilemmas

The evolving nuclear hedging strategy employed by Iran has introduced a significant degree of ambiguity and unpredictability into the Middle Eastern security environment. Iran’s systematic investments in nuclear infrastructure and incremental breaches of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), including exceeding uranium hexafluoride stockpile caps and enriching uranium to levels above the 3.67% limit set by the agreement, create a strategic opacity that complicates regional and international decision-making. This deliberate ambiguity allows Iran to blur the line between civilian nuclear energy objectives and potential military applications, enabling it to maintain the capability for rapid transition to weaponization while avoiding definitive actions that would invite severe international repercussions (Tertrais, 2020, p. 7; Bowen & Moran, 2015, p. 4). Iran’s dual-use approach amplifies the sense of insecurity among neighboring states, many of whom view Tehran’s nuclear advancements as a direct and escalating threat, thus fueling a regional security dilemma.

The maintenance of such ambiguity undermines the credibility of deterrence relationships in the region and incentivizes other Middle Eastern states to adopt nuclear hedging strategies of their own. With Iran positioning itself as both compliant and defiant toward international agreements, adversaries are forced to prepare for worst-case scenarios. This tendency toward “worst-case planning” has prompted states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to invest heavily in nuclear infrastructure and pursue policies reflecting strategic ambiguity. Such measures increase the likelihood of a proliferation cascade, whereby states seek nuclear capabilities in response to perceived threats, which subsequently exacerbates the overall security dilemma (Bowen & Moran, 2015, p. 4; Erästö, 2020, p. 6). As adversaries pursue their own hedging strategies, the already precarious balance of power in the region deteriorates further, undermining mutual trust and increasing the potential for miscalculation or preemptive action.

The absence of robust and universally applied regional arms control agreements further intensifies security dilemmas in the Middle East. The lack of a comprehensive framework for arms control not only creates an environment conducive to unilateral actions but also limits the capacity of states to engage in meaningful diplomatic de-escalation. This gap has been exacerbated by the reduction of international verification mechanisms, with Iran systematically curtailing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access and withdrawing from key transparency commitments following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 (Brewer, 2021, p. 8). Without reliable verification measures, it becomes increasingly difficult for regional and global actors to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities, heightening mistrust and reinforcing a cycle of suspicion. This dynamic undermines the effectiveness of non-proliferation regimes, as states prioritize self-reliance over cooperative measures, further destabilizing the region.

As a result of reduced transparency, global actors have shifted their reliance from international agreements to intelligence capabilities for monitoring potential breakout or “sneak out” scenarios by Iran. This dependence on intelligence presents significant operational challenges, as it introduces risks of misinformation or incomplete assessments, which could lead to erroneous policy decisions (Brewer, 2021, p. 8). Furthermore, the loss of verifiable transparency has prompted regional states to develop their own intelligence infrastructures, fostering a competitive and secretive environment. This competitive secrecy diminishes the prospects for trust-building and perpetuates the adversarial postures of states across the region. The perceived need for rapid response capabilities and preemptive measures further escalates arms races, particularly in advanced missile technologies and defensive systems, making diplomatic resolutions increasingly elusive (Brewer, 2021, p. 8; Tertrais, 2020, p. 7).

Iran’s persistent ambiguity regarding its nuclear intentions exacerbates the strategic uncertainty faced by its regional and global adversaries. Tehran’s retention of weaponization knowledge, compartmentalized research and development efforts, and historical projects such as AMAD and Project 110 serve as a testament to its latent nuclear capability (Tertrais, 2020, pp. 3–4; Bowen & Moran, 2015, p. 4). This ambiguity not only complicates adversary planning but also encourages similar hedging strategies by states like Saudi Arabia, which cite Iran’s incremental violations as justification for their nuclear pursuits (Erästö, 2020, p. 6). The resulting proliferation cycle fuels an ongoing arms race, as states prioritize their own capabilities over cooperative disarmament efforts. This environment of mutual suspicion and competitive armament creates significant obstacles to establishing any form of regional arms control or nuclear disarmament agreements.

Iran’s approach to maintaining a latent nuclear capability, wherein it preserves the technical capacity for weaponization without crossing overt thresholds, further pressures neighboring states to respond defensively. By demonstrating advances in enrichment and missile integration while maintaining technical ambiguity, Tehran leverages its nuclear programme as a strategic tool to enhance its regional influence. This posture forces neighboring states to hedge against Iran’s perceived threats by rapidly developing their own defensive and offensive capabilities (Tertrais, 2020, pp. 3–4; Bowen & Moran, 2015, p. 4). The resulting arms race extends beyond nuclear technology, encompassing delivery systems, air defence mechanisms, and intelligence capabilities. These developments reinforce adversarial dynamics, making de-escalation efforts increasingly unlikely.

The fragmented nature of regional security frameworks further compounds the problem. The refusal of some states, such as Saudi Arabia, to implement basic IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the absence of key actors like Israel from initiatives such as the 2019 United Nations conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone demonstrate the persistent challenges in creating inclusive and effective non-proliferation mechanisms (Erästö, 2020, pp. 6, 9). This fragmented environment incentivizes states to develop unilateral security measures and undermines the normative authority of global non-proliferation regimes. Consequently, regional actors adopt hedging strategies and deepen their investments in nuclear technologies, perpetuating cycles of suspicion and competition.

The ongoing escalation of Iran’s nuclear advancements, coupled with its strategic ambiguity, has destabilized the Middle Eastern security environment. Tehran’s reliance on a latent capability approach pressures neighboring states to rapidly develop their own deterrent measures, escalating arms races and diminishing opportunities for diplomatic resolutions (Bowen & Moran, 2015, p. 4; Brewer, 2021, p. 2). The region is caught in a cycle of escalation and hedging, with all parties anticipating sudden technological or political shifts by their adversaries. As a result, the effectiveness of global non-proliferation initiatives is significantly eroded, and confidence in negotiated constraints, such as the JCPOA, has diminished (Tertrais, 2020, p. 7; Erästö, 2020, p. 2).

Mutual suspicion and worst-case planning dominate the strategic calculations of regional and global actors, further accelerating the arms race and making de-escalation efforts increasingly difficult. The lack of systemic, inclusive frameworks for arms control and non-proliferation continues to undermine confidence in security cooperation, leaving self-reliance and strategic hedging as the dominant approaches to addressing the challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear programme. This dynamic locks the region in a precarious cycle of escalation, risk-taking, and mistrust, further destabilizing an already volatile security architecture. As these trends persist, they complicate efforts to establish a stable and cooperative regional order capable of mitigating proliferation risks and fostering long-term peace.

The evidence in relation to the history and the technologcal developments in Iran as well as the political factors suggests very strongly that Iran was not aiming for an operational nuclear weapons capability for now, but instead for nuclear latency. Such a stance may provide some deterrence capability and support power projection without Iran incurring the risks of becoming a target for nuclear attacks and provoke other actions by Israel and the United States. After the collapse of the JCPOA Iran began using uranium enrichment and other technical developments as a political instrument to force further concessions. This strategy has misfired and provoked the crisis that Iran is facing now.

6. International Response and Policy Options

Exploring the spectrum of international efforts and strategic measures to address Iran's nuclear ambitions, this section examines diplomatic negotiations, coercive sanctions, and covert operations as key components of global response strategies. Within the broader discussion of regional stability and non-proliferation challenges, the upcoming analysis highlights the complexities, successes, and limitations of these approaches in shaping Iran’s nuclear trajectory and regional security dynamics.

6.1 Diplomatic Initiatives

Diplomatic efforts have played a crucial role in shaping Iran’s nuclear trajectory and regional security dynamics. This section explores the design, implementation, and challenges of multilateral negotiations, regional dialogues, and confidence-building measures that aim to foster transparency, trust, and stability within a complex geopolitical environment. Positioned within the broader context of international response strategies, these initiatives highlight both their potential and limitations in addressing proliferation risks and promoting long-term peace.

6.1.1 Multilateral Negotiations

The framework of multilateral negotiations, exemplified by the P5+1 discussions leading to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, illustrated the potential of coordinated international efforts to address nuclear proliferation. The P5+1 grouping, consisting of the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, represented an unprecedented coalition that combined significant geopolitical influence and technical expertise. This coalition’s ability to align strategic objectives and impose unified diplomatic, economic, and political pressure on Iran was critical to the negotiations’ success. The agreement incorporated explicit and enforceable technical caps, including limiting Iran’s uranium enrichment to 3.67%, reducing the number of operational centrifuges, and establishing stringent uranium stockpile thresholds (Singh, 2015, p. 2). These measures were instrumental in extending Iran’s breakout time—the period required to produce sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon—while establishing measurable benchmarks for compliance. These provisions addressed pressing concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear capabilities and highlighted the importance of technical specificity in non-proliferation agreements. However, the effectiveness of the multilateral mechanism also underscored key vulnerabilities, particularly its reliance on sustained cohesion among participants, a factor undermined by the later unilateral withdrawal of the United States (Kwong, 2025, p. 2).

A defining feature of the JCPOA was its robust system of international inspections, which granted the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unprecedented access to Iran’s nuclear facilities and supply chains. This access played a transformative role in enhancing transparency and building international confidence in the agreement’s implementation while mitigating skepticism about Iran’s intentions. The periodic inspection schedules and continuous monitoring mechanisms enabled a level of oversight that otherwise would have been politically challenging to achieve (Albarasneh & Khatib, 2019, p. 10). Nonetheless, gaps persisted. Persistent concerns over Iran’s willingness to allow inspections at undeclared or suspected military sites revealed limitations in the agreement’s ability to address all proliferation risks comprehensively (Singh, 2015, p. 2). This gap not only demonstrated the difficulties of negotiating full compliance but also highlighted the asymmetrical application of trust and enforcement measures in high-stakes diplomatic frameworks.

Sanctions relief formed a central pillar of the JCPOA, serving as the primary incentive for Iranian compliance. The agreement’s phased approach directly tied economic benefits to verified reductions in proliferation-sensitive activities. While these provisions offered Iran the prospect of reintegration into the global economy, the structural fragility of the sanctions framework became evident after the U.S. withdrawal. Iran’s perception of diminishing incentives for compliance following the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions revealed a fundamental flaw in the sanctions relief mechanism: it was overly dependent on multilateral cohesion and vulnerable to unilateral political shifts (Albarasneh & Khatib, 2019, p. 12). The erosion of this incentive structure directly contributed to Iran’s incremental breaches of the agreement, underscoring the need for more durable and automatic economic incentives tied to compliance in future frameworks.

The multilateral mechanism’s ability to unify diplomatic pressure and impose coordinated sanctions stands as a testament to the potential of collective action in non-proliferation efforts. The alignment of pressure from multiple global powers forced Iran to engage diplomatically, demonstrating that synchronized multilateral strategies can be more effective than unilateral measures. This cohesion ensured that diplomatic leverage remained robust and enabled the negotiation of detailed technical restrictions, which may not have been possible in a fragmented international environment (Kwong, 2025, p. 2). However, the U.S. withdrawal in 2018 exposed how fragile such unity can be. The lack of binding enforcement protocols between participating powers created a diplomatic vacuum, weakening collective pressure and enabling Iran to exploit divisions among the original signatories (Albarasneh & Khatib, 2019, p. 12). This fragmentation not only undermined the JCPOA’s enforcement but also diminished its credibility as a model for future non-proliferation agreements.

The aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal illustrated the critical importance of multilateral cohesion for ensuring long-term compliance. European parties to the JCPOA, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, sought to preserve the agreement through initiatives such as the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). These measures aimed to circumvent U.S. sanctions by facilitating limited economic transactions with Iran, primarily in humanitarian goods (Kwong, 2025, p. 2). However, the financial and commercial scope of such mechanisms remained limited, failing to restore the level of economic benefits Iran had anticipated under the JCPOA. As Iran viewed these initiatives as insufficient to offset the effects of renewed sanctions, it escalated its breaches of the accord, further eroding confidence in multilateral frameworks. This outcome highlights the limitations of post-agreement diplomacy and the necessity of establishing resilient economic mechanisms that can withstand unilateral disruptions.

The European parties’ symbolic defence of the multilateral order through their attempts to salvage the JCPOA underscores an essential point: while multilateral agreements have significant potential, they must be underpinned by credible guarantees and enforcement mechanisms. The reliance on voluntary compliance, coupled with the absence of universally enforceable provisions, rendered the agreement vulnerable to external shocks. The European response further demonstrated that symbolic actions, though valuable for maintaining diplomatic channels, cannot substitute for substantive measures capable of ensuring compliance. This underscores the broader lesson that effective multilateral negotiations must anticipate and address the risks of unilateral exit and ensure that compliance remains incentivized even in adverse political contexts (Albarasneh & Khatib, 2019, p. 12).

Another notable feature of the JCPOA was the inclusion of the snapback sanctions mechanism, formalized in UN Security Council Resolution 2231. This mechanism intended to create an automatic reinstatement of sanctions in the event of material non-compliance, minimizing procedural delays or veto risks (Singh, 2015, p. 3). However, the snapback mechanism faced criticism for its potential misuse as a political tool, raising questions about its legitimacy. Iranian breaches of the JCPOA since 2018 have prompted European powers to consider triggering the snapback provision, but this process has also underscored the importance of embedding universally supported enforcement measures within international agreements. The challenges associated with invoking snapback sanctions emphasize the difficulty of crafting deterrent mechanisms that are both credible and acceptable to all stakeholders. As ongoing debates regarding snapback demonstrate, the sustainability of future agreements will depend heavily on the presence of enforceable backstops that ensure compliance without being subject to geopolitical manipulation (Kwong, 2025, p. 2).

The regional and domestic repercussions of the JCPOA further emphasized the complexities of multilateral negotiations. Within Iran, the agreement deepened political divisions between moderate and hardline factions, with each side contesting the merits of international compromise (Esfandiary, 2016, p. 1). These internal dynamics constrained Iran’s ability to consistently adhere to negotiated commitments, revealing the influence of domestic political factors on compliance. Regionally, the JCPOA heightened security concerns among states such as Saudi Arabia and Israel, which perceived the agreement as a potential accelerator of Iranian ambitions rather than a containment mechanism (Esfandiary, 2016, p. 1). These perceptions contributed to an arms race dynamic, as neighboring states sought to hedge against Iran’s nuclear advancements (Kwong, 2025, p. 3). This underscores the necessity of aligning technical agreements with broader regional security dialogues to address the concerns of all relevant actors and prevent counterproductive reactions.

The experience of the JCPOA illustrates that while technical agreements can constrain proliferation-sensitive activities in the short term, they cannot fully address the underlying drivers of proliferation without complementary political processes. Future diplomatic models may require the integration of multi-tiered enforcement measures, regional security guarantees, and confidence-building initiatives to sustain compliance and build trust (Singh, 2015, p. 2). Contingency planning, graduated incentives, and parallel dialogues addressing regional concerns could create more comprehensive and resilient frameworks (Kwong, 2025, p. 3). Incorporating these lessons, along with broader regional initiatives, could strengthen the credibility and effectiveness of future non-proliferation agreements.

6.1.2 Regional Dialogue

Regional dialogue initiatives are often recognized as pivotal in addressing the complex security dilemmas of the Middle East. However, they remain significantly hindered by longstanding fragmentation and the absence of key actors, which undermines their inclusivity and effectiveness. For instance, initiatives like the 2019 United Nations conference on a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone failed to include critical stakeholders such as Israel, which has consistently refused to participate in discussions it perceives as contrary to its security interests. Additionally, Saudi Arabia's partial engagement, exemplified by its refusal to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, further illustrates the challenges in achieving comprehensive buy-in from regional powers. These exclusions perpetuate an atmosphere of strategic mistrust, where perceived vulnerabilities deter actors from committing to arms control or non-proliferation measures. The absence of cross-cutting dialogue, particularly with nations possessing latent or opaque nuclear capabilities, results in initiatives that, while symbolically significant, often fail to produce substantive progress in mitigating proliferation risks or reducing tensions. Without addressing these structural impediments, regional dialogue risks reinforcing parallel arms races rather than fostering cooperation (Erästö, 2020, p. 9).

Empirical evidence underscores the deep-seated demand for more robust and inclusive security dialogues in the Middle East. A Chatham House survey revealed that 91 percent of stakeholders advocated for urgent steps toward consensus-building and confidence measures to de-escalate tensions in the region (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 25). This data reflects an acknowledgment of the inadequacies of existing international mechanisms in addressing the region’s security concerns. Repeated escalatory events, such as Iran’s breaches of enrichment limits following the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), have amplified perceptions of threat among Gulf states and reinforced the necessity for region-specific security solutions (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 18). The recognition of the importance of dialogue is accompanied by its practical challenges, as these discussions often stall due to entrenched rivalries and competing priorities. That said, the willingness of a majority of regional actors to engage provides an opportunity to design more effective frameworks that align institutional incentives and address the core security dilemmas faced by the Middle East.

The fragmentation and polarization that emerged following the JCPOA highlight the critical shortcomings of arms control agreements that fail to incorporate regional security concerns. Within Iran, the agreement accentuated domestic divisions between moderate and hardline political factions, undermining its capacity to adhere consistently to negotiated commitments (Esfandiary, 2016, p. 1). At the same time, neighboring Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, viewed the JCPOA as insufficient in curbing Iran’s ambitions and enhancing regional security (Esfandiary, 2016, p. 1). This disconnect between technical agreements and broader regional dynamics fueled an arms race dynamic, with Gulf states increasing their investments in military capabilities to counterbalance Iran (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 17). The failure to integrate broader regional dialogue into the JCPOA’s framework not only limited its effectiveness but also contributed to strategic instability. These developments underscore the necessity of complementing international agreements with inclusive regional dialogues that address both nuclear and conventional security concerns to prevent the exacerbation of existing rivalries.

Intra-regional initiatives, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) 2021 Al Ula agreement, demonstrate both the potential and limitations of regional security dialogues. By formally ending divisions within the GCC and encouraging renewed discussions on broader Middle Eastern security, the agreement signaled some capacity for intra-regional cooperation (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 17). However, the continued exclusion of pivotal actors such as Iran and Israel, as well as the reliance on external security guarantees, revealed the fragile and conditional nature of such initiatives (Erästö, 2020, p. 2). While this form of regional dialogue can function as a temporary mechanism to de-escalate crises, its inability to establish binding, inclusive frameworks limits its long-term impact. This underscores the challenge of fostering durable cooperative mechanisms in a fragmented regional security architecture where trust remains minimal and geopolitical competition intense.

The experience of international forums, such as efforts to establish a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone, highlights both the achievements and persistent flaws of regional dialogue initiatives. These forums provide valuable platforms for norm diffusion and engagement but are severely constrained by the unwillingness of influential actors to move beyond symbolic commitments. Strategic mistrust, domestic political constraints, and conflicting priorities continue to impede the development of enforceable agreements on arms control or security assurances. For instance, Israel’s absence from such forums reflects its longstanding skepticism of multilateral agreements it perceives as imbalanced or detrimental to its strategic posture. Similarly, partial engagement by other regional states further diminishes the effectiveness of these initiatives, ensuring that they remain vulnerable to recurring crises and unable to address the underlying drivers of insecurity in the region (Erästö, 2020, p. 9).

The integration of regional dialogue into the Middle East’s security dynamics remains both an urgent necessity and a formidable challenge. Achieving this requires not only formal diplomatic engagement but also the establishment of institutionalized mechanisms designed to address both nuclear and conventional security threats. Such mechanisms must promote mutual confidence, address divergences in threat perceptions, and incorporate the interests of all key regional actors, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Without this inclusive approach, regional dialogue risks being reduced to performative gestures, overshadowed by the continuation of arms races, strategic hedging, and the erosion of non-proliferation norms. To overcome these barriers, future initiatives must bridge the gap between top-down diplomatic efforts and bottom-up regional engagement, ensuring that technical arms control measures are grounded in broader frameworks that foster trust and cooperation.

6.1.3 Confidence Building Measures

Confidence-building measures have played a significant role in efforts to address the tensions surrounding Iran's nuclear programme and the broader regional security dynamics in the Middle East. The integration of transparency initiatives and periodic IAEA verification under the JCPOA offers a strong example of how such mechanisms can foster an environment of trust. The JCPOA imposed unprecedented monitoring measures on Iran’s nuclear activities, such as real-time surveillance of declared facilities and regulated access to its supply chains (Tehsin, 2017, p. 2). These measures reduced misperceptions about Iran’s intentions by enabling international actors to detect potential non-compliance swiftly. This transparency built a baseline level of trust that was crucial for productive diplomatic engagement. During the early phases of the JCPOA's implementation, concrete reductions in Iran’s enrichment activities and stockpiles demonstrated that confidence-building measures could facilitate joint problem-solving and technical dialogue. However, while these initiatives significantly enhanced trust, they also exposed challenges in sustaining such measures over time, especially in the context of shifting political dynamics.

Direct engagement between antagonistic actors has provided valuable opportunities to test the viability of regional arms control mechanisms. For example, Iranian and Saudi participation in the 2019 UN conference on a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons indicated a limited but notable willingness among rivals to engage in dialogue within inclusive forums (Erästö, 2020, pp. 6, 9). These interactions underscored the importance of dialogue as a confidence-building tool, even though the absence of key regional players like Israel and Saudi Arabia’s incomplete implementation of IAEA verification standards restricted the scope of these efforts. Such dialogue-oriented initiatives illustrated both the possibilities for progress and the limitations imposed by deep-seated rivalries and unresolved security concerns. Sustained progress in these forums requires overcoming significant barriers, including the reluctance of some states to compromise on transparency measures, which remain critical for building trust.

Broad-based support for confidence-building measures among regional stakeholders is another promising aspect of their potential. Surveys have shown that 91 percent of respondents advocate for urgent security discussions and tangible steps toward de-escalation in the Middle East (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 25). This demonstrates a strong appetite for moving beyond entrenched antagonisms to establish structured and inclusive dialogue mechanisms. Interestingly, this support extends beyond state-level actors to include regional civil society, offering an additional layer of legitimacy for such initiatives. This reflects a widespread recognition that confidence-building measures can normalize verification processes, risk-reduction protocols, and crisis communication channels. Nonetheless, translating this regional appetite into actionable frameworks remains a challenge due to the entrenched mistrust and competing priorities of key actors, which often undermine the effectiveness of these measures.

The withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA in 2018 and the subsequent deterioration of trust in multilateral frameworks highlighted both the fragility and necessity of robust confidence-building structures (Erästö, 2020, p. 2; Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 18). Amid rising tensions, Iran began to reduce its cooperation with the IAEA and increased enrichment activities, resulting in the erosion of verification and transparency mechanisms established under the JCPOA. This, in turn, exacerbated mistrust among regional states and triggered a spiral of reciprocal hardening, deepening the security dilemmas in the Middle East. The rapid unraveling of these frameworks revealed the importance of designing transparency measures with resilience in mind. Confidence-building mechanisms must be equipped to endure external shocks, such as unilateral policy changes, to ensure they can persist during periods of heightened tension.

The 2021 Al Ula agreement among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states provides an interesting case study of how intra-regional reconciliation can facilitate new platforms for dialogue. This agreement formally ended a prolonged rift among GCC members and encouraged renewed discussions on security dynamics in the Middle East (Vakil & Quilliam, 2021, p. 17; Tehsin, 2017, p. 13). While the agreement showcased the potential for confidence-building through diplomatic normalization, its effectiveness remains limited without the inclusion of key players such as Iran and Israel. Furthermore, the initiative highlighted the reliance on external security guarantees, which often serve as temporary solutions rather than addressing the core drivers of discord. Despite these limitations, the Al Ula agreement illustrates the possibility of using regional reconciliation as a foundation for more inclusive and enduring confidence-building initiatives.

Academic analyses consistently suggest that confidence-building measures in the Middle East must address the region's hybrid security dilemmas, where nuclear, conventional, and proxy conflicts intersect (Erästö, 2020, p. 2). Technical solutions, such as managed-access inspections and real-time monitoring, must be integrated with political processes that address structural asymmetries and underlying grievances. Iran's nuclear programme offers a clear example of these dynamics; while technical transparency mechanisms succeeded in temporarily reducing tensions, their sustainability was undermined by the absence of reciprocal security guarantees, dispute-resolution forums, and assurances against coercion. Bridging technical and political dimensions is therefore essential to stabilize expectations, reduce incentives for nuclear escalation, and build durable frameworks for regional security.

Confidence-building measures have shown immense potential to improve transparency and foster trust in addressing nuclear tensions in the Middle East. However, their success is contingent upon overcoming structural regional obstacles, achieving inclusivity, and establishing mechanisms that are both transparent and resilient to external disruptions. Effective measures must intertwine technical verification with broader political processes to create credible and lasting solutions to complex regional security dilemmas.

6.2 Coercive Measures

The effectiveness and limitations of coercive strategies form a crucial aspect of Iran’s broader security and proliferation landscape. Exploring economic sanctions, military deterrence, and clandestine operations reveals how targeted measures aim to constrain Iran’s nuclear progress while also exposing their strategic vulnerabilities. Within the regional and international context, these tactics highlight the complex balance between pressure and resilience in managing Iran’s advancing capabilities.

6.2.1 Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions have been a core instrument in U.S. policy toward Iran, particularly evident in the "maximum pressure" campaign initiated after the United States' exit from the JCPOA in 2018. This campaign led to a dramatic collapse in Iran’s oil sector, reducing exports by around two million barrels per day and cutting overall exports from 2.3 million barrels per day in early 2018 to roughly one million barrels per day by April 2019, which severely undercut the principal source of Iran’s state revenue. This contraction destabilized the national budget and created significant economic challenges (Mortlock, 2020, p. 5). The sharp reduction in oil revenues highlights the immediate economic vulnerabilities of Iran as a major oil exporter, but it also underscores the extent to which dependence on a single commodity can render a state susceptible to external pressures. However, while these sanctions created undeniable economic disruption, their broader impact on altering Iranian nuclear objectives remained limited, suggesting that economic hardship alone does not necessarily lead to changes in strategic policies.

The economic contraction induced by sanctions was further evidenced in the decline of Iran’s gross domestic product (GDP), which fell by 3.6 percent in 2018 and by an additional 7.6 percent in 2019, marking one of the steepest two-year declines for a major oil exporter (Mortlock, 2020, p. 5). These figures illustrate the severe macroeconomic impact of sanctions, providing tangible evidence of their capacity to disrupt the functioning of a target economy. However, the extent to which this economic downturn achieved strategic objectives remains debatable. Iran’s leadership demonstrated considerable resilience in maintaining its nuclear activities despite these disruptions. This suggests that the economic pain inflicted by sanctions may not always translate into corresponding changes in behavior, particularly when national security considerations are prioritized over economic stability.

The effectiveness of U.S. sanctions was amplified by the threat of secondary sanctions, which deterred non-U.S. entities from engaging in legitimate business activities with Iran. This extended the impact of sanctions beyond direct U.S.-Iran transactions by compelling European, Asian, and other international corporations to withdraw from Iranian markets, further isolating its economy (Mortlock, 2020, p. 1). This dynamic highlights the structural power of the U.S. financial system in enforcing global sanctions regimes, as institutions worldwide are incentivized to comply with U.S. policies to avoid potential exclusion from the American market. However, the effectiveness of such broad-based measures is counterbalanced by their significant collateral effects, including strained diplomatic relationships with allies and the erosion of trust in multilateral mechanisms. Moreover, they expose the inherent asymmetry in the global financial system, wherein the dominance of the U.S. dollar places disproportionate leverage in the hands of a single actor.

Sanctions targeting Iranian shipping, financial, and communications companies, as well as restrictions on key imports, exacerbated domestic conditions, resulting in shortages of essential goods. Inflation reportedly climbed to as high as 40 percent, and Iran’s currency, the rial, lost more than two-thirds of its value by 2019 (Dadmehr, 2013, p. 2; Peters & Robinson, 2024, p. 8). These figures underscore the significant social and economic dislocation caused by sanctions, particularly for the average Iranian citizen. However, such measures also carry the risk of unintended consequences, as they often harden domestic political positions and foster nationalist sentiments. In Iran, these economic constraints contributed to a political climate in which hardline elements gained greater support, further entrenching opposition to Western policies and undermining the prospects for diplomatic engagement.

While sanctions generated substantial economic hardship, they failed to produce a fundamental shift in Iran’s nuclear strategy. In response to the “maximum pressure” campaign, Iran began incrementally breaching key limitations outlined in the JCPOA, including enrichment thresholds and uranium stockpile caps (Kwong, 2025, p. 1; Peters & Robinson, 2024, p. 10). This calculated defiance suggests that Iran viewed its nuclear programme as leverage to extract concessions rather than as a liability under increasing sanctions pressure. This dynamic demonstrates the limits of economic sanctions in coercing states to forgo perceived strategic imperatives, particularly when such actions are framed as essential to national sovereignty and security.

Iran’s stepwise breaches of the JCPOA reflect its calculated use of the nuclear programme as both a bargaining tool and a means of signaling its resilience to external pressures. This approach aimed to coerce European and U.S. actors into revisiting sanctions policies while avoiding outright provocation that could lead to military escalation (Kwong, 2025, p. 1; Mortlock, 2020, p. 1). However, the strategy also highlighted the limits of economic pressure in achieving sustainable policy changes. When core security interests are at stake, states may prioritize long-term strategic objectives over short-term economic relief, as evidenced by Iran’s continued investment in advanced centrifuges and uranium enrichment activities.

Rather than promoting moderation, sanctions often reinforced hardline positions within the Iranian leadership, fostering nationalist narratives that justified further nuclear advancements. This trend was evident in Iran’s rapid installation of advanced centrifuges and its escalation of enrichment activities after 2019 (Peters & Robinson, 2024, p. 10; Kwong, 2025, p. 3). These developments suggest that economic sanctions, while effective in creating immediate disruption, can unintentionally incentivize adversarial behavior, particularly when the targeted state perceives itself as under existential threat. This paradoxical outcome underscores the need to integrate economic measures with broader diplomatic and security strategies to achieve meaningful policy outcomes.

Sanctions, particularly secondary sanctions, exposed the limits of European and other international actors to counterbalance U.S. dominance in global markets. Mechanisms such as INSTEX, which were designed to facilitate limited economic transactions with Iran, had minimal impact due to reluctance among banks and corporations to risk U.S. penalties (Mortlock, 2020, p. 1). This structural asymmetry highlights the challenges of building multilateral economic frameworks that can operate independently of U.S. influence. It also raises questions about the sustainability of global financial architectures that are heavily skewed toward a single actor’s policies, particularly when those policies are perceived as unilateral or inconsistent with multilateral agreements.

Iran’s trading partners attempted to circumvent sanctions through alternative mechanisms, such as trading oil for gold or adopting non-traditional payment methods, but these efforts were largely ineffective in mitigating the broader economic downturn (Dadmehr, 2013, p. 2; Mortlock, 2020, p. 1). This limited impact further underscores the challenges faced by states in resisting U.S.-led economic coercion, as well as Iran’s increasing reliance on domestic economic resilience and alternative partnerships with non-Western actors like China and Russia. However, these strategies also reveal the inherent constraints of unilateral economic measures, which may push targeted states toward deeper alignment with alternative power centers, thereby complicating broader diplomatic efforts.

The sanctions regime unintentionally deepened mistrust between Iran and Western powers, reinforcing Iran’s perception of economic coercion as a form of warfare. This skepticism led Iranian policymakers to invest more heavily in nuclear capabilities and economic self-sufficiency as safeguards against future sanctions or aggression (Dadmehr, 2013, p. 2; Kwong, 2025, p. 3). This cycle of mistrust underscores the limitations of sanctions as a standalone tool for non-proliferation, as their effects often exacerbate the very behaviors they seek to deter.

The imposition of sanctions also had profound consequences for regional security dynamics. Key actors, such as Saudi Arabia, publicly signaled their intent to pursue nuclear capabilities if Iran reached a nuclear threshold, raising the possibility of a regional arms race (Kwong, 2025, p. 3; Peters & Robinson, 2024, p. 2). This reaction illustrates the cascading effects of non-proliferation failures, where perceived inequities in enforcement or compliance incentivize parallel proliferation efforts among neighboring states. The broader erosion of trust in the effectiveness of sanctions and negotiated agreements has contributed to a climate of strategic hedging, undermining the prospects for future arms control initiatives.

The reliance on economic sanctions as a primary tool for counterproliferation highlights both their utility and their limitations. While sanctions can generate significant economic pressure, their effectiveness in achieving strategic objectives depends on their integration with diplomatic engagement and credible security guarantees. Overreliance on coercive measures risks deepening adversarial behavior and undermining the long-term stability of regional and international frameworks (Kwong, 2025, p. 3; Peters & Robinson, 2024, p. 10).

6.2.2 Military Deterrence

Military strikes have often served as a tool of deterrence in the context of U.S. and allied strategies against Iran’s nuclear capabilities. For instance, targeted strikes such as the attack on 85 Iranian proxy targets and the killing of Kata'ib Hezbollah commander al-Saadi in Syria demonstrated the potential for short-term suppression of hostile activity. These actions resulted in a 32-day cessation of attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, providing evidence that high-value kinetic actions can effectively disrupt adversarial operations (Mróz et al., 2024, p. 1). However, while these measures yield immediate tactical benefits, their limited duration reveals an underlying challenge: adversaries like Iran’s proxies retain the capacity to reinitiate hostile actions after the immediate threat subsides. This episodic deterrence underscores the necessity of integrating such strikes into broader strategic frameworks for sustained impact, as the isolated use of military force risks losing its potency over time.

A significant reduction in proxy attacks—falling from over 160 incidents across 17 weeks to only two incidents (with no casualties or damage) in the 23 weeks following the strikes—further illustrates the suppressive effect of kinetic action (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 8). Yet this measurable deterrent response points to its reversible nature, as evidenced by the resurgence of Iranian-affiliated group activities once the pressure from immediate retaliation waned. The cyclical return of aggression underscores the limitations of military deterrence in achieving durable behavioral change among adversaries. Key actors adapt their tactics and retain the capacity to threaten U.S. and allied interests when circumstances become favorable. This demonstrates that military strikes, while effective for curbing escalations in the short term, fail to impose structural changes to the strategic calculus of Iran and its proxies, necessitating complementary measures beyond kinetic interventions.

Iran’s commitment to advancing its nuclear programme has remained steadfast despite military threats, as illustrated by Tehran’s sustained progress following the Stuxnet cyberattack, which delayed its nuclear programme by 18 to 24 months (Mróz et al., 2024, p. 5). Rather than dissuading nuclear advancement, such actions led Iran to invest in redundancy, physical hardening of facilities, and increased indigenous research and development. This response indicates a pattern of resilience and adaptation, underscoring the limitations of sabotage and pressure in altering the long-term trajectory of a determined state’s nuclear ambitions. In fact, the acceleration of enrichment activities after setbacks—such as the installation of 1,400 advanced centrifuges at Fordow—demonstrates that coercive measures aimed at disruption may inadvertently incentivize further technological development as a counter-strategy (Kittrie et al., 2024, pp. 8, 13). This suggests that military and covert operations might delay progress but cannot achieve durable non-proliferation outcomes when confronted with a resourceful and ideologically committed adversary.

Iran’s enrichment escalation to 60% since April 2021 and its preservation of latent weaponization capabilities further highlight its defiant response to external attacks (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 27). The regime’s deliberate choice to double down on technological advances serves as both a bargaining tool and a demonstration of its strategic resilience. This behavior suggests that military pressure, rather than deterring Tehran, can exacerbate its risk-taking tendencies in pursuit of strategic leverage. Iran’s actions reflect a broader hypothesis: while external pressure may temporarily constrain capabilities, it may also motivate enhanced programmematic dispersion and innovation. This dynamic complicates efforts to achieve long-term deterrence or de-escalation, highlighting the need for integrated approaches that address the structural drivers of Iran’s nuclear advancements.

The regional political environment further constrains the effectiveness of U.S. and Israeli military deterrence. For example, during the Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel in April 2024, key Arab states declined to allow the use of their territories or airspace for U.S. and Israeli operations (Mróz et al., 2024, pp. 6-7). This refusal underscores the challenges of maintaining collective security measures in a region marked by divergent threat perceptions and complex intra-regional dynamics. The lack of unified support from regional actors not only undermines the operational readiness of military deterrence strategies but also weakens the credibility of extended deterrence frameworks needed to counter Iran’s nuclear ambitions. These limitations reveal the significant barriers to fostering a cohesive security architecture, further emphasizing the need for alternative measures to complement military pressure.

Iran’s calibrated approach to escalation and de-escalation through its proxies demonstrates the complexities of multi-layered deterrence. While direct high-cost responses, such as targeted killings or infrastructure strikes, have led to tactical restraint by Tehran, these measures have not closed off future avenues for conflict or technological advancement (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 8). This cyclical behavior, characterized by short-term restraint followed by renewed antagonism, undermines efforts to achieve strategic stability or long-term de-escalation. The pattern also highlights the importance of clearly communicated red lines accompanied by credible capabilities for targeted reprisals. Nevertheless, the persistence of Iranian proxies’ hostile activities suggests that military measures alone cannot decisively alter adversarial calculations or resolve the underlying drivers of instability.

Despite ongoing demonstrations of deterrence intent, Iran’s nuclear programme continues to progress, underscoring the primacy of existential security considerations in its strategic calculus. Tehran’s ability to produce weapons-grade uranium within months reflects its determination to achieve strategic autonomy, even in the face of military threats (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 13; Peters & Robinson, 2024, p. 1). This persistence reinforces the argument that military deterrence, while effective in delaying specific steps, cannot prevent a well-prepared state from reaching nuclear latency or breakout capability. Iran’s resilience in the face of military strikes and sabotage further signals that its nuclear ambitions are deeply embedded in its broader national security strategy, necessitating a multi-faceted approach to counterproliferation.

Evidence supports the conclusion that military deterrence, in isolation, is insufficient to achieve sustainable non-proliferation or to reverse technical advancements that Iran has already achieved. Intelligence assessments warn that Iran’s adaptive capabilities and rapid technological advancements reduce the effectiveness of purely military solutions to counter its nuclear ambitions (Kittrie et al., 2024, p. 13). This conclusion suggests the need for integrated policy approaches that combine military, diplomatic, and economic tools to address both proximate and structural incentives for proliferation. Without such a holistic strategy, the reliance on kinetic responses alone risks perpetuating a cycle of confrontation and technological escalation, ultimately undermining long-term regional and global stability.

6.2.3 Covert Operations

Covert operations have played a significant role in international efforts to impede Iran's nuclear programme. A prominent example of such operations is the Stuxnet cyberattack, a highly sophisticated joint effort by the United States and Israel that targeted Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in 2010. This cyber weapon was specifically designed to disrupt IR-1 centrifuge operations at the Natanz enrichment facility, reportedly destroying approximately 1,000 centrifuges and delaying the Iranian enrichment timeline by 18 to 24 months (Mróz et al., 2024, p. 5). While this operation exemplifies the potential of cyber tools to achieve tactical success, its temporary impact underscores the limitations of such interventions in achieving long-term non-proliferation objectives. Iran's subsequent investments in cyber defences, operational redundancies, and alternative enrichment technologies demonstrate its capacity to adapt and reinforce its nuclear infrastructure in response to external interference.

The effectiveness of Stuxnet lies in its precision and ability to exploit technical vulnerabilities within Iran’s nuclear programme. However, the Iranian response to this attack highlighted the challenges of achieving enduring results through covert cyber operations. Following the disruption caused by Stuxnet, Iran diversified its control systems, enhanced cybersecurity measures, and implemented emergency repair protocols to safeguard its nuclear activities against future intrusions (Mróz et al., 2024, p. 5). This adaptive behavior illustrates the inherent resilience of Iran’s nuclear programme, raising questions about the sustainability of cyber sabotage as a means of counterproliferation. Rather than halting Iran’s progress, the attack catalyzed a process of technical innovation and institutional learning, reinforcing the programme's robustness against similar threats.

Iran’s response to the Stuxnet operation also underscores its commitment to advancing its nuclear capabilities despite external disruption. The rapid recovery of centrifuge operations, expansion of enrichment facilities, and increased dispersion of sensitive activities reflect a deliberate strategy to mitigate vulnerabilities and sustain progress in the face of sustained opposition (Mróz et al., 2024, p. 5). This resilience demonstrates that covert operations, while temporarily effective, may inadvertently drive targeted states to enhance their defensive capabilities, thereby reducing the efficacy of future interventions. The progression of Iran’s nuclear programme post-Stuxnet suggests that such operations, though tactically impactful, cannot decisively alter the strategic trajectory of a state determined to achieve its objectives.

The evolution of Israel’s counterproliferation strategies further illustrates the shift toward leveraging advanced technologies in covert operations. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), artificial intelligence (AI), and cyber capabilities has become increasingly prominent, as demonstrated by the June 2021 drone attack on the Karaj centrifuge manufacturing plant and the 2024 strike on the Taleghan 2 facility in the Parchin military complex (Horschig, 2024, pp. 2, 4, 7). These operations reflect a transition from traditional sabotage methods to technology-driven approaches that capitalize on precision, deniability, and reduced personnel risk. The Karaj attack caused significant material damage and workflow disruption, showcasing the effectiveness of remote engagement in targeting heavily guarded installations (Horschig, 2024, p. 7). Meanwhile, the Taleghan 2 operation, which involved AI-assisted surveillance and operational planning, highlighted the potential of emerging technologies to enhance intelligence gathering and mission execution.

Iran’s response to Israeli technological advancements reveals the escalating nature of the counterproliferation landscape. Substantial investments in indigenous drone development, cyber capabilities, and physical security upgrades indicate Iran’s determination to mitigate vulnerabilities and counter its adversaries’ technological edge (Horschig, 2024, p. 2). This dynamic has fostered a form of technological arms race, with both sides continuously innovating to outmaneuver the other. The mutual adoption of advanced technologies raises the stakes of covert conflict, increasing the risks of escalation and complicating efforts to establish effective countermeasures. The interplay between offensive and defensive adaptations underscores the challenges of managing the long-term consequences of technologically sophisticated covert interventions.

Intelligence plays a critical role in shaping the strategic and operational dimensions of covert actions against Iran’s nuclear programme. The 2018 seizure of Iran’s “Atomic Archive” by Israeli operatives provided unprecedented insight into the country’s weaponization projects, including details on the AMAD Plan and Project 110 (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1). This intelligence revealed the existence of facilities such as Sanjarian, which was involved in high-explosive testing and the manufacture of “shock wave generators.” Such findings enabled the precise targeting of critical nodes within Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, demonstrating the intersection of intelligence gathering and operational planning in counterproliferation efforts. The destruction of equipment and disruption of sensitive activities at facilities like Sanjarian reflect the tangible impact of intelligence-led sabotage on Iran’s nuclear capabilities (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1).

The role of intelligence in counterproliferation extends beyond immediate operational gains. The detailed records uncovered in the Nuclear Archive illustrated the organizational structure, technical progress, and strategic priorities of Iran’s nuclear programme. This level of documentation not only facilitated targeted interventions but also revealed the vulnerabilities inherent in Iran’s reliance on bureaucratic recordkeeping (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 1). However, the continued continuity of sensitive experiments and the rapid resumption of activities following disruptions indicate that intelligence-based covert actions, while valuable, have not fundamentally altered Iran’s strategic ambitions or technical capacity for nuclear advancement.

Covert measures, including targeted killings of nuclear scientists, have also been employed to disrupt Iran’s progress. However, Iran’s ability to maintain or expand its pool of qualified personnel has exposed the limitations of such strategies. Institutional resilience, coupled with efforts to preserve and transfer knowledge, has enabled the continuity of high-explosive experiments and other weaponization-related activities despite significant setbacks (Horschig, 2024, p. 11). These developments highlight the challenges of relying on decapitation tactics to achieve sustainable non-proliferation outcomes, particularly when the targeted programme benefits from robust recruitment mechanisms and state support.

The persistence of Iran’s nuclear programme following repeated covert interventions underscores a broader dynamic in counterproliferation efforts. Each major operation—whether involving cyberattacks, drone strikes, or sabotage—has been met with a pattern of Iranian adaptation and resilience. This cycle of disruption and recovery demonstrates that covert measures, while tactically impactful, often fail to erode the underlying capabilities or resolve of the targeted state (Albright & Heinonen, 2019, p. 12; Horschig, 2024, p. 11; Mróz et al., 2024, p. 5). Moreover, such interventions may inadvertently incentivize greater secrecy, operational dispersion, and technological innovation, further complicating efforts to achieve long-term non-proliferation.

The reciprocal nature of covert action and Iranian adaptation has significant implications for regional security and international stability. For example, Iran’s strategic framing of sabotage as acts of aggression has been used to justify accelerated enrichment activities and investments in resilience measures (Horschig, 2024, p. 2). Additionally, Iran’s development of offensive cyber and drone capabilities in response to external attacks highlights the potential for escalation as both sides adopt increasingly sophisticated tools and strategies (Mróz et al., 2024, p. 7). This tit-for-tat dynamic elevates the risk of unintended consequences and underscores the need for a multidimensional approach to counterproliferation that integrates diplomatic, economic, and technological measures.

The reliance on covert and military operations to thwart Iran’s nuclear advancements has proven to be a double-edged sword. While such measures have achieved tactical successes in delaying progress and inflicting material damage, they have also catalyzed a cycle of innovation, secrecy, and reciprocal countermeasures that undermines their long-term efficacy. The persistent resilience of Iran’s nuclear programme highlights the limitations of purely clandestine approaches and underscores the importance of addressing the structural drivers of proliferation through a coordinated and multifaceted strategy.

7. Operation Rising Lion

From April to early June 2025, the United States and Iran engaged in renewed indirect nuclear negotiations amid growing concerns over Tehran’s rapidly advancing enrichment programme. These efforts, aimed at restoring controls on Iran’s nuclear capabilities and avoiding regional escalation, ultimately failed—culminating in Israel’s launch of Operation Rising Lion on 13–14 June 2025. The diplomatic initiative began with a U.S. outreach led by Special Envoy Steve Witkoff. On 12 April, the first indirect talks were held in Muscat, Oman, with Omani mediation. Iran proposed a phased framework: a temporary reduction of enrichment to 3.67%, enhanced IAEA inspections, and eventual export of uranium stockpiles, in exchange for sanctions relief and unfreezing of assets (International Crisis Group, 2025). While initially promising, the negotiations quickly stalled over Iran’s insistence on retaining domestic enrichment rights and the U.S. demand for dismantling facilities at Natanz and Fordow. By mid-May, a fourth high-level round failed to bridge the gap. Iran floated a multilateral enrichment model involving third-party oversight, which the U.S. rejected. Instead, Washington imposed further sanctions targeting Iran’s missile research and nuclear-linked entities (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2025). Domestic political pressure compounded the difficulty, as over 200 members of Congress warned the White House against accepting any deal that permitted enrichment on Iranian soil (Congressional Record, 2025)The atmosphere soured further in early June. Supreme Leader Khamenei declared enrichment a non-negotiable right, asserting that Iran would not bow to external dictates (Mehr News Agency, 2025). Simultaneously, Israeli intelligence reportedly warned U.S. counterparts that Iran had amassed enough uranium for multiple nuclear devices, approaching “breakout capability” (Institute for Science and International Security, 2025). The U.S. began withdrawing non-essential personnel from its missions in Iraq, Bahrain, and Kuwait (AP News, 2025), underscoring fears of imminent escalation. Although a sixth round of talks was scheduled for 12 June, momentum had evaporated. The following day, Israel executed Operation Rising Lion, striking over 100 targets, including the Natanz and Fordow nuclear sites and killing several Iranian scientists and IRGC figures (New York Times, 2025). While the U.S. denied involvement, it confirmed prior awareness of the Israeli plan (Wall Street Journal, 2025). Iran immediately suspended negotiations, declaring diplomacy dead.

On 13–14 June 2025, Israel launched an unprecedented multi-domain strike on Iran, codenamed Operation Rising Lion. The military operation targeted key Iranian nuclear sites, senior military leaders, and scientific personnel involved in Tehran’s nuclear weapons development programme. It marked the most direct and extensive Israeli attack on Iranian territory to date. The strikes followed months of deteriorating diplomacy between Tehran and Washington, during which hopes for reviving nuclear negotiations disintegrated. With Iran approaching breakout capability, Israeli officials described the mission as a necessary preemptive act to delay or destroy what they deemed an existential threat.

7.2 Planning and Rational

Israel's rationale for striking Iran's nuclear facilities has deep roots in the country's strategic culture and security doctrine. Known as the "Begin Doctrine" after Prime Minister Menachem Begin, this approach mandates that Israel prevent any hostile Middle Eastern power from acquiring nuclear weapons. This doctrine was first operationalised in the 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor and again in 2007 with the destruction of Syria's al-Kibar nuclear facility (Kroenig, 2012). By mid-2025, Israeli intelligence assessed that Iran had accumulated over 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% purity, placing it within weeks of acquiring sufficient fissile material for several nuclear devices (Institute for Science and International Security, 2025). Despite indirect U.S.-Iran talks hosted by Oman in April and May, Iran refused to halt enrichment or dismantle key facilities, while Supreme Leader Khamenei reiterated that enrichment was a sovereign right (Mehr News Agency, 2025).

The final trigger was reportedly the detection of new underground construction at Natanz, potentially intended to house advanced centrifuge cascades in a hardened structure. Concurrently, Iranian missile deployments to western bases raised alarms in Jerusalem. Mossad operatives on the ground inside Iran also confirmed that several of Iran’s top nuclear scientists had been reassigned to a new military project (Wall Street Journal, 2025). With diplomacy stalled, Israel viewed preemption as its only option.

7.3 Military Strikes

Operation Rising Lion commenced in the early hours of 13 June 2025. Over 200 aircraft, including F-35Is and F-15I Ra’am fighters, conducted coordinated strikes on more than 100 targets across Iran. The operation began with electronic warfare units jamming Iranian radar and communications systems. Simultaneously, cyberattacks reportedly disrupted control nodes linked to Iran's air defence network. In the first wave, Israeli jets struck Natanz's above-ground halls, Isfahan's Uranium Conversion Facility, and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant. Drones targeted Parchin's high-explosives testing complex and missile storage depots near Hamadan. Subsequent waves hit IRGC command centers in Tehran and Bandar Abbas, while long-range precision missiles struck sites near Arak and Tabriz. The Israeli Navy contributed with submarine-launched cruise missiles in the Gulf of Oman (Al Jazeera, 2025).

Covert sabotage teams, reportedly infiltrated weeks earlier, supported the aerial strikes by disabling backup generators and emergency power systems at key facilities, amplifying the damage inflicted (The Australian, 2025).

7.4 Decapitation: Leaders and Scientists Targeted

Among the most significant aspects of the operation was the targeted killing of several senior Iranian military and scientific leaders. Notable among them were:

Major General Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces

Major General Hossein Salami, Commander of the IRGC

General Gholam Ali Rashid, senior strategist with oversight of asymmetric warfare planning

Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the IRGC Aerospace Force

Ali Shamkhani, former Supreme National Security Council secretary and close adviser to Khamenei

In addition, six top nuclear scientists were reportedly killed, including Dr. Fereydoon Abbasi and Dr. Mohammad Tehranchi, both associated with Iran’s weaponisation programme and formerly under international sanctions (Time, 2025).

These assassinations aimed to disrupt Iran’s institutional knowledge and delay nuclear R&D. Analysts argue that the simultaneous elimination of command-and-control figures and elite scientists represents one of the most coordinated decapitation efforts since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq (Atlantic Council, 2025).

7.5 Damage Assessment of Facilities

Initial satellite imagery confirmed severe damage to the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, with multiple above-ground centrifuge halls reduced to rubble. However, Iran's underground facilities—particularly those hardened into mountain ranges—suffered only partial damage due to the depth of burial and air defence shielding (Institute for Science and International Security, 2025). The Fordow site experienced structural collapse in several surface access points, but core centrifuge arrays remained functional. At Isfahan, significant destruction occurred at the Uranium Conversion Facility, impacting the conversion of yellowcake to uranium hexafluoride. Arak’s heavy-water reactor site was hit, but core containment appeared intact. Israeli intelligence reportedly underestimated the dispersal and duplication of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, particularly the hardened tunnels near Natanz and new underground sites near Qom (New York Times, 2025). Nonetheless, missile and drone strikes successfully degraded storage facilities, power relays, and ancillary equipment critical to restarting full-scale enrichment.

7.6 Iranian Response

Iran retaliated within 48 hours, launching over 100 Shahed-136 drones and medium-range ballistic missiles at Israeli airbases, economic sites, and civilian targets. While the Iron Dome and David’s Sling systems intercepted most projectiles, at least three Israeli civilians were killed, and several others wounded (AP News, 2025). The IRGC claimed responsibility for attacks on Ramon and Negev airbases. Simultaneously, Hezbollah fired rockets from southern Lebanon, and Houthi militants in Yemen targeted Eilat with long-range missiles. Iran-backed militias also threatened U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria, prompting U.S. CENTCOM to raise alert levels. Despite the ferocity of Iran’s response, it lacked the precision or scale to match the initial Israeli offensive. Iranian officials vowed continued resistance and declared that nuclear activities would be resumed with even greater urgency (Mehr News Agency, 2025).

7.7 Strategic Analysis: Impact on the Nuclear Programme

Operation Rising Lion dealt a significant tactical blow to Iran's nuclear infrastructure and leadership cadre. However, most experts agree it did not destroy the programme outright. Iran’s advanced underground facilities, knowledge base, and indigenous production capacity remain intact. According to nuclear analysts, Iran could rebuild its damaged centrifuge arrays within 6–12 months and resume enrichment at near pre-strike levels (Fitzpatrick, 2025). Moreover, the strikes may have incentivised Iran to accelerate weaponisation work covertly, now believing that overt cooperation yields vulnerability. The IAEA, barred from immediate inspections, expressed concerns that the strikes would complicate verification efforts and provoke further opacity (IAEA, 2025). The operation may have delayed Iran’s breakout capability but also reduced international leverage for future diplomacy.

7.8 Regional Impacts and Future Risks

Regionally, the strikes further polarised the Middle East. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia issued muted responses, with unofficial sources suggesting quiet approval of Israeli actions. Turkey and Qatar condemned the strikes, while Egypt and Jordan urged de-escalation. Militia attacks on U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq surged, and oil prices spiked amid fears of war in the Strait of Hormuz. Hezbollah's mobilisation and the presence of IRGC Quds Force operatives in Syria increased the risk of multi-front escalation. Diplomatically, Operation Rising Lion marked the death knell for U.S.–Iran nuclear diplomacy in the near term. President Trump defended Israel’s actions while reiterating that Washington was not involved. The EU and Russia condemned the strikes as violations of international law. The operation also cast doubt on the viability of the non-proliferation regime. Some analysts warned that countries such as Saudi Arabia or Egypt may now pursue nuclear hedging strategies in response to perceived Iranian vulnerability and Israeli assertiveness (Kahl, 2025). Operation Rising Lion represents the most audacious Israeli military action since the 1981 Osirak strike. It succeeded in killing key Iranian figures, damaging parts of the nuclear infrastructure, and demonstrating Israeli military reach. However, it failed to eliminate Iran’s nuclear potential and may have hastened Tehran’s determination to acquire a deterrent. Strategically, the operation has introduced new instability into an already volatile region, undermined diplomatic efforts, and raised the spectre of prolonged asymmetric conflict. Unless followed by a robust international diplomatic initiative, the strikes may prove to be a tactical success but a strategic gamble with lasting consequences. The fundamental reality remains that the knowledge to develop military nuclear capabilities in Iraq exists and will remain. Given the high protection of some nuclear sites, it is unclear how much Israel can actually destroy if the operation continues for some time. It also remains uncertain whether the United States or other actors will be drawn into the conflict. For now it remains unlikely that the Iranian regime will fall, but even if that were to occur, it is not clear that what will come after that will be any less hostile to Israel.

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